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ABSTRACT 
The increasing accessibility of personal genetic information creates new challenges for the 
English Legal System.  One of these challenges is the familial nature of genetic 
information, as screening one individual reveals information about their family unit as a 
whole.  There are potential benefits to disclosing this information, the most important of 
which is facilitating access to preventative therapies and early treatment.  This thesis 
considers whether clinicians should be subject to a duty to disclose genetic information to 
those members of a patient’s family who are at the highest risk of sharing genetically 
transmissible conditions.  It is suggested that such a duty could be created through the Tort 
of Negligence and that such a duty would be consistent with the underlying aims of the 
tort.  This thesis considers the constituent parts of a claim in Negligence – duty, breach and 
causation – and suggests how these components might be interpreted to, firstly, create a 
duty to disclose and then, secondly, to give meaningful content to any such a duty.  The 
thesis considers both domestic case law and jurisprudence from America, where a duty to 
disclose has been created by the courts, and considers whether a similar approach is 
permissible in English Law.  It also examines the current paradigm of confidentiality and 
data protection and explains why the present legal framework is inadequate and does not 
provide sufficient legal protection for the relatives of patients harmed as a consequence of 
nondisclosure.  It is the aim of this thesis to advance the debate on the legal implications of 
the familial aspect of genetic diagnosis and the role of the common law in tackling this 
challenge.  It is also the first work to provide an in depth analysis of a potential duty to 
disclose genetic risks to the families of patients. 
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‘We used to think our fate was in our stars.  Now we know, in large measure, our fate is in 
our genes.’ 
– James Dewey Watson, former director, National Centre for Human 
Genome. 
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OVERVIEW 
 
The increasing accessibility of genetic information poses new challenges for the English 
Legal System.  This is because genetic information is simultaneously personal and 
familial: when an individual undergoes genetic screening, the results reveal information 
about both the patient’s genetic heritage and that of their family.  This duality represents a 
significant challenge to current legal paradigms.  Medico-personal data has traditionally 
been treated as confidential because it holds relevance only for the patient, however, 
genetic information can potentially provide clinicians with insight into the long-term health 
of whole families. An inherited disease might therefore be identified early and treated 
preemptively to prevent the condition eventuating or, in the alternative, to reduce the 
overall risk that the disease will occur.  For example, if a member of a family is identified 
as being at risk of breast cancer, relatives who may share that risk could be forewarned, 
creating an opportunity for them to obtain screening and, if necessary, chemoprevention or 
a mastectomy. 
There is no doubt that disclosing genetic risks within a family unit represents an 
opportunity to improve and protect long-term health when a treatment is available for the 
identified condition.  An important question is how should the law respond to this familial 
aspect of genetic information.  Should the courts adhere to a paradigm of patient 
confidentiality or should they recognise that disclosure is necessary in particular 
circumstances to avoid or minimise harm?  This thesis proposes that the courts should 
adopt the latter approach and argues disclosure could be achieved through recognition of a 
tortious duty to disclose genetic risks to the patient’s immediate family.  It is argued here 
that when treatments are available for a disease, nondisclosure harms those family 
members who ‘share’ the patient’s deleterious genetic trait. 
In absence of statutory regulation, the law of tort will be the route for those wishing 
to bring a claim concerning the nondisclosure of genetic risks.  The tort of negligence is an 
appropriate vehicle for this task.  Its traditional role is to recognise and remedy harms 
inflicted upon individuals and indicate the appropriate standards of behaviour across a 
broad range of circumstances.  These circumstances include medical practice and 
disclosure, thus a duty concerning genetic risks would not represent a wholesale expansion 
of the scope of negligence, although it may be portrayed as a radical amendment to the 
existing law. 
This thesis is a doctrinal study.  It will focus on how liability for the nondisclosure 
of genetic risks may be recognised through adaptation of the tort of negligence.  The thesis 
comprises seven chapters.   
 9 
Chapter one provides an overview of the science fundamental to the argument: it 
discusses the familial nature of genetics, patterns of inheritance and the potential benefits 
of disclosure. Chapter two examines the issues arising in respect of data protection and 
confidentiality.  It explores different approaches to genetic information and doctor-patient 
confidentiality, the current legal framework and when disclosures are presently considered 
justifiable.  It argues a confidentiality and data protection paradigm may permit disclosure 
of genetic information by reference to a public interest and considers which public interests 
might favour disclosure in this context. The chapter concludes by outlining why – if 
disclosure is possible within the current legal paradigm – a tortious duty should be 
preferred to a confidentiality model. 
Chapter three examines the fundamentals of the duty of care.  It also considers the 
attitude of the courts to non-physical harm, citing claims for psychiatric injury as a 
potential indication of the response of the courts to claims arising from the nondisclosure 
of genetic risks.  The chapter then focuses on the scope of the duty to disclose to patients, 
which is a crucial element in defining the scope of a duty to relatives, because such must 
compliment the existing legal obligation.  The duty to disclose to relatives cannot be 
articulated in broader terms than the clinician’s duty to their patients.  Finally, the chapter 
examines judicial responses to disclosure to third parties both domestically and in the 
United States and what these decisions may mean for a duty to disclose. 
How claimants may go about establishing a duty to disclose is then considered in 
chapter four and five.  Chapter four focuses on the concept of harm and explores possible 
definitions attributable to harm in the context of genetic nondisclosure.  It posits that, 
despite current thinking, genetic conditions may constitute harm in negligence.  Chapter 
five explores the issue of proximity, or neighbourhood, and how this requirement may be 
satisfied through demonstrating that the claimant is an identifiable victim.  It also considers 
whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty and examines potential policy issues 
that may militate for or against creating a duty to disclose genetic risks. 
The question of breach is the focus of chapter six, which begins by examining the 
current approach to breach in medical negligence claims and the problems presented by a 
test predicated on common practice.  The chapter then considers whether breach should be 
approached in a way similar to that developing in cases on patient disclosure and if this 
approach would be fairer to claimants.  Chapter seven considers the difficulties of 
causation.  It examines the different approaches employed by the courts over time – the 
‘but for test’, loss of a chance and material contribution to risk – and whether or not each 
approach is appropriate method of establishing a causal link in claims arising involving 
nondisclosure. 
 10 
It is argued here that disclosure to family members is appropriate in particular 
circumstances and that harm sustained as a consequence of a nondisclosure should be 
recognised by the courts. Through a considered examination of the existing law, it is the 
aim of this thesis to demonstrate that the tort of negligence is an appropriate and practical 
means for dealing with the familial and legal implications of the (non)disclosure of genetic 
information and risk. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
From Anonymity to Prominence 
If the 20
th
 Century was the atomic age – with scientific advancement during this period 
indelibly linked with nuclear physics – then the 21st Century may be the age of genomics.  
In first decade of the new millennium, genetic science has staked an impressive claim to 
the mantle of the pioneering science of this chapter of human history.  In 2003, after 
fourteen years of international collaboration and billions of dollars of investment, the 
Human Genome Project (HGP) successfully completed mapping the entire human genome.  
The conclusion of the HGP represented a watershed moment in genetics, scientific and 
medical development hurtling along at breakneck pace in the subsequent years.  The rapid 
nature of progress is characterised by the European Commission’s provision of commercial 
approval for gene therapy for lipoprotein lipase deficiency in 2012, adopting a 
recommendation of the European Medical Agency.
 1
  This represented the first marketing 
authorisation for gene therapy within the EU and came only nine short years after the 
conclusion of the HGP, emphasising the speed of progress in medical genetics. 
 The high profile and widespread coverage of developments in modern genetics is a 
far cry from the quiet, humble beginnings of mankind’s interest in his genes – a seminal 
study of the inherited traits of pea plants by Czech monk Gregor Mendal in 1866.
 2
  
Overshadowed by the apocalyptic fury of the atomic bomb, throughout the 20
th
 Century 
breakthroughs in genetic science were made quietly and rarely garnered significant public 
attention.  The anonymity of genetics during this period is characterised by the discovery 
of the double helix structure of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) by James Watson, Francis 
Crick and Maurice Wilkins in 1953.  Later described as ‘one of the most significant 
                                                        
1
 BBC News ‘Gene Therapy nears approval in Europe’ 20 July 2012; BBC News ‘Gene therapy: 
Glybera approved by European Commission’ 2 November 2012; European Medicines Agency 
‘European Medicines Agency recommends first gene therapy for approval’, 20 July 2012, available 
at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2012/07/news_detail
_001574.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1 (accessed 15 July 2014). 
 
2
 Mendal observed that particular phenotypes – observable characteristics – occurred predictably 
through several generations of garden pea plants.  His hybridisation experiments revealed the 
pattern of inheritance of several characteristics that manifested in two contrasting phenotypes (e.g. 
height, which manifested as tall and dwarf).  Mendal’s research forms the basis of transmission 
genetics, sometimes called ‘Mendelian Inheritance’, which is used to explain the inheritance of 
autosomal dominant and autosomal recessive traits. 
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scientific discoveries of the 20
th
 Century’, it led to the award of a Nobel Prize in 1962, 3 
but scarcely made the headlines at the time.
 4
 
 The beginning of the HGP – which was endorsed by the US National Research 
Council in 1988 and set up as an internationally coordinated study in 1990 – increased 
media coverage and public awareness of genetic science.  It also coincided with a surge of 
interest in various genetic sciences in popular culture.
 5
  When it was announced in 2000 
that the mapping of the entire double helical chain of DNA (stylised as ‘the master 
blueprint of us all’6) was 85 per cent complete, the milestone garnered significant attention.  
Notably, it commanded political attention, with then US President Bill Clinton and UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair holding a joint news conference via a transatlantic satellite link.  
Mr Blair heralded the sequencing of the human genome as ‘[a] revolution in medical 
sciences whose implications far surpass even the discovery of antibiotics’ and ‘the first 
technological triumph of the 21
st
 Century’. 7  Mr Clinton highlighted the importance and 
potential of genetic science, stating ‘[i]t’s possible that our children’s children will know 
cancer only as a constellation of stars.’ 8 
 
Genes, Genetic Information and Genetic Testing 
The success of the HGP in 2003 concluded genetics rise from anonymity to prominence, 
ensuring that subsequent developments have become a regular fixture of mainstream news.  
A prominent area of scientific and medical advancement since the HGP has been genetic 
testing.  Increasingly inexpensive methods of sequencing the human genome are being 
continually sought,
 the consequence being that ‘personal’ genetic information is becoming 
increasingly accessible and this could fundamentally change the manner in which 
                                                        
3
 For more information, see NobelPrize.org ‘The Discovery of the Molecular Structure of DNA – 
The Double Helix, a scientific breakthrough’ available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/medicine/dna_double_helix/readmore.html (accessed 26 
July 2012). 
 
4
 BBC News ‘Era of personalised medicine awaits’ 8 April 2009. 
 
5
 Some notable examples of the use of genetic science as plot devices include Jurassic Park (1993) 
– cloning; Gattaca (1997) – eugenics; James Cameron’s Dark Angel (2000-2002) – transgenics and 
genetic engineering; and Sam Rami’s film reboot of the Spiderman franchise (2002-2007) – genetic 
engineering. 
 
6
 US Department of Energy and National Institute of Health, The Human Genome Project 1991-
1992 Programme Report (Office of Energy Research and Office of Environmental Research: 
Washington DC, 1992). 
 
7
 BBC News ‘Leaders’ genetic code warning’ 26 June 2000. 
 
8
 Ibid. 
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healthcare is delivered.
9
  To provide a sense of the tumbling figures, the estimated cost of 
the HGP is between $2 billion and $3 billion; the cost of sequencing James Watson’s 
genome in 2007 was $1 million;
10
 routine sequencing of cancer genomes has been 
estimated as costing $30,000; and, in 2009, a company stated it would be capable of 
sequencing entire genomes for $5,000.
11
  The search for sequencing at a reduced cost may 
foreseeably allow medical practitioners to provide ‘personalised medicine’ through an 
understanding of individual patient’s genomes.  For example, drug treatments may be 
adapted to the specific individual as a result of pharmacogenomics – the study of the 
influence of genetics in responses to drugs.  Taking account of the make up of the patient’s 
genome, a treating physician could prescribe the most effective medication for that 
particular individual, ‘personalising’ the medical intervention. 
Genetic testing is entering mainstream healthcare and the introduction of genomic 
medicine into the framework of the National Health Service (NHS) has had notable 
proponents.  The government’s advisor on genetics, Professor Sir John Bell, recommended 
in 2012 that the NHS back the genetic revolution,
 12
 and the House of Lords has previously 
called for greater integration of genetic medicine into mainstream healthcare.
 13
  Healthcare 
providers are also demonstrating a willingness to embrace the potential benefits of genetic 
technologies.  In April 2012, the NHS initiated a pilot scheme extending the scope of 
neonatal genetic testing
14
 and, in 2010, the Royal Brompton Hospital became the first NHS 
institution capable of screening the entire human genome.
 15
 
                                                        
9
 The development of cheaper sequencing techniques has been highly incentivised.  The Archon X-
Prize offered a $10,000,000 prize to the first company that could sequence 100 genomes in ten 
days for $10,000 or less: BBC News ‘$10m prize for super genetic test’ 4 October 2006.  A further 
$10,000,000 prize was announced in 2012 requiring the genomes of 100 centenarians to be 
sequenced in 30 days at a cost no greater than $1000 a genome: BBC News ‘Genetic entrepreneur 
to compete in genomics X prize’ 24 July 2012. 
 
10
 Aldhous, P., ‘Genome sequencing falls to $5000’ New Scientist (6 February 2009) 
 
11
 Ibid. 
  
12
 Human Genomics Strategy Group, Building on Our Inheritance: Genomic Technology in 
Healthcare (Department of Health: London, 2012). 
 
13
 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, Genomic Medicine (HMSO: London, 
2009). 
 
14
 BBC News, ‘Newborn screening to be extended in pilot study’ 8 April 2012.  The pilot was a 
success and subsequently the extended screening programme has been rolled out across the United 
Kingdom. 
 
15
 Royal Brompton & Harefield NHS Foundation Trust, ‘“Next Generation” Gene Sequencer to 
determine the genetic links of heart disease’ 15 November 2010, available at 
http://www.rbht.nhs.uk/media/press-releases/archive/gene-sequencer-to-determine-the-genetic-
links-of-heart-disease/ (accessed 12 June 2012). 
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There can be no doubt that increasing accessibility of genetic information will pose 
significant challenges to established legal paradigms but a threshold question must be: 
what is meant by ‘genetic information’?  Genes are the fundamental unit of hereditary, the 
building blocks of life that code proteins ‘essential to the construction and functioning of 
an organism.’16  Defined broadly, genetic information can incorporate a potentially huge 
range of data: ‘information about what genes are, their number, variety, sequence or 
arrangement in a particular context, their function, the impact of that function (or non-
function) upon the organism itself, and, relatedly, information about how gene expression 
affects phenotype.’17  Taylor suggests that genetic information can be subdivided into two 
basic categories: ‘what is “is”, and what it “means”.’ 18   The first is predominantly 
descriptive, defining the contours of an individual’s (or group’s) genomic architecture; the 
second is more interpretive, outlining the biological significance of a particular genetic 
make up.  In the context of genetic testing and healthcare, it is the latter categorisation 
which is of interest, as it is this type of information that indicates what effect any given 
gene within the genome of the proband – the subject – will have.  Of particular interest to 
this thesis are those genes that negatively impact an individual’s long-term health, either 
because a particular gene indicates a genetic disorder will eventuate at a future point, or 
there is an increased risk of a disorder developing during the proband’s lifespan. 
Genetic information therefore has utility but it may also ‘be used to stigmatise’19 
and individuals could be prohibited from securing employment, seeking medical treatment 
or obtaining insurance premiums.  These concerns have led commentators to question the 
suitability of the United Kingdom’s compartmentalised approach to Discrimination Law 
for tackling potential claims of genetic discrimination.
 20
 
A second legal conundrum will flow from the nature of genes and genetic 
information.  At one and the same time, genes are personal and familial, thus genetic 
information will hold significance to both the proband and his or her blood relatives.  This 
is because fifty per cent of an individual’s genome is inherited from their mother’s ovum 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
16
 Taylor, M., Genetic Data and the Law: A critical perspective on privacy protection (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge: 2012), p. 44. 
 
17
 Ibid, p. 45. 
 
18
 Ibid. 
 
19
 Bill Clinton, above, n 8. 
 
20
 See, for example, Waterstone, M., de Paor, A., ‘Forever in Blue Genes’ (2012) 106(1) GLSI 20; 
Thompson, A., ‘Genetic Discrimination’ (2008) SJ 152(26), 18. 
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and fifty per cent from their father’s sperm, thus persons descending from a common gene 
pool can ‘share’ genetic traits.  As Mendal observed in his pea plants, phenotypes – 
observable characteristics – will manifest vertically through generations, thus a parent and 
child can share height, eye colour, build and genetic risks.  Consequentially, the results of a 
genetic test reveal information about both the proband’s genome and the genetic heritage 
of his family.  With genetic information becoming increasingly accessible, healthcare 
practitioners will foreseeably come into possession of information that is both pertinent to 
the health of their patient and that patent’s family.  If information about a treatable disorder 
is withheld then the patient’s relatives may come to harm because they are unable to avail 
themselves of medical treatment, but if a disclosure is made then the clinician may be in 
breach of doctor-patient confidentiality.  It is essential, then, that the law is equipped to 
adjudicate on potential claims arising from failures to disclose genetic information – 
specifically genetic risks – to those who may share elements of the patient’s genome.  As 
McClean explains, this type of difficulty has not arisen thus far because medical 
information has traditionally been ‘regarded as falling into the sphere of privacy, protected 
by both data protection laws and the professional obligation of confidentiality … because it 
usually only concerns no one but the patient him- or herself.’ 21  However, the established 
paradigm is difficult to sustain insofar as genetic testing is concerned because genetic 
information is shared.  Attempting to bring genetic information within the current legal 
framework on confidentiality is therefore likely to be unsatisfactory.  This is because 
confidentiality cannot recognise any potential harms nondisclosure causes to the proband’s 
blood relatives. 
The complexity of scenarios involving genetic information is illustrated by the 
following example: a woman undergoes genetic testing and her results indicate that she is 
an asymptomatic carrier of the Haemophilia A gene.  Providing that her father is not a 
haemophiliac, it can be presumed that her mother is also an asymptomatic carrier of the 
deleterious trait.
22
  By sequencing the proband’s genome her mother’s genetic make up has 
also been revealed without the need for the mother to undergo testing.  This raises an issue 
                                                        
21
 McClean, S., Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish: London, 2010) p. 155. 
 
22
 Haemophilia is a recessive, sex-linked disorder that almost exclusively affects males.  This is 
because the male XY chromosomal pair lacks the duplicate copy of the deleterious gene present in 
the female XX pairing.  In the XX pairing, the non-faulty gene is dominant and expresses the 
associated phenotype (i.e. normal clotting).  Haemophilia A affects an estimated one in 5,000 
males.  For more information, see www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Haemophilia/Pages/introduction.aspx 
(accessed 26 July 2012). 
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of consent.
23
  In addition, the proband’s relatives – including, potentially, any partner or 
spouse – will be interested in her genetic information because (i) it is indicative of the 
content of their own genomes as they are descendants of a common gene pool, and (ii) 
because it has implications for their reproductive choices.  The question therefore arises: 
should the proband’s genetic information be disclosed? 
This thesis is concerned with scenarios where the proband’s genetic information 
has revealed treatable genetic risks and whether these risks should be disclosed to blood 
relations who may also possess the deleterious trait.  For example, what if the proband’s 
results in the above example indicated a predisposition to cancer?  Disclosure of the 
patient’s genetic information would apprise family members of a risk to their long-term 
health and present an opportunity to seek preemptive therapies.  It is arguably in the 
interests of the many that genetic information is disclosed in such a scenario; in contrast, if 
an untreatable risk is identified there is less of an imperative to disclose because 
knowledge of the risk does not afford affected individuals the opportunity to avoid or 
minimise harm.
24
 
It is axiomatic that the desire of blood relations to know of prospective risks to their 
health may not align with the proband’s interest in medical privacy or the clinician’s 
professional obligation of confidentiality.  However, it is an interest that must not be 
ignored.  The question is how the law should protect the family’s interest in genetic risks 
and avoiding harm that may be minimised or averted entirely. 
The response proposed by this thesis is the creation of a duty to disclose treatable 
genetic risks.  Statutory intervention is presently unlikely thus it is proposed that a duty 
should be articulated through the tort of negligence.  Negligence is accustomed to 
adjudicating on matters of clinical practice and the disclosure of risk, albeit thus far 
litigation has been generally restricted to disclosure within the doctor-patient 
relationship.
25
  However, at first blush tortious intervention may appear unnecessary 
because: (i) arguably responsibility for dissemination of genetic information is a matter for 
                                                        
23
 In that, if the mother is subsequently told of her carrier status, ‘she is receiving information about 
her health as though she herself had been tested without her consent.’  British Medical Association, 
Medical Ethics Today: The BMA handbook of Ethics & Law, 2
nd
 ed. (BMJ Publishing: London, 
2004), p. 315. 
 
24
 The domestic courts appear to have acknowledged that a lack of benefit militates against 
disclosure of genetic information: see Re YZ [2013] EWHC Fam 935. 
 
25
 For example, see Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital & Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871; 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] 1 PIQR 53; Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 
134; Birch v University College London Hospital [2008] EWHC 2237; Nadine Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board [2010] CSOH 104. 
 
 17 
the proband, and (ii) the duty of confidentiality already allows clinicians to disclose in 
breach of doctor-patient confidence when there exists ‘a countervailing public interest 
which favours disclosure’.26  It is therefore possible to breach doctor-patient confidentiality 
when the proband is unwilling or unable to disclose genetic risks to their family.  The 
problem, however, is that confidentiality is concerned with the security of personal 
information and the preservation of professional relationships.  It cannot recognise claims 
by family members who have suffered harm following the nondisclosure of treatable 
genetic risks.  A further issue is that although the proband is encouraged to ‘involve other 
family members in discussions about … testing’27 and, generally, patients are ‘keen to pass 
on information … to relatives’,28 it cannot be presumed that genetic information is shared 
automatically, for ‘geographical, social and emotional factors can mean that 
communication does not happen.’ 29   The duty of confidentiality therefore offers no 
guarantee that clinicians will pick up the baton in these circumstances and make a 
disclosure.  It is also significant that the uptake of genetic testing among blood relations 
doubles when a healthcare practitioner makes a disclosure as opposed to when a patient is 
relied on as a conduit of information about inherited risks.  Disclosure by practitioners 
therefore has a significant positive impact on relatives’ access to preemptive therapies.30 
 
Patterns of Inheritance 
Prior to engaging in substantive analysis, it is necessary to briefly outline some of the 
basics concepts of human genetics, particularly the different patterns of inheritance 
associated with genetic disorders.  Genes, as has already been stated, are the fundamental 
unit of hereditary and code proteins that enable organisms to function.  The majority of 
cells in the human body contain 46 pairs of chromosomes and each pair contains two 
copies of any one gene (with the exception of the X and Y chromosomal pair).  These are 
called diploid cells.  Reproductive cells – gametes – only contain 23 single chromosomes 
and are haploid cells.  At the point of conception, the haploid gametes merge to create a 
                                                        
26
 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
 
27
 BMA, above, n 20, p. 315. 
 
28
 Lucassen, A., and Parker, M., ‘Confidentiality and Sharing Genetic Information with Relatives’ 
The Lancet vol. 375, 1
 
May 2010, p. 1507. 
 
29
 Ibid. 
 
30
 Suthers, G.K., Armstrong, J., McCormack, J., and Trott, D., ‘Letting the family know: balancing 
ethics and effectiveness when notifying relatives about genetic testing for a familial disorder’ 
(2006) J Med Genet 43, 665–670 
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diploid cell called a zygote, which, through a process of cell division, becomes a foetus.  
The chromosomal pairs of the zygote are thus a combination of the 23 single chromosomes 
present in the reproductive cells of the parents.  Each chromosome contains a compete 
sequence of DNA and each pair (with the exception of X and Y) has two copies of each 
gene. 
Depending on the genome of the parents, a gene pairing inherited by a foetus may 
consist of ‘two faulty copies, one faulty and one healthy copy, or two healthy copies’ of a 
gene.
31
  The recipient of ‘two healthy copies of a particular gene will not suffer the 
disorder with which the gene is associated’.32  The recipient of two faulty copies of a gene 
will, however, suffer the associated disorder subject to the degree of penetrance of that 
disorder.
33
  An individual who has both a healthy and faulty copy of a gene may manifest 
the associated disorder depending on that disorder’s pattern of inheritance.  There are three 
common patterns of inheritance for monogenic – single gene – disorders: autosomal 
dominant, autosomal recessive and sex-linked.  Alternately a condition can be polygenic or 
multifactorial – the result of the interaction of several genes and environmental factors. 
Autosomal Dominant: these disorders – for example, Huntington’s disease – require 
the presence of only one copy of a faulty gene.  The faulty gene in the pairing asserts 
‘dominance’ regardless of the presence of a healthy copy.  Whether or not the disorder will 
eventuate is, however, dictated by the degree of penetrance of the condition.  A parent with 
an autosomal dominant disorder has a 50 per cent chance of passing the genetic trait onto 
their progeny or sharing the condition with blood relatives. 
Autosomal Recessive: this type of disorder requires an individual to possess two 
faulty copies of the relevant gene and includes conditions such as cystic fibrosis.  If there is 
a healthy copy of the relevant gene present in a pairing, then that gene asserts ‘dominance’, 
thus for progeny to be affected by autosomal recessive disorders both parents must be 
asymptomatic carriers at the minimum.  Those with a ‘recessive’ condition have a 25 per 
cent chance of sharing the disorder with blood relatives and a 50 per cent chance that those 
relatives will be asymptomatic carriers of the faulty gene.  Knowledge of ‘recessive’ 
disorders is likely to be most significant in respect of reproductive decision-making. 
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Sex-linked Disorders: The sex chromosomes in humans are stylized as XX for 
female and XY for male.  Sex-linked disorders are conditions where the deleterious gene is 
present in the X chromosome but not the Y chromosome.  These disorders – e.g. 
Haemophilia and Duchenne’s Muscular Dystrophy – are typically recessive thus in the 
female XX pairing the healthy gene is ‘dominant’, with women being asymptomatic 
carriers in the majority of cases.  The male XY chromosome pair, however, does not have 
a second copy of the faulty gene and for this reason males are always affected by sex-
linked disorders when a faulty gene is present.  An individual with a sex-linked disorder 
has a 25 per cent chance of sharing the condition with blood relatives and a 50 per cent 
chance that a female relative will be an asymptomatic carrier. 
Multifactorial Disorders: Monogenic disorders are caused by a fault in a single 
gene or pair of genes but multifactorial – or polygenic – disorders are caused by faults on 
several genes, sometimes in combination with external factors such as an individual’s 
lifestyle or environmental pollutants.  Heart disease, cancer and diabetes all have a genetic 
component but – unlike autosomal dominant or autosomal recessive disorders – possession 
of a deleterious genetic trait is not wholly determinative of whether a condition will 
eventuate.  It is, however, indicative of the level of risk.  For this reason genetic 
information concerning multifactorial disorders is not as predictive as information 
concerning monogenic conditions.  Nevertheless there is utility in knowing of heightened 
risks of disease and the opportunity such knowledge affords to obtain screening, diagnosis 
and medical intervention.  Breast cancer is a useful example of the utility of genetic 
information in the treatment of polygenic conditions.  The average risk of breast cancer is 
approximately 12 per cent, however, if a woman has a mutation on either the BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 gene the risk is elevated to between 50 and 80 per cent.  Knowledge of the risk 
presents a woman with a significant opportunity to seek preemptive treatments, with 
options ranging from preventative therapies
34
 to surgical intervention.
35
  Early diagnosis is 
crucial in the treatment of cancers and knowledge of genetic risks could be particularly 
beneficial in the treatment of cancers that are typically diagnosed late, such as pancreatic 
cancer. 
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The Benefits of Disclosure 
Disclosing the genetic information of the proband to their blood relatives has a number of 
potential benefits.  Chief among them is that disclosing genetic information forewarns 
descendants of common gene pools of potentially shared genetic risks.  Dissemination of 
this knowledge provides individuals with opportunity to access genetic testing and medical 
intervention that could lead to harm being avoided or minimised.  For example, a woman 
could undergo a double mastectomy if she discovered she had a high risk of developing 
breast cancer.
36
 
The ‘availability of a cure carries with it the certainty that disclosure can 
incontrovertibly avert harm.’37  The availability of treatment – as opposed to a cure – also 
indicates that disclosure can minimise or avert harm where a risk is potentially shared.  For 
example, individuals at high risk of particular cancers have been found to benefit from 
daily doses of aspirin, the research indicating that reduces the risk of the disease 
eventuating.
38
  Where no treatment is available for a condition, the benefits of disclosing 
genetic risks are less certain, although evidence exists that both supports
39
 and refutes
40
 
‘the benefits of disclosure in facilitating preparedness.’41  Significantly, the courts have 
demonstrated a reluctance to engender the disclosure of genetic information in absence of 
medical benefit.
42
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Gene therapy is another dimension to the argument in favour of disclosing genetic 
information.  Somatic gene therapy involves inserting genetic material into the patient’s 
genome to remedy a defect in their genes.
43
  Deleterious genetic traits may therefore be 
corrected before the associated phenotype manifests.  China was the first country to 
officially sanction gene therapy
44
 and the European Medicines Agency recently 
recommended the European Commission approve gene therapy for lipoprotein lipase 
deficiency, with market authorisation being granted by the Commission in November 
2012.
45
  Promising results have been highlighted in the news,
46
 however, the majority of 
clinical trials – 60.2 per cent – are in phase I, with 18.6 per cent between phases I and II 
and 21 per cent at phases II through IV.
47
  Widespread clinical use is therefore some years 
away, however, developments in gene therapy are ‘beginning to result in real clinical 
promise’.48  As more gene therapies become available it will be possible to treat increasing 
numbers of genetic conditions at a pre-symptomatic stage.  The benefits of disclosing 
genetic information in such circumstances are self-evident. 
The benefits of disclosing genetic information may also extend beyond blood 
relatives.  It is possible that healthcare providers could benefit economically.  
Pharmacogenomics could create the opportunity for a more efficient and medically 
effective distribution of medication and genetic testing could potentially increase access to 
cost saving, preemptive interventions.  Cancer again provides an illustration: the estimated 
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cost of treatment in the UK in 2010 was £9.4 billion.
49
  Suppose that prescribing aspirin to 
those individuals at risk of developing cancer resulted in a 25 per cent decrease of 
incidences of the disease – such a reduction equates financially to a potential saving of 
approximately £2.35 billion.  Although healthcare providers would face an increase in 
expenditure for the preventative drug – in this basic hypothetical, aspirin – this would be 
offset by a reduced demand for chemotherapy, surgery and palliative care.  A preemptive 
approach to disease could also facilitate a new method of resource allocation – for 
example, the availability of new cancer drugs could be increased for individuals who go on 
to develop the disease.   
The hypothetical presented here is not definitive – it does not, for example, account 
for the cost of genetic testing or disclosure, both necessary considerations in any 
assessment of the economic benefits of disclosing genetic information – but it is not meant 
to be, instead it is an indication of the potential benefits disclosure may hold for healthcare 
providers.  The focus of this thesis is on blood relatives and potential tortious claims when 
genetic information is not disclosed, however, it is important to note that healthcare 
providers are significant stakeholders in genetic medicine.  It is therefore suggested that 
the potential economic benefits of disclosure warrant research. 
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2.  Genetic Information and Data Sharing 
 
 
A Challenge to Confidentiality and Data Protection 
Genetic sequencing is becoming increasingly affordable and transitioning from laboratory 
setting to mainstream healthcare.  Indeed, ‘straight-to-consumer’ testing is available for a 
price via the Internet.
1
  Genetic information is therefore becoming increasingly available 
and greater access to this type of knowledge will challenge existing paradigms of 
confidentiality and data protection. 
Medico-personal data has traditionally been ‘regarded as falling into the sphere of 
privacy, protected by both data protection laws and the professional obligation of 
confidentiality … because it usually only concerns no one but the patient him- or herself.’ 2  
However, ‘the familial nature of genetic information’3 challenges the established paradigm 
because genetic information simultaneously reveals information about the patient and their 
blood relations.  Consequentially, a patient’s genetic information has utility for the 
individual and their family: specifically disclosure to blood relatives can facilitate access to 
screening and preemptive medical intervention.  Though an argument can be made that 
genetic information is personal, demanding equivalent protection to other types of medico-
personal data (which are considered ‘obviously private’4 and ‘entitled to be protected by an 
obligation of confidence’ 5 ) the familial aspect of genetic information is difficult to 
adequeately reconcile with an individualistic approach to confidentiality and data 
protection. 
Descendants of a common gene pool ‘share’ genes, thus it is inevitable that 
clinicians engaged with genetic testing will find themselves in possession of information 
relevant to persons who are not their immediate patients.  The significant question is 
whether sufficient justification exists for disclosing genetic information beyond the doctor-
patient relationship. 
It is argued here that a strict adherence to doctor-patient confidentiality and data 
protection will be undesirable in circumstances where disclosure provides a tangible 
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benefit.  By way of example, consider the following: a patient submits for genetic testing 
and it is established that she is genetically predisposed to bowel or breast cancer.  
Following diagnosis, the proband can undertake preventative therapies, which can reduce 
the risk of the disease eventuating.
6
  In these circumstances, it is axiomatic that the 
proband’s blood relations also stand to benefit from knowledge of her greater risk of 
developing cancer, since family members who share the risk are also able to seek 
preventative treatment.  If the proband’s doctor where to strictly adhere to confidentiality 
in these circumstances, blood relations would be denied access to preventative therapies 
and thus would face an increased risk of developing the condition. 
This thesis argues that a duty to disclose genetic information is appropriate in such 
circumstances.  Principles of confidentiality and data protection are not absolute, meaning 
it is possible for healthcare practitioners to disclose genetic information when justifiable.  
The problem is the current legal framework cannot recognise harm to individuals other 
than the data subject or confider.  Thus if the proband’s blood relations suffered harm 
because genetic information was not disclosed, no means of redress is currently available.  
That is not to say that confidentiality and data protection are dispensed with – quite the 
contrary.  If a duty to disclose is to be sustainable then disclosure of genetic information 
must constitute an acceptable departure from the prevailing legal framework.  The public 
interest has an important role to play in this regard as confidential information can be 
disclosed providing the disclosure is in the public interest.
7
  Thus for a duty to disclose to 
constitute a legitimate infringement of confidentiality and data protection, it must be in the 
public interest to disclose genetic information to blood relatives. An important precursor to 
establishing a duty to disclose is therefore to establish what public interest favours 
disclosure of genetic information. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an answer to the question ‘what public 
interest might favour the disclosure of genetic information’.  It will also outline why a duty 
to disclose is necessary should disclosure be in the public interest.  To this end, the chapter 
is divided into four parts.  Part one provides background on the different arguments that 
have been put forward regarding the confidentiality of genetic information.  Part two sets 
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out the specific context, exploring the key components of the legal and professional 
framework that governs medical information.  Part three attempts to define a public 
interest that supports disclosure of genetic information.  Finally, part four outlines why a 
duty to disclose is necessary even if a public interest justification exists within the current 
legal paradigm. 
 
Part I: Setting the Context (i) – Genetic Information and Confidentiality 
Confidentiality has long been ‘one of the cornerstones’8 of the doctor-patient relationship 
as ‘few would go to those who were unable or unwilling to keep a patient’s intimate details 
to themselves.’9  In Hunter v Mann, the court summarised a clinician’s legal obligation as: 
 
‘the doctor is under a duty not to disclose, without the consent of the patient, 
information which he, the doctor, has gained in his professional capacity.’10 
 
Confidentiality is not, however, a strictly legal sphere.  The common law duty owes much 
to its counterpart ethical obligation, the origins of which can be traced back to the 
Hippocratic Oath, which required healthcare practitioners to keep secret ‘[a]ll that may 
come to my knowledge in the exercise of [their] profession … which ought not to be 
spread abroad’.  The modern ethical basis of the obligation is the Declaration of Geneva, 
which similarly requires practitioners to ‘respect the secrets confided in [them], even after 
the patient has died’.  The legal obligation is based upon a public interest in maintaining 
confidences and it has been said that without respect for confidentiality ‘doctors will be 
discredited … for future patients will not come forward if doctors are going to squeal on 
them’.11  However, confidentiality is not an absolute concept and a breach of the obligation 
is justifiable when there exists a ‘countervailing public interest which favours 
disclosure’.12   
The scope of the confidentiality – and, indeed, data protection – is an important 
consideration, since it is inevitable that a duty to blood relations will conflict with a 
                                                        
8
 Laurie, G.T., ‘Obligations arising from Genetic Information – Negligence and the protection of 
Familial Interests’ [1999] CFLQ 109. 
 
9
 Pattinson, S., Medical Law and Ethics, 3
rd
 ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2011), p. 201. 
 
10
 [1974] 2 All ER 414 per Boreham J at 417. 
 
11
 X v Y & Others [1988] RPC 379 per Rose J at 386.  See also R (on the application of Axon) v 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] QB 539 per Silber J at 563. 
 
12
 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, HL, per Lord Goff at 392. 
 
 26 
doctor’s obligations to their patients.  Tensions between proband and family have not 
arisen so far because medical information has typically been ‘regarded as falling to the 
sphere of privacy … because it usually only concerns no one but the patient him- or 
herself.’13  Genetic information, however, will simultaneously provide information about 
the individual and their family and this duality gives rise to legal and ethical tensions.  
These tensions have been the subject of a long running debate among commentators and 
opinion is divided about the most appropriate solution.  There are three predominant 
schools of thought in the literature.  These are best described as absolute confidentiality, a 
familial treatment of genetic information and a patient oriented approach.  These divergent 
approaches will be considered in turn. 
 
Absolute Confidentiality 
One possible approach to potential tensions between disclosure and confidentiality is to 
treat genetic information as strictly confidential, unless the proband consents to its 
disclosure.  This is a conservative approach and prioritises the patient’s interests in 
confidentiality and controlling their personal information, at the expense of potential 
benefits to family members who may share the proband’s deleterious genetic traits.  The 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology recommended this approach 
in its 1995 publication, Human Genetics: The Science and the Consequences, contending 
that unless the patient is willing to share their genetic information with relatives, the doctor 
should consider the confidence of their patient as paramount.
14
  The Select Committee 
argued that nondisclosure placed the proband’s family ‘at no worse position than if no test 
had been performed’ and, furthermore, ‘[t]o fail to respect the privacy of genetic 
information in this way could discourage couples from … seeking information which 
could help them safeguard their health.’ 15   A comparably robust approach to genetic 
information has been advocated by the French National Ethics Committee,
16
 the 
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Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
17
 and the Swiss Academy of Medical 
Sciences,
18
 who were of the opinion that: 
 
‘For results obtained in the course of genetic investigations, the same regulations 
governing professional medical secrecy and data protection apply as for other 
medical data.  The medical doctor may make the medico-genetic findings available 
to third parties only with the consent of the person investigated or of his legal 
representative, and only after the implication of such disclosure have been 
explained to them.’19 
 
The difficulty with an approach of absolute confidentiality – particularly when the premise 
is that put forward by the Select Committee on Science and Technology – is that once the 
proband has undergone testing, the position of the family is not analogous to when no test 
has been conducted.  Once the patient’s genome is screened and the results returned, 
healthcare practitioners are in possession of information that simultaneously reveals data 
about the genetic heritage of the proband and their family.  If information about genetic 
diseases is kept from the patient’s blood relations – when there is a therapeutic response 
available – there is a risk of harm. 
Returning to the example of a patient with a genetic predisposition to cancer, it was 
observed that disclosure of the risk enables access to preventative therapies.  If the 
deleterious trait identified concerns a condition that is typically diagnosed late, the 
information will be vital in achieving prompt, effective intervention.  Pancreatic cancer 
provides a star illustration here: 90 per cent of cases are diagnosed too late in the 
pathological process to be operable and only three per cent of patients survive beyond five 
years.  Knowledge of the deleterious trait is therefore beneficial because of the difficulties 
in diagnosing the condition.  Disclosure of the information means blood relations also 
benefit from the prospect of earlier diagnosis and treatment, thus a potential exists for harm 
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to be avoided or minimised.  In contrast, when the proband does not undergo screening and 
deleterious traits are unknown, disclosure does not offer the possibility of averting or 
minimising harm.  The circumstances are not analogous.  When a person undergoes 
screening, the healthcare practitioner is furnished with information concerning the long-
term health of the individual and, simultaneously, their family.  Thus they have knowledge 
of relatives’ prospective genetic risks.  When the proband has not been screened there is 
simply no information available. 
An approach based upon absolute confidentiality has, however, achieved relatively 
little success, a notable exception being the Human Genetic Examination Act (HGE) in 
Germany.
20
  Those institutions that previously advocated strong approaches to the 
confidentiality of genetic information have gradually altered their views as knowledge and 
understanding of the human genome and its role in disease has developed.  It is perhaps 
telling that, with the exception of the HGE, the literature cited was published in the 
formative years of the Human Genome Project, suggesting that early discussions 
concerning genetic information and confidentiality focused upon protecting the 
individual’s privacy, eschewing the difficulties posed by the (at the time, lesser 
understood) familial nature of genetics.
21
  An interesting comparison will be how domestic 
law develops in respect of genetic information in light of the approach adopted by 
Germany. 
 
A Familial Approach 
A contrasting approach to the tensions between doctor-patient confidentiality and 
disclosure is to treat genetic information as belonging to the family as opposed to the 
individual patient.  Parker and Lucassen suggest that when dealing with genetic 
information it is appropriate to switch from a ‘personal model account’ to a ‘joint model 
account’ explaining that while ‘on the personal account model the default position is an 
assumption of confidentiality, on the joint account model it is assumed that information 
should be available to all account holders unless there are good reasons to do otherwise.’22  
Knoppers likewise argues that ‘genetic information is necessarily familial and the needs 
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and interests of other family members cannot be ignored’,23 and Gilbar goes as far as 
suggesting that ‘[w]hen familial tensions over genetic information arise … the strict rule of 
confidentiality should be relaxed and provide room for the ethics of the family.’24 
The familial approach is based upon the presumption that ‘[g]enetic information is, 
spontaneous mutations aside, unavoidably familial in nature.’25  Genes are the fundamental 
unit of hereditary and individuals descended from a common gene pool ‘share’ genetic 
heritage.  Thus deleterious traits identified in the proband’s genome may also be present in 
the genome of blood relations.  However, a familial model of genetic inheritance is not 
without critics and Liao argues against any portrayal of genes as being unequivocally 
familial because ‘depending on the disease, spontaneous mutations occur frequently.’26  
Liao contests that genetic disorders are not necessarily the product of an inherited trait and 
can instead occur as a result of a spontaneous mutation within an individual’s genome 
post-conception.  There are studies that lend some weight to his argument, for example, it 
has been identified that 33 per cent of cases of Dunchenne’s muscular dystrophy (DMD) 
are the result of a spontaneous mutation and not the individual’s biological inheritance.  
But while the figure is substantial the remaining 67 per cent of cases are a consequence of 
an inherited trait and – although a third of cases will not be the result of family genetics – a 
significant chance remains that the deleterious gene has been inherited.  In the case of 
DMD, this means that there is a two in three chance it is a familial gene and other members 
of the proband’s family are at risk of passing the disorder on to their progeny. 
For this reason it is difficult to exclude the possibility that deleterious genetic traits 
are shared by the proband’s family.  Although some instances of a disease will occur as the 
result of spontaneous genetic mutations, it is only possible to rule out inheritance by 
screening a patient’s close relatives for that genetic trait.  Unless there exists compelling 
evidence to the contrary, the presumption that ‘[g]enetic information is … unavoidably 
familial in nature’ is an irresistible perspective. 
The difficulty with pursuing a familial approach or joint account model is, 
however, the palpable gap between genetic disorders that can be identified through 
screening and those for which a therapeutic response is available.  As Mason and Laurie 
explain ‘[access to] genetic information does not necessarily allow us to avoid genetic 
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disease.’27  The benefits of universal disclosure are therefore drawn into question, for 
although 
 
‘availability of a cure carries with it the certainty that disclosure can 
incontrovertibly avoid harm … few cures or minimally invasive therapies are 
currently available for genetic conditions.  And if disclosure is made to avoid an 
ancillary harm such as psychological upset there is less of a guarantee that the harm 
in question will, de facto, be avoided.’28 
 
Until a greater number of therapeutic responses are available for genetic disorders, a joint 
account model may be difficult to argue as a realistic preference when dealing with genetic 
information.  One counterpoint may be that as more information enters the public domain 
through disclosure, the chances of a greater number of therapeutic responses increase as 
knowledge accrues.  Thus a joint account model may coincide with a general public 
interest argument in terms of the benefit of sharing sensitive and confidential medical 
information.
29
  However, whether or not a familial approach is presently achievable, the 
shared nature of our genetic heritage remains an important dimension to the debate on 
disclosing genetic information.  It is a dimension that should not be ignored. 
 
A Patient Oriented Approach 
The final approach to the tension between the familial aspect of genetics and doctor-patient 
confidentiality constitutes the prevalent approach to confidentiality in the UK.  The 
common law duty is based on ‘a public interest that confidences should be preserved’.30  
However, the obligation is not absolute and breaching it can be justified when the public 
interest in confidentiality is ‘outweighed by some other countervailing public interest 
which favours disclosure’. 31   The legal position is reflected in the self-regulatory 
framework of the medical professions.  The GMC’s 2009 guidelines on confidentiality 
explain that a patient’s medical information may be disclosed without consent where a 
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‘failure to disclose may expose others to risk of death or serious harm.’32  The guidelines 
expressly address genetic information but provide little meaningful content, merely stating 
that healthcare practitioners should balance their duty of care to the patient against their 
duty to help protect others from serious harm, leaving much to the discretion of the 
individual clinician.
33
  The British Medical Association (BMA) provides similarly broad 
advice in the context of genetics, stating that ‘the doctor’s duty of confidentiality to the 
individual patient is of fundamental importance and should be breached only when there is 
a legal requirement or overriding public interest.’ 34   This raises the question: what 
constitutes an overriding public interest in the genetic context?
35
 
A patient oriented approach to confidentiality and genetic information also draws 
support from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics who in their 1993 publication, Genetic 
Screening: ethical issues, assessed possible tensions between doctor-patient confidentiality 
and the interests of other family members in genetic information.  The council reflected the 
position expressed by Rose J in X v Y,
36
 stating: 
 
‘Respect for privacy is vital to the doctor/patient relationship.  The relationship is 
one which must be built on trust and confidence if the patients are to reveal 
information essential to the proper diagnosis and treatment of their condition.  Yet 
trust and confidence would be shattered if doctors were to fail to respect the 
confidentiality of intimate personal information.’37 
 
While the council acknowledged that ‘the accepted standards of the confidentiality of 
medical information should be followed as far as possible’,38 they also accepted that ‘in 
exceptional circumstances, heath professionals might be justified in disclosing genetic 
information to other family members, despite an individual’s desire for confidentiality.’39  
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The Human Genetics Commission (HGC) and the Department of Health have also 
endorsed a patient oriented approach to genetic information,
40
 while at a regional level the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine states that the proband’s genetic 
risks may be disclosed in circumstances ‘proscribed by law [that] are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of public safety … the protection of public health or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’41 
A patient focused approach to confidentiality is also practiced in non-EU countries, 
notably Switzerland.  The approach is a significant deviation from the opinion advanced by 
the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences and is incorporated in Art 119f of the Swiss 
constitution, which states that a ‘person’s genetic material may only be analysed, 
registered or disclosed with consent or if the law so provides’.42   At an international 
echelon, support for a patient focused approach comes from the United Nations Economic, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) whose Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights states: 
 
‘The privacy of the persons concerned and the confidentiality of their personal 
information should be respected.  To the greatest extent possible, such information 
should not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was 
collected or consented to, consistent with international law, in particular 
international human rights law.’43 
 
UNESCO’s preference for a patient oriented approach when dealing with the possibly 
conflicting interests of the proband and members of their family is further emphasised by 
the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, which reads: 
 
‘Human genetic data … should not be disclosed or made accessible to third parties, 
in particular, employers, insurance companies, educational institutions and the 
family, except for an important public interest reason in cases restrictively 
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provided for by domestic law consistent with the international law of human 
rights.’44 
 
UNESCO’s position is arguably consistent with the current domestic approach to 
confidentiality, permitting doctor-patient confidentiality to be justifiably breached where 
there exists a countervailing interest favouring disclosure.  It is clear that both UNESCO 
and the GMC accept that exceptions to confidentiality are necessary in the genetic context 
but generally expect healthcare practitioners to place the interests of the patient ahead of 
those of their family.  However, there is a paucity of case law on what constitutes a 
countervailing public interest in respect of disclosing genetic risks.  Professional guidance 
has not indicated in what circumstances it may be appropriate to disclose either, the 
decision making process thus far being left to clinical judgement.  In the first instance, the 
proband is relied upon to disclose genetic information to their relatives, which, as 
previously indicated, is not certain to happen. 
 
Part II: Setting the Context (ii) – The Legal Framework 
The legal framework governing the privacy of medical information is a tapestry of 
common law and statutory provisions.  The core elements with which this thesis is 
concerned are the common law obligation of confidentiality and the Data Protection Act 
1998 (DPA), which implements a 1995 EC Directive.  This common law and statutory 
framework exists against a backdrop of human rights instruments, thus the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – largely transposed into domestic law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) – must also be taken account of.  There are other 
provisions to which healthcare practitioners are also subject,
45
 but analysis of these is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 It is the aim here to outline the legal framework and set the regulatory context for 
the question addressed in part three of this chapter: namely, what public interest might 
favour the disclosure of genetic information to the proband’s blood relations? 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights 
The ECHR is a backdrop for may regulatory frameworks and the privacy of medial 
information is no exception.  Convention rights are intimately bound up in issues of data 
protection and confidentiality, with the critical provision in this context being Art 8 – the 
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right to respect for private and family life – which is incorporated into domestic law by the 
HRA.
46
  Art 8(1) states ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence’ and medico-personal data falls within its scope.47  It is 
important to note, however, that although Convention rights are engaged by the regulation 
of medico-personal data there is currently no freestanding action for breach of privacy in 
the UK.  Under the terms of the HRA public authorities must act compatibly with 
convention rights, s6(1) stating ‘[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which 
is incompatible with a Convention right’.  Actions for breach of privacy can therefore be 
brought under this umbrella duty when the defendant is a public body, such as the National 
Health Service.  Where the State – through its authorities – fails to respect Convention 
rights, it too can be subject to a claim in the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.  When a breach of Art 8 does not involve a body of the State, claims are 
generally articulated through confidentiality, misuse of private information and 
defamation.   
The right to respect for private life is a qualified right.  Art 8(2) defines the scope 
of the right, explaining that interference with the right to privacy by a public authority is 
only acceptable when it is  
 
‘in accordance with the law and … necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
 
Since issues of data protection and confidentiality will engage Art 8, any exceptions to 
medical secrecy must be consistent with at least one of the limitations in Art 8(2) ECHR.  
These restrictions are broad and encapsulate matters of public interest, the margin of 
appreciation leaving a degree of interpretation to individual States.  Of particular relevance 
here is that privacy can be legitimately interfered with to protect health or the rights and 
freedoms of others, and, arguably, disclosing genetic information might be justified under 
either.  Thus the significant question is whether there exists a compelling public interest 
justification for breaching data protection and confidentiality.  If it is in the public interest 
to disclose, then it appears that the broad restrictions in Art 8(2) could be satisfied and the 
proband’s Convention rights legitimately infringed. 
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Confidentiality 
The obligation to maintain confidentiality ‘arises when confidential information comes to 
the knowledge of a person … in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have 
agreed, that the information is confidential’.48  It will be held than an individual agreed the 
information was confidential when it is received in circumstances where the reasonable 
person ought to have known of its confidential status.  The common law obligation applies 
to all confidential information and not merely medico-personal data, but it constitutes ‘one 
of the cornerstones’ of the doctor-patient relationship.49 
The provision of medical treatment is strongly reliant on a relationship of trust 
between clinician and their patients, and the obligation of confidentiality is an important 
factor in developing the requisite degree of trust between the parties.  As Rose J robustly 
emphasized in X v Y & Others ‘patients will not come forward if doctors are going to 
squeal on them’. 50   Commentators have likewise highlighted the essential role of 
confidentiality in developing a successful doctor-patient relationship because patients 
 
‘need to believe that those whom they go to for medical advice, diagnosis and 
treatment are competent and discreet … [and] few would go to those who were 
unable or unwilling to keep a patient’s intimate details to themselves.’51 
 
The key function of confidentiality within the doctor-patient relationship is further 
emphasised by professional guidelines, the GMC stating 
 
‘[w]ithout assurances about confidentiality, patients may be reluctant to seek 
medical attention or give doctors the information they need in order to provide 
good care.’52 
 
The BMA likewise reiterates that confidentiality is crucial to successful medical care, 
observing that ‘[p]atients who do not believe that their secrets will be protected may 
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withhold information that is important not only to their health but possibly the wellbeing of 
others.’53  This latter observation is particularly cogent with respect to genetic information.  
Although, in general, patients are ‘keen to pass on information … to relatives’,54 a situation 
might arise where a patient refuses to undergo screening because they do not believe that 
their genetic information will be sufficiently protected.
55
 
The conceptual foundations of the clinical obligation to respect patients’ 
confidences are simultaneously drawn from medical ethics and law and, as Mason and 
Laurie explain, it is a context wherein ‘it is difficult to dissociate the two disciplines’.56  
The ethical content of doctor-patient confidentiality is a powerful influence on its legal 
form for, as Coleridge LJ articulated in R v Instan, ‘[a] legal common law duty is [often] 
nothing else than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation without legal 
enforcement.’57 
The ethical backbone of doctor-patient confidentiality can be traced to the 
Hippocratic Oath, which read ‘all that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my 
profession … which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never 
reveal.’  In Hunter v Mann,58 Boreham J attributed a legal definition to the clinician’s 
obligation of confidentiality consistent with that ethical duty.  He stated: 
 
‘[a] doctor is under a duty not to disclose, without the consent of the patient, 
information which he, the doctor, has gained in his professional capacity.’59 
 
His definition highlights the relationship between medical ethics and law when it comes to 
doctor-patient confidentiality.  In the modern era, the ethical basis of the clinical obligation 
is the Declaration of Geneva, which requires medical practitioners to ‘respect the secrets 
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confided in [them]’.  But, as Mason and Laurie observe ‘the word “respect” is open to 
interpretation’.60  The flexibility inherent in the language of the Declaration is consistent 
with the legal and professional views expressed in the UK, which portray confidentiality as 
a crucial element in medical practice but one that ‘is not absolute’.61 
Commentators have advanced various interpretations of the conceptual 
underpinnings of confidentiality, exploring the issue from both ethical and legal 
perspectives.  Ethical justifications for respecting patient confidentiality have been 
suggested as flowing from principles of autonomy and utility,
62
 while departure from the 
obligation in particular circumstances is supported by principles of non-maleficence and 
beneficence.
63
  Commentary from a legal perspective, such as that of Libling, has 
suggested that the concepts underpinning confidentiality flow from property rights in 
information.
64
  Others have proposed that the basis of an action for breach of confidence is 
in fact the ‘broad equitable principle of good faith’.65  However, as Laurie explains, ‘one 
common and unifying source for the duty of confidentiality can be identified from the case 
law.  That source is the public interest.’66 
The public interest was central to the House of Lords decision to uphold 
confidentiality in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2)
67
 and Lord Advocate v 
Scotsman Publications.
68
  In Guardian Newspapers it was stated by Lord Keith that ‘as a 
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general principle it is in the public interest that confidences should be respected’.69  Lord 
Goff agreed, stating ‘there is such a public interest in the maintaining of confidences that 
the law will provide remedies for their protection.’70   
In Campbell v Mirror Group News
71
 the House of Lords opined that the language 
of breach of confidence had shifted from ‘a balance of public interests to a balance of 
Article rights’. 72   However, the substance of confidentiality does not appear to have 
changed.  Lord Hope, in particular, doubted the semantic evolution necessitated by the 
Human Rights Act fundamentally altered the centre of gravity of the action, explaining that 
‘the balancing exercise … is essentially the same exercise, although it is plainly now more 
carefully focused and more penetrating.’ 73   Campbell concerned an internationally 
recognised supermodel being covertly photographed attending a narcotics clinic after 
publicly stating she was not addicted to drugs.  The claimant did not seek to prevent 
publication of her addiction but brought an action for breach of confidence concerning 
publication of additional details of her therapy and the photographs of her attending the 
clinic.  The House of Lords was challenged with striking a balance between the claimant’s 
Art 8 right to respect for privacy and the defendant’s Art 10 right to freedom of expression.  
Despite articulating the balancing exercise as one between convention rights, the key 
concept remained the public interest, Lord Hoffmann explaining: 
 
‘While there is no contrary public interest recognised and protected by the law, the 
press is free to publish anything it likes.  Subject to the law of defamation … But 
when press freedom comes into conflict with another interest protected by the law, 
the question is whether there is a sufficient public interest in that particular 
publication to justify the curtailment of the conflicting right.’74 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
69
 Guardian Newspapers, above, n 67, at 256. 
 
70
 Ibid., at 281. 
 
71
 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
 
72
 Mason, Laurie, above, n 27, p. 182. 
 
73
 Campbell, above, n 71, at 86.  
 
74
 Ibid., at 56. 
 
 39 
Campbell exemplifies the dicta of Lord Wilberforce in British Steel Corporation v 
Granada Ltd,
75
 where he stated that there exists ‘a wide difference between what is 
interesting to the public and what is in the public interest.’ 76   The House of Lords 
ultimately found in favour of the claimant: although publication to correct the previous 
inaccurate statements regarding the claimant’s addition was in the public interest, it was 
held that publishing additional details of her therapies and covertly taken photographs were 
not. 
It is noteworthy that (although instructive regarding the continuing importance of 
public interests in breach of confidence) Campbell is distinct from cases concerning 
doctor-patient confidentiality because it did not involve a relationship giving rise to a 
prima facie obligation of confidence.  Instead it involved circumstances where the claimant 
was entitled to a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’.77  Although there is overlap between 
Art 8 privacy and common law confidentiality it is crucial to recognise that the two 
concepts are not synonymous: confidentiality ‘is concerned as much with the protection of 
a relationship as with personal information’,78 whereas privacy ‘requires no relationship 
and is concerned with the interest that encompass … personal information’.79 
The obligation of confidentiality is also subject of professional guidance and this 
guidance distills broad principles from the case law, providing healthcare practitioners 
with an indication of when it may be justifiable to breach confidentiality.  The GMC, for 
example, explains that while confidential medical care is in the public interest ‘there can 
also be a public interest in disclosing information’ and this can arise 
 
‘to protect individuals or society from risks of serious harm … or to enable medical 
research, education or other secondary uses of information that will benefit society 
over time.’80 
 
The guidance indicates that medico-personal data may be disclosed without patient consent 
provided ‘the benefits to an individual or to society of the disclosure outweigh both the 
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public and the patient’s interest in keeping the information confidential.’81  The GMC’s 
guidelines are not a source of further detail of when a public interest may justify 
disclosure, but they do require healthcare practitioners to consider the patient’s private 
interest in confidentiality – an irrelevant factor in a legal analysis of the justification for 
breach of confidence.
82
  The GMC further requires doctors to weigh possible harms of 
nondisclosure against possible harm to the overall trust between doctors and patients.
83
  
The guidance also stipulates that the clinician must ‘be satisfied that the identifiable 
information is necessary for the purpose’.84  Doctors must therefore engage in a balancing 
exercise that takes account of additional factors to those considered by the courts, but the 
guidance available provides only a broad framework and much is left to clinical discretion. 
The BMA likewise recognises that ‘on occasion, the public interest may be seen to 
override the privacy of an individual’ and explains that disclosure ‘essential to prevent or 
lessen a serious and immediate threat to public health or to the life and health of another 
individual typifies this category of justification.’85   These examples are, however, not 
treated as exhaustive and it is recognised that ‘neat divisions are not entirely satisfactory 
and, in many cases, harm is multifaceted.’86  Unlike the GMC, the BMA does not place 
particular emphasis on the patient’s personal interest in confidentiality when reaching a 
just balance between competing interests, in fact recognising that a ‘decision to disclose is 
often not based on the interests of the person concerned’.87  It further encourages clinicians 
‘where feasible … to try to envisage the seriousness of the potential harm from the 
viewpoint of the person likely to suffer it.’88 
The justification for a legal obligation of confidentiality can thus be characterised 
as based upon a public interest in confidentiality.  Significantly, breaching the obligation 
may also be justified by reference to a public interest.  In the genetic context, a doctor may 
therefore be able to justify discloses their patient’s genetic information to blood relations if 
a countervailing interest favouring disclosure can be identified.  This returns us to the 
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central question – which receives a ‘frustratingly ill-defined’ reply89 – what constitutes a 
countervailing interest justifying disclosure?  This is a point to which this chapter returns 
in part three, below. 
 
The Data Protection Act 1998 
The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), which implemented a 1995 European Directive, 
covers the processing of personal data and provides ‘further protection for medical 
information.’90  Data protection law subdivides information into two categories: personal 
data and anonymised data.  Both categories are relevant in the healthcare setting but 
anonymised data does not engage the provisions of the Data Protection Act.  What in fact 
constitutes ‘anonymised’ data is, however, a source of contemporary debate.91  The role of 
anonymisation in actions for breach of confidence is also contentious.
92
   
Here the focus is on personal data.  Within data protection context, personal data is 
defined as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’ and an 
identifiable person ‘is one who can be identified directly of indirectly, in particular by 
reference to mental, economic, cultural or social identity’. 93   Usually, information 
concerning an individual’s health will fall within the definition of personal data, but there 
are times when it is unclear that information is actually ‘personal’.94  If the information is 
regarded as personal data, the DPA regulates the ‘processing’ of that data.  The Directive 
attributed a wide definition to ‘processing’, the term including: 
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‘any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether 
or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction.’95 
 
As Mason and Laurie note, ‘there is little that could be done with data which would not fall 
within such a definition’, 96  although there are exceptions. 97   Once it is established 
‘personal data’ is being ‘processed’, the DPA seeks to regulate this processing by reference 
to eight principles defined in Schedule 1 of the act.  These principles ensure that data is 
processed only when fair and lawful to do so, processed and kept only so far as is 
necessary for the purposes it was obtained, accurate and kept up to date, and not 
transferred to a jurisdiction with inadequate data protection provisions.   
The processing of personal data will only be fair and lawful providing that, in 
conjunction with meeting obligations of confidentiality, at least one condition from 
Schedule 2 of the act is met.
98
  Where processing involves sensitive personal data, which 
includes information about an individual’s ‘physical or mental health or condition’,99 then 
at least one condition from both Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 must be satisfied.
100
  Under 
Schedule 2, the data subject must give valid consent to the processing of their personal 
information or, alternately, processing must fall within one of six exceptions to the consent 
requirement – the most significant, in the context of genetic information, being Schedule 2, 
paragraph 5(d), under which processing can be justified if it is necessary ‘for the exercise 
of any … functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest’.  Schedule 3 contains 
ten exceptions to the requirement of explicit consent, the most relevant being paragraph 
8(1), which states processing without consent is justifiable if is it ‘necessary for medical 
purposes’ and undertaken by a healthcare practitioner101 or someone with an equivalent 
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duty of confidentiality.
102
  ‘Medical purposes’ are defined broadly in paragraph 8(2) and 
include ‘preventative medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research, the provision of care 
and treatment and the management of healthcare services.’  A further justification for 
processing personal data in absence of consent – and which is likely to be relevant in the 
context of genetics – is found in Schedule 3, paragraph 3(c), which states processing can 
be justified if necessary to ‘protect the vital interests of another person, in a case where 
consent on behalf of the data subject has been unreasonably withheld’.  The exceptions 
contained in Schedule 3 may provide justification for disclosing genetic information to a 
patient’s blood relations – it could either be couched as preventative medicine or protecting 
the vital interests of another.  However, it is important to remember that for these 
exceptions to the consent requirement to apply, one of the conditions in Schedule 2 must 
initially be satisfied.  Paragraph 5(d) – ‘the exercise of any … functions of a public nature 
exercised in the public interest’ – has been highlighted as being the most appropriate of the 
Schedule 2 conditions in the context of disclosing genetic information.  This, in turn, 
returns us to the question posed in respect of confidentiality – what is the public interest 
that favours disclosure? 
 
Part III: A Public Interest in Disclosure 
It is clear that for the disclosure of genetic information to be considered a justifiable 
departure from confidentiality and data protection – and, thus, the argument in favour of a 
duty to disclose sustainable – the disclosure must be in the public interest.  Jurisprudence 
on medical confidentiality emphasises ‘the important public interest(s) served by 
respecting patient confidences’,103 but the clinical obligation to protect patient’s secrets can 
be ‘outweighed by some other countervailing [public] interest which favours disclosure’.104  
Personal data can also be processed non-consensually under the terms of the DPA, 
provided such is necessary in the exercise of a function of a public nature, exercised in the 
public interest; the provision of healthcare foreseeably falling within the catch all term – 
‘functions of public nature’ – employed here.  The exception to confidentiality and the 
precondition for processing highlighted in the DPA are logically conjoined.  If it is held 
that breaching doctor-patient confidentiality is in the public interest, then the processing of 
that medico-personal data must also be justified as an exercise of a function of a public 
nature (i.e. provision of healthcare) which is exercised in the public interest (for example, 
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to prevent harm).  Thus there is considerable overlap when considering questions 
concerning the nature, scope and identity of public interest exceptions. 
The existence of these exceptions does not diminish the importance of 
confidentiality and data protection within medical practice.  Protecting the patient’s 
privacy remains central to the provision of effective healthcare, because  ‘few would go to 
those who were unable or unwilling to keep a patient’s intimate details to themselves.’105  
However, these exceptions enable practitioners to justify the disclosure of confidential 
information and avoid censure for breach of confidence or data protection, providing 
disclosure advances a suitable public interest.   
When a defendant raises a public interest exception, the courts are required to 
decide whether the interest in maintaining confidentiality, or enforcing data protection, is 
countervailed by the other public interest.  When faced with competing interests, it is for 
the court to achieve a just balance between the two.  This balancing exercise will always 
begin with the public interest in protecting confidential information.  The claimant’s 
personal interest in maintaining the secrecy of their medico-personal data is eschewed.  
Thus in the context of disclosing genetic information, the proband’s personal desire to 
keep such data confidential is ancillary; the central question before the courts is whether or 
not, in the given circumstances, the public interest is served by upholding confidentiality 
and data protection.  The subordinate nature of the private interest was highlighted in W v 
Egdell,
106
 wherein Sir Stephen Brown explained that although the claimant does have a 
private interest in maintaining doctor-patient confidentiality, the obligation ‘owed to him is 
based on the broader ground of public interest’.107  Bingham LJ also observed that while 
the claimant may have a personal interest in restricting the disclosure of information 
(which, in Egdell, effected the claimant’s potential release from detention under the Mental 
Health Act 1959) ‘private considerations should not be allowed to obscure the public 
interest in maintaining professional confidences.’108  The reliance of the courts on the 
public interest as a justification for upholding confidentiality is a crucial element of the 
legal framework because, as Laurie explains, were the courts to engage in a balancing 
exercise involving the claimant’s private interest and a countervailing public interest then 
‘such a balance would always weigh in favour of the latter interest.’109 
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A breach of confidentiality and data protection is only justified by reference to a 
countervailing interest if disclosure is in the public interest, as opposed to of public 
interest.  Thus a degree of advancement is implied.  It is therefore insufficient to merely 
identify a competing interest and ‘necessary to demonstrate that the breach of confidence 
will de facto further the competing public interest, or at least a likelihood of this.’ 110  The 
benefit to the public of processing must outweigh ‘the public good of maintaining trust in 
the confidentiality of services’.111  Additionally, no alternate way to achieve this benefit 
must be available to the defendant.
112
 
The circumstances in which a public interest justification will be available are not 
clearly defined in the case law, although it is apparent that justification is dependent on the 
striking of a ‘just balance’ between the public interest in confidentiality and any competing 
interest.
113
  As the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG) at the Health Research 
Authority note, the public interest ‘is not a concept usually unpacked in the abstract.  
Rather it is an idea given substance by the specifics of a particular case.’ 114   Laurie 
characterises the public interest as a ‘relative notion which depends on a just balance 
between competing interests.’115 
Public interest exceptions are therefore a somewhat fluid concept, retaining a 
degree of flexibility that permits recognition of new countervailing interests when they 
arise.  In this way the law is able to reflect changes in societal values, technology, 
understanding and medical practice.  Thus the door is open for the disclosure of genetic 
information to be recognised as being in the public interest, which leads to the question: 
what might that public interest be? 
To identify countervailing interests in this context, Laurie suggests an appropriate 
starting question may be ‘which interests might be jeopardised by non-disclosure of 
genetic information?’ 116   This question might return an answer of the interests in 
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preventing harm to others, protecting public health and halting the spread of disease.   
Disclosure might also be in the public interest because preventing of harm to a patient’s 
blood relatives might also protect their right to life.  Disclosure might therefore be justified 
by reference to both the public interest and Art 2 ECHR.  Alternately, it might be argued 
that disclosure is in the public interest because it benefits both the proband and the 
recipient – if a patient’s blood relations are also tested, the proband’s genetic information 
will be afforded greater clarity and utility.  Or it might be argued there is a public interest 
in sharing genetic information generally, because large data sets with critical masses of 
genetic information will lead to significant improvements in genomic medicine. 
An important qualifier is that it is ‘necessary to demonstrate that the breach of 
confidence will de facto further the competing public interest, or at least a likelihood of 
this.’ 117  Thus processing must ‘benefit patient care or achieve some other tangible benefit 
that might be reasonably described as a public good’.118  Additionally, an alternate way of 
advancing the public interest – which does not involve breaching confidentiality – must not 
be available.  It is this latter point that poses a problem if the sharing of genetic 
information is proposed as being of general public interest.  Although the collation of large 
data sets represents an opportunity for significant improvements in genomic medicine – 
which is arguably in the public interest
119
 – an alternate means of collecting data, which 
does not require a breach of confidentiality, is available via projects such as Genomics 
England
120
 (presently overseeing the 100,000 Genome Project) and the Personal Genome 
Project: UK (PGP: UK), which invites ‘willing participants to publicly share their personal 
data for the greater good.’121   The strong public interest in maintaining confidentiality 
means that any countervailing interest must be compelling, but the existence of alternate 
ways of obtaining genetic data weakens the argument that disclosure is generally in the 
public interest. 
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An analogy might be drawn with the case of X v Y & Others.
122
  Here the court was 
concerned with balancing the public interest in protecting confidentiality against interests 
in protecting public health and freedom of the press.  The case involved an unauthorised 
disclosure of medico-personal data to a newspaper by an employee of the claimant health 
authority.  The data in question concerned two general practitioners with Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), who were still practicing in the UK and had sought 
advice from the claimant regarding their condition.  The health authority obtained an 
interlocutory injunction restraining the newspaper ‘from publishing or disclosing to third 
parties or making any use whatsoever of any confidential information … contained in [the 
GPs’] medical records’.123  Breaching the order, the newspaper published an article entitled 
‘Scandal of Docs with AIDS’, which alleged that the Department of Health and Social 
Security – as it then was – had refused to answer certain questions regarding healthcare 
practitioners with AIDS.  Further coverage of the so-called ‘scandal’ was planned and, 
initially, it was the newspaper’s intention to reveal the identities of the GPs or, at the very 
least, their respective areas of expertise.  The health authority made an application for a 
permanent injunction in the terms of the interlocutory order on grounds of breach of 
confidence and contempt of court.  The defendants argued that any breach of confidence 
was justifiable by reference to the public interest in protecting public health, which 
necessitated a debate on whether or not clinicians with AIDS should continue to practice 
after they had been diagnosed with the condition.  Having considered a range of expert 
testimony regarding the condition, its transmission and the risks associated with a breach 
of confidence, Rose J concluded: 
 
‘[T]here is some public interest in knowing that which the defendants seek to 
publish
124
 … [but] those public interests are substantially outweighed when 
measured against the public interest in relation to loyalty and confidentiality both 
generally and with particular reference to AIDS patients’ hospital records.’125 
 
                                                        
122
 [1988] RPC 379. 
 
123
 Ibid., at 401. 
 
124
 Ibid., at 389 Rose J acknowledged that ‘public debate about, for example, the degree of risk, 
notifiability and the voluntary nature of constraints on practice is, in my judgment appropriate, 
necessary and desirable.’ 
 
125
 Ibid., at 395-396. 
 
 48 
The court refused the defendants authorisation to disclose the GPs’ medical records and the 
claimant was granted a permanent injunction.  The critical point was Rose J did not 
consider the information the newspaper sought to reveal as advancing the public interest.  
Although a debate on AIDS did engage the interest in protecting public health, he 
explained: 
 
‘The deprivation of the public of the information sought to be published will be of 
minimal significance … all the evidence before me shows that a wideranging (sic) 
public debate about AIDS generally and about its effect on doctors is taking 
place’.126 
 
Rose J also observed that authorising disclosure of medico-personal data by reference to an 
interest in protecting public health was potentially counterintuitive.  He noted that 
preserving confidentiality was necessary secure public health, since patients would not 
come forward if doctors did not respect the privacy of the information in their 
possession.
127
  Neither of the GPs concerned were involved in invasive procedures and 
therefore the risk of transmission to their patients was appreciably low.
128
  The risk that 
concerned Rose J was that – were the court to authorise disclosure of the GPs’ medical 
records – individuals with AIDS might be discouraged from seeking medical advice 
because of a perception that their confidentiality would not be as robustly protected as that 
of other patients. 
The decision in X v Y is arguably correct.  The lack of sufficient advancement 
linked to the disclosure undermined the defendant’s public interest arguments.  The court 
also recognised the significance of an environment in which personal medical issues can be 
discussed (generally) without fear of repercussions.  Patients are unlikely to be honest and 
receive effective treatment if they are guarded in the consulting room.  For this reason, a 
similar objection might be raised about the disclosure of genetic information being 
generally in the public interest.  It is unequivocal that advancing genomic medicine is in 
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the public interest; likewise, the debate on whether healthcare practitioners with AIDS 
should continue to practice was also in the public interest.  However, in both 
circumstances, one might argue that routinely breaching doctor-patient confidence will 
give rise to a perception that the patient’s confidentiality is not respected.  In X v Y it was 
posited that AIDS patient’s could be dissuaded from seeking medical advice.  Similarly, a 
failure to respect the confidentiality of genetic information may discourage patients from 
obtaining genetic testing.  It may of course have the opposite effect if the information, 
eventually, is perceived as being important to share from a societal point of view.  That is, 
members of the public could become sensitised to the benefits of testing and sharing.  The 
law could nudge this perception in the right direction if it allowed disclosure more readily, 
although prior to a change in societal values any such attempt may instead be characterised 
as an unwelcome intrusion into the private sphere. 
The main point of debate regarding whether general disclosure of genetic 
information is in the public interest is advancement.  Disclosure must further the public 
interest or be likely to do so and an alternative means of advancing the interest must not be 
available.  In X v Y, since the essential facts of the disclosure – that clinicians with AIDS 
continued to practice in the UK – were already in the public domain, the defendant’s 
contentions that they were acting in the public interest were rendered hollow.  A similar 
argument might apply in respect of genetic information, since projects such as Genomics 
England and PGP: UK provide alternative means of advancing genomic medicine without 
breaching confidentiality.  An argument for genetic altruism therefore fails to gain any 
traction. 
The decision in X v Y offers a robust defence of confidentiality but its weakness 
‘lies in its failure to explain more clearly the precise nature of the concept of the public 
interest’, 129  a lack of clarity that Laurie views as being ‘compounded by subsequent 
decisions’.130  The lack of clarity means that assessing whether a breach of confidentiality 
is in the public interest has become a relative notion dependent ‘on a just balance between 
competing interests.’131  Public interest justifications are therefore less reliant on precedent 
and instead display sensitivity to context.  Since the balance only weighs in favour of a 
countervailing interest when it is likely to be meaningfully advanced, whether a sufficient 
degree of advancement is likely will depend on the context in which the disclosure is 
sought.  Thus general disclosure of genetic information may not further the public interest 
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because alternate avenues are available, but it does not mean that disclosure will never be 
in the public interest.  The medical information of AIDS patients demonstrates this fact.  In 
X v Y the defendant’s public interest defence failed, but the opposite was true in the case of 
H (a healthcare worker) v Associated Newspapers Ltd.
132
 
In H the claimant was again a practitioner infected with the HIV virus who the 
press sought to make certain disclosures about.  Chiefly, they intended to identify the 
health authority for whom he worked but, in the alternative, they wished to disclose his 
particular specialty and the approximate date he contracted HIV.  Litigated after the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, the fundamental tension for the courts to resolve 
was between the defendant’s Art 10 right to freedom of expression and the claimant’s Art 
8 right to respect for privacy.  However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the 
claimant was challenging the government’s policy regarding healthcare practitioners 
diagnosed with HIV.  The policy required a ‘look back’ exercise to be conducted and any 
patients who had come into contact with HIV positive clinicians to be informed of the 
potential risk of transmission.  The claimant, after seeking advice and learning the risk of 
transmission within his discipline was negligible, refused access to his patients’ records 
and sought an injunction to protect his identity, discipline and the name of the health 
authority by whom he was employed.  Nevertheless a piece was published entitled 
‘Judge’s gag over AIDS threat to patients’, which contained clues regarding the claimant’s 
identity.  Thereafter, the defendant successfully applied for a variation of the injunction 
permitting further disclosure.  The claimant unsurprisingly appealed and it fell to the Court 
of Appeal to strike a just balance between the competing interests. 
Lord Phillips MR, delivering the judgment of the court ‘found some measure of 
support for both sides of the argument’,133 and encapsulating the judgment of Rose J in X v 
Y, he stated: 
 
‘there is an obvious public interest in preserving the confidentiality of victims of 
the AIDS epidemic and, in particular, of healthcare workers who report the fact that 
they are HIV positive … if healthcare workers are not to be discouraged from 
reporting that they are HIV positive, it is essential that all possible steps are taken 
to preserve the confidentiality of such reports.’134 
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The Court of Appeal therefore recognised the importance of an environment in which 
personal medical issues can be discussed without fear of repercussions.  However, it also 
accepted that the information the defendants wished to publish contained ‘features of 
considerable public interest.’135  Lord Phillips explained: 
 
‘It is a matter worthy of debate whether N [the health authority] should not have 
reacted swiftly and forcibly when faced with a healthcare worker who was 
challenging Department of Health Guidelines … It is a matter worthy of debate that 
there is a present a hiatus during which the patients of a healthcare worker with a 
particular speciality are not being notified that he is HIV positive … That debate 
will be muted while the speciality remains unknown.’136 
 
The context within which the defendant sought to make the disclosure – the claimant’s 
challenging of the ‘look back’ exercise – weighed strongly upon the Court of Appeal as 
there existed a strong public interest in guidelines pertaining to healthcare workers 
diagnosed with HIV.  Yet the court simultaneously recognised that protecting the 
confidentiality of AIDS patients was in the public interest because, as Rose J observed in X 
v Y, it is ‘a way of protecting public health.’137  It was ultimately decided that neither the 
claimant nor the health authority employing him could be identified per se, however, the 
court was not satisfied that the risk of the claimant being identified was sufficient to 
prohibit the defendants from publishing his speciality.  He was, in the end, revealed to be a 
dentist.  Explaining why there was an insufficient risk to justify a continued restriction on 
the publication of his field of practice, Lord Phillips set out the public interests that 
supported the defendant’s arguments,138 concluding that: 
 
‘There must be a risk that some who know the details of H’s retirement may 
suspect, and it can be no more than suspicion, that he is the healthcare worker in 
this action.  Provided, however, that the other restraints … remain in force … we 
do not consider this risk justifies continuing the restraint on disclosing H’s 
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speciality … this restraint is inhibiting debate on what is a matter of public interest 
… [and] is not justified.’139 
 
While the court refused to authorise disclosure of the GPs’ specialties in X v Y because it 
did not advance the public interest, the opposite was considered true in H.  The distinction 
between the cases rests on H’s challenge of the ‘look back’ exercise.  In X v Y the fact that 
GPs with HIV continued to practice and the associated risks were all ready available to the 
public and thus nothing was advance by disclosure.  Furthermore, the GPs had sought 
advice to limit the possibility of transmission and disclosure may have discouraged 
otherwise responsible action.  In H the Court of Appeal believed the public interest in the 
guidelines the claimant was challenging (and the potential health risks associated with that 
challenge) justified disclosure.  Thus the claimant’s area of practice was considered 
relevant to the public debate regarding whether or not a ‘look back’ exercise should be 
conducted when a clinician was diagnosed with HIV.  This was despite the negligible risk 
of transmission in dental practice.  A further influence upon the court may also have been a 
shift in societal attitudes towards HIV in the interceding years, given the negative 
connotations associated with an AIDS diagnosis in the 1980s. 
Public interest justifications are context sensitive and the divergent outcomes in X v 
Y and H provide support for the proposition that they are a ‘relative notion’, dependent on 
the striking of a just balance between competing interests.  Neither judgment can be 
characterised as incorrect since the material facts at issue were sufficiently distinct.  In the 
context of genetics, X v Y and H lend support to the proposition that disclosure of genetics 
risk may not be in the public interest if couched in terms of genetic altruism – since 
alternate routes are available by which to advance the public interest – but might be 
accepted as in the public interest if disclosure is raised within a different context. 
As noted above, the public interest is a fluid concept.  On the one hand there is a 
strong public interest in protecting confidentiality because patients will be encouraged to 
seek treatment.  However, interests in protecting public health, preventing harm and 
stopping the spread of disease may also be engaged and justify disclosure.   Thus although 
the GPs confidentiality was protected in X v Y, disclosure was justified in H because it 
furthered interests in public health and preventing the spread of disease and no alternate 
means of advancement were available.  For this reason, if the general disclosure of genetic 
information is rejected as not advancing the public interest, because of the availability of 
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an alternate route, this does not represent a blanket prohibition and a different justification 
for disclosing genetic information can be identified.  
One alternate countervailing interest might be that disclosure is beneficial to both 
the proband and the recipient, because it improves the clarity and utility of genetic 
information.  The question here is whether the interest engaged is a private interest.  
Achieving greater clarity and utility will benefit members of a family unit, but whether this 
is sufficient to be in the public interest is open to conjecture.  It may be that since greater 
clarity and utility will improve therapeutic responses to genetic conditions, the interests of 
the proband and their blood relatives could be repackaged as part of an overriding interest 
in public health.  The difficulty is that genetic conditions are inherited instead of 
contagious.  Transmission occurs through reproduction and not exposure to an affected 
person, unlike, for example, HIV, the transmission of which requires exposure to affected 
bodily fluids.  Therefore the public health element may not be immediately apparent.  
However, the courts’ interpretation of the public interest has not always subscribed to strict 
notions of public good.  An example is the decision in R v Crozier.
140
  Here a psychiatrist – 
engaged by counsel for the defence – disclosed the contents of an evaluative report to 
counsel for the Crown.  The report detailed how the defendant was suffering from a 
psychiatric illness and recommended detention pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1983.  
As a consequence of receiving this information, the Crown sought a variation of the 
judge’s disposal under the Supreme Court Act, requesting substitution of the original 
custodial sentence for a hospital order.  The variation was granted and the defendant 
appealed against the modified disposal, arguing that the courts should have disregarded the 
psychiatrist’s report because it had been disclosed in breach of doctor-patient 
confidentiality.  Absolving the psychiatrist of impropriety and dismissing the appeal, 
Watkins LJ observed that ‘in a very difficult situation, he [the psychiatrist] acted 
responsibly and reasonably.’141 
Crozier demonstrates that lines between public and private interests are difficult to 
draw.  Varying the trial judge’s disposal arguably did not engage a public interest 
(Crozier’s crime gave no indication he posed a risk to the public) and it is ‘more credible to 
argue that a hospital order was in the patient’s (better) interests rather than in the public 
interest.’142  Therefore it is possible to extrapolate that while genetic conditions may not be 
contagious – and thus do not typically affect the wider public – it may nonetheless be held 
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to be in the public interest that genetic information is disclosed.  The problem with 
constructing the interest as providing greater clarity and utility to the proband’s genetic 
information is that the interest is couched in terms of individual – as opposed to public – 
benefit.  Public good would depend on a trickle down effect – i.e. that improving the 
clarity and utility of one individual’s genetic information improves therapeutic responses 
for all patients who suffer the identified condition.  Constructing the public interest in such 
a way also shifts the reason disclosure is sought away from the risks faced by blood 
relatives and instead focuses on the potential benefits to the proband.  If a duty to disclose 
is to be a justifiable and sustainable departure from confidentiality and data protection, 
then it must be in the public interest to disclose genetic information to the proband’s blood 
relatives and not because it is in the interests of the proband.  A further problem may if the 
benefit is couched in terms of broadly improving genetic medicine because the argument 
concerning alternative routes is reengaged, questioning whether disclosure sufficiently 
advances the public interest. 
As Laurie suggests, an appropriate question to consider is ‘which interests might be 
jeopardised by non-disclosure of genetic information?’ 143   This question might 
immediately return an answer of the interest in preventing harm to others
144
 and halting the 
spread of disease.  These interests are important when treating patients with communicable 
diseases and ‘have clear potential application in the context of genetics’.145  In the context 
of HIV, it is justifiable to disclose a patient’s HIV status to a sexual partner, who is then 
able to make informed choices regarding unprotected intercourse.  Subsequent to 
disclosure, if ‘the partner chooses to act responsibly infection will not take place and the 
public interests that served as justification for breaching the patient’s confidentiality will 
be furthered.’146  Therefore, as Laurie writes, 
 
‘it might be argued that the prevention of harm to others and the reduction of the 
incidence of genetic disease are legitimate public interests that can be furthered 
through disclosure of genetic information.’147 
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However, justifying disclosure by reference to a public interest in the prevention of disease 
is problematic.  This is because there is no certainty that the public interest will be 
furthered in any meaningful way, which undermines the justification for derogating from 
confidentiality and data protection.  Genetic diseases are inherited, thus for the public 
interest to be furthered a disclosure of genetic information must be likely to effect 
reproductive choices.  But, as Laurie notes, ‘there is no certainty that even if disclosure is 
made people will no longer reproduce or will only reproduce in a “responsible” fashion.’148 
Alternately, where a potential for harm exists, the courts are willing to justify a 
breach of confidentiality as in the public interest.  A case in point – although not strictly 
within the context of medicine – is W v Egdell.149  Here the Court of Appeal held that a 
disclosure regarding a prisoner’s mental state, made by his psychiatrist, was in the public 
interest.  The claimant was a prisoner who had been convicted of five counts of 
manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility and had been detained without limit 
in a secure hospital.  Twelve years after his conviction he applied to a mental health review 
panel for transfer to a less secure facility, with a long-term view of returning to the 
community.  The defendant was engaged as an independent consultant but his review of 
the claimant’s mental state was unfavourable.  The application was withdrawn but the 
psychiatrist – aware the claimant was due for a routine review under s71(2) Mental Health 
Act 1983 and concerned that his report would not be included in the prisoner’s notes – 
disclosed his findings to the relevant authorities.  The Court of Appeal held that disclosure 
was justified by reference to the public interest in preventing harm, Bingham LJ explaining 
that where there existed ‘a real risk of consequent danger to the public’150 it was in the 
public interest for the psychiatrist ‘to take such steps as are reasonable in all the 
circumstances to communicate the grounds of his concerns to the responsible 
authorities.’151 
Although concerned with the risk posed by a dangerous criminal, Egdell provides a 
sense of the compelling nature of the public interest in preventing harm.  Thus if the 
disclosure of genetic information can be shown as preventing harm to the proband’s blood 
relatives, it may countervail the interest in protecting doctor-patient confidentiality. 
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Applying the interest in preventing harm to genetics engages two important 
questions.  Firstly, what harm is prevented by disclosure,
152
 and, secondly, can harm ‘be 
prevented by disclosure in the context of genetics’? 153   The focus here is the latter 
question; the former is one to which this work will return in subsequent chapters. 
In circumstances where a cure is available for the condition the patient is suffering, 
disclosure to his or her blood relatives can prevent harm because it expedites access to the 
cure.  When therapeutic responses short of a cure are available, disclosure may also 
prevent harm because it facilitates access to medical interventions which may alleviate or 
minimise symptoms of the disease.  However, if treatment is ineffective, especially 
invasive, painful or difficult to obtain, then whether disclosure prevents harm is somewhat 
debatable.
154
 
An example of the potential of disclosure to prevent harm is provided by 
haemochromatosis.
155
  There is currently no cure available; however, the condition can be 
alleviated through periodic phlebotomy – bloodletting – which, if sought preemptively, can 
reduce the risk of fibrosis.  Furthermore, haemochromatosis is a common recessive 
disorder, meaning that the chances of relatives sharing the condition are 25 to 50 per cent.  
Collectively, ‘all of this might be taken as the basis of a strong case to justify disclosure to 
potentially affected individuals.’156  Similar arguments could be advanced in the case of 
breast cancer – or, perhaps, cancers generally – where early intervention may reduce the 
risk of the disease manifesting either through chemoprevention or surgery.
157
  In these 
circumstances disclosure is likely to further the public interest because it facilitates access 
to medical interventions and thus prevents – or minimises – harm to the proband’s blood 
relatives.
158
  The public interest would only be furthered, however, when treatment is 
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available for the relevant condition, since ‘if disclosure is made to avoid an ancillary harm 
such as psychological distress or psychiatric disturbance … there is less of a guarantee that 
the harm in question will de facto be avoided.’159  In such circumstances, disclosure may 
actually conflict with the public interest in preventing harm.  The case of Re YZ
160
 implies 
that disclosing genetic information in absence of a tangible benefit (i.e. a cure or treatment) 
may not be in the public interest.  Herein Baker J refused to order genetic testing for two 
young boys involved in care proceedings when the biological father asserted he may have 
Huntington’s Disease, on the basis that the disadvantages of testing – including emotional 
and psychological harm – outweighed the advantages from the perspective of the boys. 
Justifying the disclosure of genetic information by reference to a public interest in 
preventing harm might also engage Art 2 ECHR, which, in turn, strengthens the claim that 
disclosure is in the public interest.  Logically, the prevention of harm – particularly in 
circumstances involving potentially fatal conditions, such as cancers – might also protect 
the right to life of patients’ blood relations.  If engaged, the status of Art 2 as absolute 
means the public interest in confidentiality and the proband’s Art 8 right to respect for 
privacy would be countervailed by the right to life of family members.  Disclosure of the 
proband’s genetic information would thus be a justified derogation from confidentiality 
and data protection. 
Art 2(1) ECHR reads ‘everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’.  In broad 
terms, this means that the state ‘must not cause the death of any person’.161  However, Art 
2 also imposes a positive obligation on the state ‘to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives
162
 of those within its jurisdiction’,163 with the caveat that steps must not amount to a 
‘an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.’164  In Association X v United 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of certain diseases.  The important point, however, is that wider, societal benefits do not necessarily 
prevent harm to the individual to which the information is to be disclose.  This is because 
advancing knowledge of disease is a long term goal and thus may take years to produce tangible 
results. 
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Kingdom
165
 the Commission considered the duty to the state under Art 2 included the 
provision of adequate and appropriate health care.  This interpretation of the right to life is 
also evident in LCB v United Kingdom.
166
  Here the claimant was a woman diagnosed with 
leukaemia allegedly caused by her father’s – a former RAF servicemen – exposure to 
radiation during nuclear tests conducted on Christmas Island in the late 1950s.  The 
claimant alleged that ‘the failure of the British Government to warn her parents of the 
potential health risk to her by virtue of her father’s presence at the nuclear testing’ was a 
breach of Art 2.
167
  The question for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was 
whether ‘the State did all that could have been required of it to prevent the applicant’s life 
from being avoidably put at risk.’168 
The ECtHR dismissed the claim because a causal link between the father’s 
exposure to radiation and the daughter’s cancer had not been established.  However, the 
judgment did appear to affirm that ‘the state could have been required to take steps to warn 
and advise if it had appeared likely at the time that the irradiation of the father would 
endanger the health of a daughter not yet conceived.’169  LCB therefore indicates that when 
a state – through the medium of a public authority – is aware that a particular individual170 
is likely at risk of harm, it is obliged to take appropriate steps to safeguard their right to 
life, providing these steps are not impossible or disproportionately burdensome.  The 
obligation arises when it is ‘likely’ that an individual’s Art 2 rights are endangered.  Thus 
the claimant need only be vulnerable
171
 and it is not necessary for harm to be certain, 
which is important in respect of genetics because there is no guarantee that diseases will be 
shared by descendants of a common gene pool, only a statistical likelihood. 
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If the rationale from LCB is applied to genetic information, the argument forms that 
once a deleterious trait is identified in the proband’s genome, the NHS becomes aware of 
the potential risks to the health of the patient’s blood relations.  The right to life is not a 
right to exist – a fact demonstrated by litigation concerning the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment.
172
  Instead Art 2 operates in the medical context to safeguard the right 
to life through the provision of an appropriate standard of healthcare.
173
  Therefore, to 
protect the Art 2 rights of the proband’s family the NHS may be obliged to disclose the 
patient’s genetic information.  While there would remain a strong public interest in 
protecting the proband’s confidentiality in these circumstances, the right to life – as an 
absolute right – would countervail this interest and justify disclosing genetic information to 
the proband’s blood relatives.  The caveat is that safeguarding the right to life must not be 
impossible or disproportionately burdensome.  Disclosure would thus only be appropriate 
when a therapeutic response is available for the relevant genetic condition and the recipient 
of the information is identifiable.   
One difficulty with justifying disclosure by engaging Art 2 ECHR is that making a 
disclosure could be characterised as disproportionately burdensome upon the NHS.  
Consequentially, one might argue that it is not an appropriate step to safeguard the right to 
life.  A comparable objection has been raised in the United States in litigation concerning a 
duty to warn blood relations about transmissible genetic risks.  In Pate v Threlkel
174
 it was 
accepted that ‘to seek out and warn various members of a patient’s family would often be 
difficult or impractical and place a heavy burden upon the physician.’175  The underlying 
concern was that an obligation to disclose would divert resources away from clinical 
practice.  However, the argument was rejected in Safer v Estate of Pack,
176
 wherein the 
court concluded ‘a duty to warn of avertable risk from genetic causes … is sufficiently 
narrow to serve the interests of justice.’177  It was concluded that because genetic diseases 
are hereditary ‘[t]he individual or group at risk is easily identified, and substantial future 
harm is easily … minimized by a timely and effective warning.’ 178  In the context of Art 2 
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ECHR, the state is obliged to take appropriate steps to safeguard the right to life which are 
not disproportionately burdensome.  It is axiomatic that taking steps to protect individuals’ 
Art 2 rights will incur a degree of burden; that burden, however, must not be 
disproportionate.  Thus a distinction can be drawn between disclosing to identifiable and 
unidentifiable blood relations, with it only being appropriate to disclose genetic 
information to those relations who are easily identified.
179
  Because public authorities are 
not obliged to act when the steps available are disproportionately burdensome, this would 
allow scope for ruling that, when relatives are not identifiable, the disclosure of genetic 
information does not constitute an appropriate means of safeguarding Art 2 rights.   
The public interest in preventing harm and Art 2 ECHR would appear to provide a 
strong basis for justifying the disclosure of genetic information to blood relations, 
countervailing the interest in maintaining confidentiality and data protection.  However, 
Laurie argues that healthcare practitioners in possession of genetic information are 
‘restricted’,180 which draws into question the capacity of disclosing genetic information to 
prevent harm.  Laure explains that while it is possible to establish the abstract probability 
of an individual possessing a deleterious genetic trait, in practice it is impossible without 
screening to pinpoint which individuals actually possess the gene in question.  He suggests 
that effective disclosure would therefore require the information to be made available ‘to a 
wide circle of persons with possible diminishing utility.’181  The proband’s confidentiality 
would therefore ‘be breached on many occasions with unpredictable, and possibly 
minimal, results.’ 182   The question therefore whether disclosure can be in the public 
interest if it is disproportionately burdensome upon the interests of the proband or is of 
diminishing utility.  Laurie distinguishes between monogenic diseases, multifactorial 
conditions and familial predispositions, positing that it is less clear cut disclosure will 
further an interest in preventing harm or safeguarding the right life when the proband’s 
genome contains a deleterious trait of the latter varieties.  The counterpoint to this 
objection is that when a familial predisposition to particular disease is identified harm can 
be prevented, or the right to life safeguarded – in turn furthering the public interest – if 
access to screening and preemptive treatment is facilitated through disclosure.  
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A further dimension to an argument that the Art 2 rights of blood relations 
countervail the public interest in confidentiality is s6 Human Rights Act 1998.  Section 
6(1) states ‘it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with 
a Convention right.’  Therefore, if familial genetics engage Art 2 ECHR and disclosure is 
considered an appropriate step to safeguard the right to life of blood relations, then the 
NHS would be obliged to disclose the proband’s genetic information to those relatives who 
may ‘share’ the deleterious trait.  In this case, the argument for a duty to disclose also 
becomes more compelling.  This is because disclosure would be necessary for the NHS to 
act compatibly with Art 2 ECHR and a duty would protect the convention rights of the 
proband’s blood relatives.  
 
Part IV: Outlining the Case for a Duty to Disclose 
This chapter has explored the public interest that justifies disclosing genetic information to 
the proband’s blood relations.  It has been argued here that disclosing genetic information 
– specifically in circumstances when a cure or treatment is available – furthers the public 
interest in preventing harm and is consistent with Art 2 ECHR.  It has been argued that 
these interests countervail the public interest in maintaining confidentiality and data 
protection and justify breaching doctor-patient confidentiality.  The question therefore 
arises, if disclosure of genetic information can be justified by reference to a public interest, 
why is it necessary to create a duty to disclose?  Subsequent chapters will explain how a 
duty may be constructed; here the case for why a duty is necessary will be outlined. 
Critics may argue that disclosures could be facilitated without introducing a new 
duty, particularly if disclosure is in the public interest.  Certainly, there will be minimal 
need for judicial creativity if an exception to breach of confidence is accepted as the way 
forward, since the courts have already shown in Crozier that public and private interests 
will be reconciled where it is in the interests of justice.  Furthermore, as doctor-patient 
confidentiality is a cornerstone of medical practice, an argument may be made that 
authorising disclosures through exceptions to confidentiality and data protection would 
allow healthcare practitioners to engage with and appreciate their legal obligations.  There 
is some merit to this point because clinicians are exposed to a variety of professional 
literature regarding the balancing of competing interests demanded by a decision to 
disclose.  Approaching the familial aspects of genetic information through an exception to 
confidentiality and data protection may therefore suit the medical profession. 
The problem with this approach is that the circumstances when public interest 
exceptions apply are not clearly defined.  Although this grants public interests a measure of 
fluidity, it means that exceptions to breach of confidence are uncertain.  It has argued here 
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that disclosing genetic information is consistent with the public interest in preventing harm 
and Art 2 ECHR, but because balancing competing interests involves an element of 
discretion, it does not follow that because an exception exists it will be consistently 
applied.  One reason for this might be that, although disclosure is in the public interest, 
genetic information might be communicated through the proband and a breach of 
confidence avoided.  It would depend upon the context of the situation, but it is possible 
that the existence of an alternative means of disclosing genetic information could lead to 
the courts refusing to authorise disclosure.  The effectiveness of disclosure via the proband 
is debatable, however, because ‘geographical, social and emotional factors can mean that 
communication does not happen.’183  Furthermore, studies have shown that the uptake of 
genetic screening (and, consequently, access to preemptive treatments) is virtually doubled 
when clinicians make the disclosure,
184
 which suggests that communication by healthcare 
practitioner is a more effective means of communicating information about genetic 
diseases than relying on the patient him- or herself. 
A duty to disclose would obligate clinicians to make disclosure in particularly 
circumstances and, in this way, introduce a measure of certainty regarding when 
confidentiality and data protection can be breached.  Though it has been posited that 
disclosing genetic information is in the public interest, when public interests necessitate 
disclosure is based on the balancing of competing interests.  The decision therefore 
incorporates a degree of discretion, thus subjective interpretation of clinical guidance will 
influence the outcome of the balancing exercise.  More significantly, there is no means of 
censure for failing to disclose information, a point to which this work returns below.  A 
duty to disclose would create a framework within which disclosure is necessary when 
certain conditions are met.  Thus an aspect of clarity consistency could be achieved, since 
for a clinician to discharge their duty they would need to comply with the appropriate 
standard of care.  In order for doctors to effectively discharge their duty, the standard of 
care would need to be sufficiently defined for them to engage with, setting a minimum 
threshold of behaviour in respect of disclosure.  An ill-defined standard of care would 
mean the duty would be inaccessible and the medical profession would be unable to 
understand their legal obligation.  Since the standard of care would indicate what 
behaviour is expected to discharge a duty to disclose, healthcare providers would know the 
scope of their obligation to the blood relations of a proband with a deleterious genetic 
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trait.
185
   In plain terms, the existence of a duty to disclose means the balancing exercise 
necessary to evaluate whether a breach of confidence is justifiable has all ready been 
undertaken. 
A duty to disclose may be characterised as attempting to remove the element of 
discretion from decisions about breaching doctor-patient confidentiality, but instead its aim 
is to provide a framework within which clinical discretion does not disadvantage those 
who would be harmed by nondisclosure.   It is trite that discretion is a necessary 
component of medical practice, however, unchecked it can lead to inconsistency and this is 
particularly evident when considering the balancing exercise applied to breaches of 
confidence.  Although guidance attempts to introduce a measure of objectivity by 
encouraging clinicians to consider disclosure from the perspective of the patient and the 
recipient, the balancing will to some extent depend upon the healthcare practitioner’s 
experiences and beliefs.  Therefore it is entirely possible for individual clinicians to come 
to different conclusions regarding the same deleterious trait.  Thus clinician one might 
disclose said trait because to do so further a public interest in preventing harm, while 
clinician two may consider the balance as weighing in favour of protecting confidentiality.  
Both of these outcomes are justifiable by reference to a public interest, yet only the 
decision to disclose is likely to be a candidate for judicial scrutiny because the potential 
recipient when disclosure does not occur has no standing in confidentiality.  The 
inconsistency is also problematic as it creates something of a postcode lottery.  A duty to 
disclose could introduce a measure of consistency because the standard of care necessary 
to discharge the duty would require doctors to disclosure when particular circumstances 
arose.  The balancing exercise between competing interests would therefore all ready be 
complete.  A duty to disclose, however, would not remove discretion entirely and 
therapeutic privilege would continue to exist, but arguably therapeutic privilege would 
only arise in circumstances involving disclosure where no cure or treatment is available.  
Thus therapeutic privilege would compliment rather than conflict with a duty to disclose.   
A duty would, arguably, through the standard of care, introduce a measure of 
consistency to decisions on disclosure and recognise the interests of blood relations in 
being informed of their genetic conditions.  The scope of the duty proposed herein is 
relatively narrow and it would only arise when a treatable genetic disease is identified.  
The duty would thus be discharged once details of the proband’s deleterious trait are 
communicated to identifiable relations.  An analogy can be drawn between a duty to 
disclose genetic risks and a duty upheld in the United States and Australia to sexual 
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partners of patients with HIV:
186
 the duty arises at a specific point (diagnosis) and is 
discharged at an equally specific point (communication of the diagnosis to the patient).  If 
a healthcare practitioner negligently fails to inform the patient of their HIV positive status 
and a sexual partner becomes infected, liability accrues because the most effective 
precaution – warning the patient – has not been taken.  It must be noted that in the context 
of HIV, it is the patient’s condition that poses a risk to sexual partners, thus apprising them 
of their diagnosis enables them and their partner to exercise precautions.
187
  The patient’s 
genetic condition does not pose a risk to others, thus informing the patient is of limited 
value to blood relatives because it does not necessarily enable the taking of precautions 
because genetic information is not always communicated.  Furthermore, as noted 
previously, uptake of genetic screening (and thereby access to preventative therapies or 
earlier treatment) is increased when healthcare practitioners make the disclosure, indicating 
the clinical benefits of this approach.
188
 
However, the critical reason confidentiality and data protection are an unsuitable 
means for facilitating disclosure of genetic information is because neither framework is 
capable of recognising harm to individuals other than the confider/data subject.  
Confidentiality and data protection focus on the individual to whom the information being 
processed pertains, protecting the secrecy of their medico-personal data and the integrity of 
doctor-patient relationship.  Legal redress is available to those who suffer an unauthorised 
disclosure of confidential data or whose data is processed unlawfully, although the law 
does provide a number of exceptions which doctors can rely on to justify making a 
disclosure.  However, confidentiality and data protection do not recognise the interests of 
third parties who are harmed because particular information was not disclosed.   
Thus a duty to disclose could recognise the potential harms the proband’s blood 
relations can experience should genetic risks be withheld.  The critical aspect here is what 
constitutes harm in the genetic context and this is a point to which this work returns in 
chapter four.  The issue for present purposes is that if nondisclosure is recognised as 
harmful but information is withheld, the current legal paradigm provides no redress for 
those who have suffered harm because information was not released.  In this way, a duty to 
                                                        
186
 See Reisner v The Regents of the University of California, (1995) 37 Cal Rptr 2 d 5180; BT v 
Oei [1999] NSWSC 1082; PD v Harvey [2003] NSWSC 487. 
 
187
 In the event the doctor’s duty is disclosed but the patient acts recklessly, then in the UK the 
patient becomes subject to criminal sanctions. 
 
188
 Suthers, G.K., Armstrong, J., McCormack, J., and Trott, D., ‘Letting the family know: balancing 
ethics and effectiveness when notifying relatives about genetic testing for a familial disorder’ 
(2006) J Med Genet 43, 665–670. 
 
 65 
disclose would recognise the familial aspect of genetics, the potential for harm and the 
necessity of protecting the interests of blood relations.  The focus of confidentiality and 
data protection upon the data subject, the proband in this context, means that recognising 
and redressing harm beyond that caused by unauthorised disclosure or processing is 
unachievable, even though disclosure of genetic risks is arguably in the public interest.  
The confidentiality/data protection paradigm thus eschews the vulnerable position of the 
proband’s blood relations.  The shared nature of genetic information means it is not typical 
personal data, therefore adhering to the current legal paradigm would not recognise the 
broader issues that arise when deleterious traits are isolated within the proband’s genome.  
Although it is acknowledged that doctor-patient confidentiality and data protection must be 
respected insofar as is possible – to maintain the level of trust necessary to effectively treat 
patients – data secrecy must yield insofar as is necessary to prevent harm to others. 
Genes are ‘shared’ and the familial dimension to genetic testing means that the law 
has to look beyond the current paradigm of confidentiality and data protection.  It must 
adapt and recognise the broader familial implications of genetic information and it is 
argued here that it should do so in circumstances where disclosure of the proband’s 
deleterious genetic traits can prevent harm to blood relations.  In the subsequent chapters, 
this work will outline the basis of a duty to disclose, the concept of harm and how such a 
duty might be realised through the tort of negligence. 
 
 
 
3. FOUNDATIONS OF DUTY AND DISCLOSURE AT COMMON LAW 
 
Introduction 
The common law obligation of confidentiality requires healthcare practitioners to respect 
the confidences of their patients and data protection governs when information may be 
lawfully processed.  The legal framework provides patients with redress when disclosure 
or processing occurs without authorisation or sufficient justification.  The problem in the 
context of genetics is confidentiality and data protection are not suitable vehicles for 
claims by blood relations flowing from nondisclosure of the proband’s genetic 
information.  English tort law does not recognise a duty to rescue, thus no general 
obligation exists to act in the best interests of third parties ‘however reasonably or 
probably … loss or damage might have been anticipated.’1  Thus the proband’s family 
must demonstrate a duty of care is owed to them by the proband’s clinician, the duty has 
been breached, and that breach is causative of the harm sustained. 
There is a paucity of case law addressing the complexities of genetic information 
and risks but claims concerning medical disclosure have been articulated in negligence 
both in the UK and United States.  Claimants have been owed duties of care in respect of 
the disclosure of information, risks and alternative treatments.
2
  The duty of care 
articulated here builds upon the duties articulated within the doctor-patient relationship and 
argues in favour of an extension of a healthcare practitioners’ duty to particular third 
parties.  The US judiciary has grappled with a duty to disclose medical risks beyond the 
therapeutic relationship, but the UK courts have only dealt with nondisclosure of medical 
risks within the context of the doctor-patient relationship.  Thus no precise analogy exists 
in UK tort law, although cases have arisen concerning disclosure of risks to third parties.  
American tort law, in contrast, has an established line of case law regarding a duty to 
disclose both physical and medical risks, including genetically transmissible diseases.  
Though no perfect analogy exists domestically, some comparisons may be drawn with the 
duty to secondary victims.  Secondary victims are claimants who are proximate to the 
defendant by virtue of an intermediate party and – although important distinctions do exist 
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– proximity plays a comparably crucial role in determining liability.  At a higher level of 
abstraction, it might also be argued that liability to secondary victims is indicative of the 
courts accepting claims by third parties, though subject to rigorous thresholds. 
Before examining the paucity of domestic case law focusing on the disclosure of 
risks to third parties, it is necessary to briefly consider the clinician’s duty of disclosure to 
patients.  This is an important reference point in a discussion of a duty to disclose to blood 
relations because the scope of any such obligation cannot be broader than that of the duty 
to patients.  There is a risk of undermining the doctor-patient relationship if the duty to 
blood relations is more robust than the duty to patients.  It is thus important to establish the 
scope of healthcare practitioners’ obligation to disclose in respect of patients before 
considering the mechanics of a duty to the proband’s family. 
The underlying focus of the duty to disclose also warrants consideration at this 
early stage.  Traditionally the tort of negligence is a route for remedying harms carelessly 
inflicted upon the claimant and ‘setting standards for employers … drivers, manufacturers, 
healthcare professionals and many others whose carelessness may cause harm.’ 3  
Negligence is therefore ‘happiest when faced with damage that arises in knotty problems 
involving collisions between strangers, preferably with lots of broken limbs.’4  Stapleton 
describes harm as the gist of a negligence action,
5
 thus an important question that arises in 
respect of a duty to disclose is what is the harm?  The question is directly addressed in the 
following chapter.  A necessary precursor to an analysis of the concept of harm is 
discussion of the fundamental premise of a duty to disclose: specifically, whether the duty 
is concerned with protecting familial interests in genetic risk or recognising and remedying 
harm arising from nondisclosure. 
Questions of interest and wrongdoing are typically collated because ‘negligence is 
not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest’.6  By way of 
example, a claim arising from a road traffic accident simultaneously protects the claimant’s 
interest in physical integrity and recognises and remedies the harm caused by the 
negligence.  Concepts of interest and wrongdoing are symbiotic in this circumstance; when 
the negligence is nondisclosure, a duty may protect an interest in knowing information or 
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recognise and remedy harm caused by the failure to disclose.  The distinction is crucial 
because the focus of the duty will fundamentally differ dependent on the perspective 
adopted.  A duty concerned with protecting an interest is breached – and harm inflicted – 
when the relevant interest is frustrated, examples including the torts of battery and false 
imprisonment, which protect interests in bodily security and liberty respectively.
7
  A duty 
that recognises and remedies a harm requires a greater interference with the claimant than 
the frustration of their interest.  Thus negligence typically requires physical or non-
physical injury in addition to an interference with a legally recognised interest.  As a 
secondary victim, for example, it is insufficient to demonstrate an interference with an 
interest in psychical integrity, which could take the form of grief, stress or anxiety.  For a 
negligence claim to exist, a claimant must suffer harm; for secondary victims, this harm 
takes the form of a recognised psychiatric disorder.
8
 
Thus it is necessary to explore the underlying purpose of a duty to disclose.  The 
central consideration is whether such a duty can be reconciled with the traditional focus of 
negligence on remedying harm or – alternately – whether it should be construed as 
protecting the interests of the proband’s blood relations.  The paradigm within which a 
duty to disclose fits will then form the basis of the discussion of the relevant harm in 
chapter four.  In advance of discussing the underlying rationale of duty to disclose, it is 
necessary to establish the contextual framework.  Thus this chapter will briefly revisit the 
historical development of duty of care.  Thereafter it will consider whether lessons can be 
learned from the development of the duty to secondary victims, which concerns a model of 
liability with which careful analogies might be drawn.  The chapter will then return to the 
question what is the underlying premise of a duty to disclose, before outlining the scope of 
the clinician’s duty of disclosure to patients.  The chapter will then conclude by examining 
key cases from the UK and the US engaging with the issue of disclosure to third parties. 
 
The Evolution of Duty 
The duty of care is a cornerstone of modern negligence; in plain terms, the existence of a 
duty of care transforms a defendant’s conduct from negligence in fact to negligence in law.  
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Modern understanding of duty begins with the seminal judgment of Lord Atkin in 
Donoghue v Stevenson, wherein he created the neighbour principle.
9
  Articulating the 
scope of duty, his Lordship famously stated ‘in law you must not injure your neighbour’ 
and defined ‘neighbours’ as 
 
‘persons so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts and 
omissions called into question.’10 
 
The neighbour principle determined a duty existed when it was reasonably foreseeable that 
injury would occur to person or persons with whom the defendant was sufficiently 
proximate.  The judgment of Lord Atkin developed an earlier attempt to establish a test for 
duty by Brett MR in Heaven v Pender,
11
 an exercise he subsequently attempted to 
resuscitate (as Lord Escher) in Le Lierve v Gould.
12
 
Donoghue established the modern tort of negligence and provided a single, 
unifying test for duty of care.  However, the neighbour principle was a broad concept and 
‘little was said about how the principle might be confined; it was not limited by reference 
to any particular type of loss.’13  Subsequently the courts attempted to refine the neighbour 
principle and, initially, attempts were made to limit it by reference to the narrow ratio of 
Donoghue.
14
  However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the judiciary favoured trailblazing 
over consolidation, first recognising a duty of care in respect of negligence 
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misstatements,
15
 then extending the scope of the duty of care in Anns v Merton London 
Borough Council.
16
  In what became a maligned judgment, Lord Wilberforce explained 
that it was no longer necessary to develop the duty of care by reference to ‘previous 
situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist.’17  He explained that whether a 
duty existed between the parties had to be approached in two stages: 
 
‘First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person 
who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or 
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, 
carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter … [Secondly] it 
is necessary to consider whether the are any considerations which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty’.18 
 
The two-stage test in Anns continued to require satisfaction of the neighbour principle and 
if these elements were demonstrable a prima facie duty of care arose.  Thereafter, it was 
for the court to evaluate whether compelling reasons existed to militate against holding a 
duty was owed or in other ways limit its scope.  The test was favourable for claimants 
because a duty was, in effect, established by demonstrating foresight and proximity and it 
was left to the defendant to show policy factors militated against a finding of liability.  
This permitted novel negligence actions to succeed because there was no need to 
demonstrate an analogy with existing categories of claims.
19
  However, Lord Wilberforce’s 
two-stage approach was not well received and quickly became subject of judicial criticism, 
with hostility growing over the subsequent decade.
20
  The High Court of Australia was first 
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to decline to follow the Anns test in Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman,
21
 
Brennan J clearly articulating judicial concerns with the two-stage approach: 
 
‘the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by 
analogy with established categories, rather than by massive extension of prima 
facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable ‘considerations’ which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of persons to whom 
it is owed.’22 
 
The House of Lords was persuaded by Brennan J’s dicta when the opportunity arose to 
reconsider the test for the duty of care in Murphy v Brentwood District Council
23
 and 
Caparo v Dickman.
24
  In both judgments their Lordships approved of the approach of the 
High Court of Australia
25
 and Lord Bridge delivered a speech in Caparo that ‘has come to 
be regarded as the classic exposition of the modern approach to the duty of care’.26  He 
said: 
 
‘in addition to the foreseeability of damage … there should exist between the party 
owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by law 
as one of “proximity” or “neighbourhood” and that the situation should be one in 
which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a 
duty of given scope on one party for the benefit of the other.’27 
 
At first blush, the three-part test from Caparo might appear to be a restatement of the two-
stage approach from Anns.  Foreseeability and proximity remain necessary ingredients to 
establishing a duty of care.  Policy considerations also continue to be evaluated via the 
requirement a duty be fair, just and reasonable.  However, the approaches adopt different 
perspective on duty and, as Lunney and Oliphant explain, the shift 
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‘may aptly be characterised as one between an approach that starts from the 
presumption of a duty, and requires the invocation of policy factors if the duty is to 
be negated, and one that starts from a presumption of no duty, and requires the 
invocation of policy factors if a new duty is to be established.’28 
 
The shift from expansion to restriction was also encapsulated by Lord Bridge, who 
suggested that negligence had moved in a direction of attaching greater significance to 
analogy as a guide ‘to the existence, the scope and the limits of the varied duties of care the 
law imposes.’29  He approved of the High Court of Australia’s preference for incremental 
development and called for a similar approach to be adopted domestically.  This could be 
seen as precluding (or at least making it very difficult) to prove novel duties exist because 
there may not be a readily available analogy, although the point is somewhat moot 
following Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank Plc.,
30
 where the House 
of Lords stated that ‘[i]n absence of any touchstone [of liability] … a court faced with a 
novel situation must apply the threefold test.’ 31   The tort of negligence thus remains 
flexible and adaptable and extension is possible in absence of analogous case law, 
providing the three-part test is satisfied.  This reflects Lord Macmillan’s statement in 
Donoghue that ‘the categories of negligence are never closed’.32  Some commentators have 
argued the law is experiencing a restrictive period;
33
 it is perhaps more appropriate to 
describe the prevailing judicial attitude as one of consolidation and circumspection, 
whereas the 1970s represented a period of legal trailblazing.  Negligence has continued to 
develop and encompass new liabilities
34
 but the pace of change has slowed, particularly in 
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relation to the duty of care.  Against the background of a supposedly increasingly litigious 
society and amid concerns of a ‘compensation culture’,35 this quiet trickle of development 
might be characterised as a search for balance between justice and preventing the opening 
of the proverbial floodgates.
36
 
To successfully establish a duty to disclose it is necessary to overcome judicial 
caution in respect of extending negligence.  Thus any duty must be robust, its scope 
rigorously defined to avoid potential floodgates arguments.  A further obstacle in the 
context of genetics is that the duty is concerned with non-physical injury, which has 
traditionally not been ‘on the same [legal] footing as physical injury.’37  Thus, in advance 
of analysing the elements of a duty to disclose, it is helpful to consider the courts’ attitude 
to non-physical harm.  This chapter therefore considers the development of liability to 
secondary victims and whether there are any inferences to be drawn with regard to a duty 
to disclose genetic risks to a patient’s relatives. 
 
Duties to Secondary Victims 
The duty of care to secondary victims is an example of expansion in the tort of negligence 
and reflects Lord Macmillan’s observation in Donoghue that the concept of legal 
responsibility may develop in accordance with altering social conditions and standards.
38
  
The courts were initially reluctant to allow recovery for psychiatric injury in absence of 
physical peril or actual harm, but advancements in psychiatry and changes in societal 
perceptions have resulted in the judiciary becoming more amenable to claims for psychical 
injury.  As Weir explained in 1992, public perception exerts an influence on what 
constitutes harm.  He wrote: 
 
‘There is … no doubt that the public draws a distinction between the neurotic and 
the cripple, between the man who loses his concentration and the man who loses 
his leg.  It is widely felt that being frightened is less than being struck … the duty 
to avoid injuring strangers is greater than the duty not to upset them.  The law has 
reflected this situation as one would expect, not only by refusing damages for grief 
                                                        
35
 For a recent analysis of the compensation culture see Lewis, R., ‘Compensation Culture 
Reviewed: Incentives to Clam and Damages Levels’ (2014) 4 JPIL 209. 
 
36
 A case that exemplifies the difficulties of balancing justice with possible floodgates issue – and 
in which the House of Lords arguably erred too much on the side of caution – was Alcock v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310. 
 
37
 Chico, above, n 4, p. 29. 
 
38
 Donoghue, above, n 9, at 619. 
 
 74 
altogether, but by granting recovery for other psychical harms only late and 
grudgingly.’39 
 
Weir’s point might also be applied to the nondisclosure of genetic risks.  It is possible that 
harm resulting from a lack of knowledge of a risk is perceived as less serious than harm 
caused by negligent treatment.  The liability of doctors failing to disclose of risks to 
patients suggests nondisclosure does already constitute harm in particular circumstances.  
Of course, the nondisclosure of risks to blood relations does lie outside the present scope 
of liability, but psychiatric injury exemplifies that ‘an outcome which was once not a harm 
can come to be perceived as such.’40  Despite initial reluctance, the judiciary has gone as 
far as to acknowledge that ‘psychiatric harm may be far more debilitating than physical 
harm’41 and although the courts remain circumspect about extending liability for mental 
injury,
42
 it is no longer accurate to describe their inclination towards recovery for 
psychiatric injury as grudging. 
Although there are similarities between secondary victims and the proband’s blood 
relatives a note of caution is necessary.  Both types of claim involve liability to parties with 
whom the defendant is proximate because of a relationship with an intermediary party – 
the primary victim in psychiatric injury, the proband in nondisclosure.  However, though 
the intermediary is determinative of proximity in both situations, there is a significant 
difference that must be born in mind.  Primary victims are persons in a zone of danger and 
are either physically injured or physically imperiled (or are reasonably perceived to be so 
by the secondary victim) as a result of the defendant’s negligence.  By contrast, the 
proband is not at risk of harm if genetic information is not disclosed to their blood 
relations.  Despite this distinction, secondary victims are indicative of the courts 
willingness to uphold a duty of care to third parties in circumstances where harm to those 
individuals is reasonably foreseeable.  The duty of care to secondary victims is thus a 
useful case study when discussing creation of a duty to disclose genetic risks to persons 
beyond the traditional therapeutic relationship. 
The prevailing attitude to psychiatric injury at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was summarised in Dulieu v White,
43
 where Kennedy J said that liability should 
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only exist when a claimant experiences ‘a shock that arises from a reasonable fear of 
personal injury to oneself’.44  The decision in Dulieu was effectively an attempt to exclude 
liability to individuals who witnessed a traumatic event but were not themselves at risk of 
being injured.  The difficulty with requiring claimants to fear personal injury was 
recognised by the Court of Appeal in Hambrook v Stoke Bros,
45
 wherein Atkin LJ (as he 
then was) explained it  
 
‘would result in a state of law in which a mother, shocked by fright for herself, 
would recover, while a mother shocked by her children being killed before her 
eyes, could not’.46 
 
Hambrook represents the beginnings of a duty to secondary victims but the Court of 
Appeal provided little exposition of the content and scope of the duty.  The House of Lords 
was provided with an opportunity to address this uncertainty in Bourhill v Young,
47
 
wherein the claimant witnessed the aftermath of a road traffic accident and alleged it 
caused her to suffer shock and a miscarriage.  Their Lordships rejected the woman’s claim 
because it was not considered foreseeable that an individual of reasonable phlegm would 
suffer shock in those circumstances, distinguishing Hambrook on its facts.  The outcome 
excluded bystanders from the duty expressed in Hambrook but, though the duty’s scope 
was refined, their Lordships did little to explain its content and there was no attempt made 
to reconcile the cases, though it can be implied that a person of reasonable phlegm would 
have suffered shock in Hambrook as the injured child’s parent. 
The decisions in Hambrook and Bourhill demonstrate the serpentine development 
of tort law, which has been described by commentators as one step forwards and two steps 
back.
48
  The evolution of liability to secondary victims is a window onto the shifting 
perspectives that influence development of novel duties of care.  To some extent, new 
duties are dependent upon the constitution of the courts: a judge with expansionist views 
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(or one sympathetic to the claimant) might rule favourably for the injured party, while a 
more conservative judge might refuse to extend the scope of tort law or take the 
opportunity to reign in an earlier decision.  Development in torts ebbs and flows, shifting 
from expansion to contraction, as exemplified by Dulieu, Hambrook and Bourhill. 
The duty to secondary victims started to stabilise in the 1980s and reached 
somewhat of a plateau in the 1990s, coinciding with the emergence of a more conservative 
approach to the duty of care concept.  The crucial decisions that shaped the modern 
approach to secondary victims were McLoughlin v O’Brian,49 Alcock v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire
50
 and McFarlane v E. E. Caledonia.
51
  These cases provide an indication 
of the courts’ approach to liability for non-physical injury to third parties and how the 
limits of such accountability are defined.  They are also indicative of the pitfalls that 
should be avoided when constructing a duty to disclose. 
The decision in McLoughlin reflected the earlier judgment in Hambrook and 
affirmed that a duty is owed to close relations of those negligently injured by the 
defendant.  The claimant was a woman who suffered severe shock after witnessing the 
condition of her husband and children in hospital – described as ‘distressing in the 
extreme’52 – in the aftermath of a road traffic accident.  The House of Lords considered 
that she fell within a class of persons who the law already permitted to recover damages 
for psychiatric injury, namely those possessing a close tie of love and affection to the 
injured or deceased party.
53
  Lord Wilberforce further added that 
 
‘to insist on direct and immediate sight or hearing would be impractical and unjust 
and that under the aftermath doctrine, one who, from close proximity comes very 
soon to the scene, should not be excluded.’54 
 
It was thus held that the defendant’s duty of care extended to individuals who did not 
directly perceive the traumatic incident but witnessed its aftermath, however its scope was 
restricted to those claimants in a close relationship with the victim(s).  Lord Bridge agreed 
                                                        
49
 [1983] AC 410. 
 
50
 [1992] 1 AC 310. 
 
51
 [1994] 2 All ER 1. 
 
52
 McLoughlin, above, n 49, per Lord Wilberforce at 417. 
 
53
 Ibid., at 421-422. 
 
54
 Ibid., at 422. 
 
 77 
that the claimant’s case was merit worthy and allowed the appeal.  But, in contrast to Lord 
Wilberforce, Lord Bridge was reluctant to define the scope of liability by reference to 
proximity, perception or consanguinity, arguing that to do so was to ‘impose a largely 
arbitrary limit of liability’.55  He contended that: 
 
‘this is an area of negligence where we should resist the temptation to try yet once 
more to freeze the law in a rigid posture which would deny justice to some who, in 
the application of the classic principles of negligence … ought to succeed, in the 
interests of certainty, where the very subject matter is uncertain and continuously 
developing’.56 
 
Lord Bridge’s statement regarding rigid boundaries applies equally to genetic risks.  The 
law should not refuse to establish a duty to disclose because proximity is not demonstrated 
by traditional means, i.e. the existence of a doctor-patient relationship.  Although a degree 
of certainty is necessary if healthcare practitioners are to effectively discharge their duty, 
the tort of negligence also needs to remain flexible in the interests of justice.  A duty to 
disclose, however, can be defined by reference to consanguinity because of the familial 
nature of genetic risk, thereby may potentially avoid arguments concerning indeterminate 
liability that apply to secondary victims. 
Despite Lord Bridge’s reticence, the House of Lords did attempt to freeze the law 
on psychiatric injury in a ‘rigid posture’ in Alcock, producing mixed results in the long 
term.  Alcock was a test case arising from the Hillsborough Stadium disaster in 1989 where 
a crowd crush during and FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest 
resulted in 96 deaths and 766 further injuries.  The case concerned psychiatric injury 
sustained by relatives of those who were at the ground.  Although Lord Bridge had earlier 
called for flexibility regarding secondary victims, the House of Lords opted for a 
conservative approach.  Approving the scope of liability Lord Wilberforce applied in 
McLoughlin, which referenced ‘the class of persons whose claims should be recognised; 
the proximity of such persons to the accident; and the means by which the shock is 
caused’,57 their Lordships dismissed the appeals, concluding no duty arose because of a 
lack of sufficient proximity between the parties.  The main reason for their findings was 
that none of the claimants has demonstrated a close tie of love and affection with the 
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victims.  Though Lord Wilberforce had alluded that a duty arose when a close tie of love 
and affection existed between claimant and victim in McLoughlin, the tie was axiomatic on 
the facts and did not warrant further consideration.  In Alcock, the House of Lords 
considered it a prerequisite to liability and only presumed that a close tie existed between 
parent-child and spouses.  In all other circumstances, the presumption that no close tie 
existed had to be rebutted.  Considering the claim of a man who had lost his brother in the 
disaster, Lord Ackner explained: 
 
‘The quality of brotherly love is well known to differ widely – from Cain and Abel 
to David and Jonathan … [the] claim was not presented upon the basis that there 
was such a close and intimate relationship between them as gave rise to that very 
special bond of affection which would make his shock-induced psychiatric injury 
reasonably foreseeable.’58 
 
Alcock is a significant example of mercurial judicial attitudes and how negligence can 
quickly shift.  Prior to their Lordships’ decision it was unknown that a close tie of love and 
affection ‘was a precondition of liability in such cases.’59  The judgment has been criticised 
as it was ‘harsh to disallow a claim for not being pleaded in a way that no-one had 
previously suggested was necessary.’ 60   Their Lordships’ decision can also be fairly 
portrayed as representative of the conservative approach to extending the duty of care that 
had been building since the late 1980s, albeit at an extreme point on the spectrum.  
Though the House of Lords dismissed the claimants’ action, Lord Ackner,61 Lord 
Keith
62
 and Lord Oliver
63
 ‘were prepared to accept that there might be liability [in absence 
                                                        
58
 Alcock, above, n 50, at 406. 
 
59
 Lunney, M., Oliphant, K., above, n 24, p. 346. 
 
60
 Ibid. 
 
61
 Alcock, above, n 50, at 403: ‘while it may be very difficult to envisage a case of a stranger, who 
is not actively and foreseeably involved in a disaster or its aftermath, other than in the role of a 
rescuer, suffering shock-induced psychiatric injury by mere observation of apprehended or actual 
injury of a third person … I see no reason in principle why he should not, if in the circumstances, a 
reasonably strong-nerved person would have been so shocked.  In the course of argument your 
Lordships were given, by way of an example, that of a petrol tanker careening into a school in 
session and bursting into flames.  I would not be prepared to rule out a potential claim by a passer-
by so shocked by the scene as to suffer psychiatric illness.’ 
 
62
 Ibid., at 397: ‘The case of the bystander unconnected with the victims of an accident is difficult.  
Psychiatric injury to him would not ordinarily, in my view, be within the range of reasonable 
foreseeability, but could not perhaps be entirely excluded from it if the circumstances of a 
catastrophe occurring very close to him were particularly horrific.’ 
 
 79 
of a close emotional tie] when the accident witnessed by a bystander was particularly 
horrific.’64  Strangely, their Lordships did not consider the Hillsborough disaster horrific 
enough for liability to accrue and avoided providing an explanation as to ‘how any “scales 
of horror” could be devised, especially given the subjective nature of reactions to such 
events.’65  The implication is that their Lordships were attempting to leave themselves 
room to maneuver in the event that a ‘horrific’ disaster occurred leading to claims by 
bystanders, yet the introduction of this loophole was inconsistent with the remainder of the 
Alcock judgment. 
This inconsistency was recognised by the Court of Appeal in McFarlane, a case 
arising from the Pipia Alpha disaster in July 1988, when a series of explosions destroyed a 
North Sea oil and gas rig killing 167 of the 229 crewmen aboard.  The claimant had been 
aboard a support ship that went to assist in rescue and firefighting operations, suffering 
psychiatric injury as a consequence of his experiences before he was airlifted to safety.  
The Court of Appeal dismissed his claim because he was neither a primary victim, as he 
had not been physically imperiled, nor a secondary victim because he lacked a close tie of 
love and affection with those aboard the Alpha.  It was considered extending liability to 
bystanders ‘ran counter to the general thrust of Alcock and would present practical 
problems since reactions to horrific events are subjective and variable.’66 
Liability to secondary victims is a useful litmus test when exploring the possibility 
of a duty to disclose genetic risks to the proband’s blood relations.  First, it is proof that ‘an 
outcome which was once not considered a harm can come to be perceived as such.’67  
Second, it demonstrates that the judiciary is willing to extend the scope of negligence as 
our understanding of human biology and psychology develops.  Genetic technology and 
our understanding of the human genome and its role in disease are advancing rapidly.  
Liability for psychiatric injury demonstrates a willingness to accept novel claims as 
medical knowledge and psychiatry develop, thus it is arguable the courts will grow 
                                                                                                                                                                       
63
 Ibid., at 416: ‘I would not exclude the possibility envisaged by my noble and learned friend, Lord 
Ackner, of a successful claim, given circumstances of such horror as would be likely to traumatise 
even the most phlegmatic spectator, by a mere bystander.’ 
 
64
 Lunney, M., Oliphant, K., above, n 24, p. 346. 
 
65
 Ibid. 
 
66
 Peel, E., Goudkamp, J., Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 19
th
 ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 
2014), p. 232.  It is difficult to understand why a petrol tanker careening into a school is any more 
horrific than Hillsborough or Pipa Alpha; for further discussion, see Oughton, D., Lowry, J., 
‘Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm’ (1995) 46 NILQ 18. 
 
67
 Chico, V., above, n 4, p. 29. 
 
 80 
increasingly receptive to claims arising from genetic technology as science and medicine 
advance.  In 1992, Weir described recognition of psychiatric injury as grudging, but in the 
two decades since the House of Lords decided Alcock the courts have become more open 
to claims for psychiatric harm.  The House of Lords has even acknowledged that  
 
‘there is no rigid distinction between body and mind … a recognisable psychiatric 
illness results from an impact on the central nervous system.  In this sense therefore 
there is no qualitative difference between physical and psychiatric harm.   And 
psychiatric harm may be far more debilitating than physical harm.’68 
 
If there is no rigid distinction between body and mind then it may also be argued that the 
same is true of the physical body and genetics: the nondisclosure of a genetic risk 
ultimately interferes with the physical wellbeing of the individual. 
Finally, the development of a duty to secondary victims demonstrates a willingness 
to uphold liability to third parties where it is in the interests of justice.  Despite the 
dismissal of the claims in Alcock, the House of Lords did create a duty to individuals who 
were not traditionally proximate to the defendant, but became proximate because of a 
relationship to the victim.
69
  There is a similarity in this respect with a duty to disclose 
genetic risks, as proximity is determined by consanguinity.  The foundations of liability for 
genetic nondisclosure are therefore already present in negligence.  A duty to disclose does 
not represent a wholesale departure from existing principles of liability but builds upon 
them.  If the courts are willing to accept a duty arises because of an emotional tie with 
victims of the defendant’s negligence, it is not radical to suggest the courts may be 
receptive to liability predicated upon genetic links.  Because descendants of a common 
gene pool share genes, commonality is greatest within the nuclear family, thus the risk of 
indeterminate liability does not arise, unlike in claims flowing from circumstances like 
those in Alcock. 
It is therefore possible to suggest that while the duty to disclose would represent an 
extension to the duty of care it is not a radical departure from current models of liability.  
The question is whether – given the conservative approach to duty highlighted above – the 
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judiciary are willing to create a duty to disclose, particularly considering it will require the 
courts to either acknowledge a new head of damage or reinterpret existing types of harm.   
 
Protecting Interests or Remedying Harms 
The changeable attitude of the courts to extending negligence to novel types of injury 
during the 20
th
 century suggest it is not a foregone conclusion that a duty to disclose will 
be accepted or rejected.  The question is whether such can be established using the Caprao 
test, which remains the threshold for new duties of care.  However, before undertaking a 
substantive analysis of the elements of the three-stage test in the genetic context, it is 
important to return to the earlier posed question: what is the underlying purpose of a duty 
to disclose? 
On the one hand, a duty could be created to vindicate a claimant’s interest in 
knowing about the proband’s genetic risks; on the other, it could recognise and remedy 
harm caused by nondisclosure.  The second of these permutations follows the traditional 
approach of negligence, although the distinction is to some extent artificial because 
negligence ‘is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protect interest.’70  
An invasion of an interest is necessary but a duty that recognises and remedies harm also 
requires that the claimant is foreseeably injured.  Secondary victims provide an illustration: 
the claimant must show more than an interference with their interest in mental integrity, 
they must also prove they are suffering from a recognised psychiatric illness. 
If a duty is focused on vindicating the claimant’s interest, liability accrues when the 
relevant interest has been frustrated.  For example, in actions for battery or false 
imprisonment it is not necessary for the defendant to cause harm to the claimant, it is 
sufficient that their actions infringe the interest protected by those torts.  If the purpose of a 
duty to disclose is to protect the claimant’s interest in genetic information, then the duty 
will be breached by the decision not to disclose.  In contrast, a duty concerned with 
remedying harm would require the nondisclosure to harm the claimant before liability 
would accrue. 
The immediate difficulty with a duty that protects an interest is that a potential 
conflict arises with the proband’s interest in confidentiality.  Disclosure would need careful 
balancing against confidentiality and would require the support of a countervailing public 
interest.  It was argued in the proceeding chapter that the most compelling justifications for 
disclosing genetic information flow from a public interest in preventing harm and Art 2 
ECHR.  A duty concerned solely with the frustration of an interest in genetic information 
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would not fall within these justifications for breaching confidentiality and data protection.  
Furthermore, an interest-based duty could lead to a situation where the confidentiality of 
the patient is subservient to the interests of their blood relations.  Confidentiality allows 
disclosure where there is a ‘countervailing public interest which favours disclosure’,71 but 
it is difficult to reconcile protecting a familial interest in genetic information with public 
interests in harm or the right to life.  Broader public interests may offer some measure of 
support to an interests-based duty but, as discussed previously, broader interests can 
encounter a problem in that other means for advancing the public interest exist.  A duty 
focused on harm arising because of nondisclosure is (potentially) consistent with the public 
interest in preventing harm and Art 2 ECHR and thus a justifiable breach of 
confidentiality. 
A traditional approach to duty focused on harm is favoured here but whichever 
permutation of duty is preferred, a fundamental requirement is that the claimant 
demonstrate ‘a wrong to herself, i.e., a violation of her own right.’72  The interest being 
infringed must be legally recognised because where ‘claims relate to the defeating of 
interests which are not legally recognised harm in negligence, they are currently largely 
likely to meet with rejection.’73   A duty protecting an interest in genetic information 
therefore requires courts to, firstly, recognise that interest and, secondly, accept that 
frustration of that interest is actionable in tort.  Working within the traditional framework 
of duty, harm consequential to nondisclosure can be reconciled with interests already 
protected in negligence. 
The interest in bodily integrity includes an interest in mental integrity because – per 
Lord Steyn in White – mental and physical injury are indivisible.  The same logic can be 
applied to one’s health.  If the wellbeing of a claimant is compromised by negligence – 
say, through exposure to toxins – the harm constitutes an interference with bodily integrity.  
I the context of genetics, if a risk of disease is not disclosed and disease eventuates – and 
either a cure or preventative treatment was available – then the nondisclosure can be 
characterised as interfering with the claimant’s bodily integrity.  Knowing about genetic 
risks may therefore be reconciled with an interest recognised in negligence.  If this view is 
correct, the core themes of the duty also coincide with the public interests justifying 
derogation from confidentiality and data protection. 
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If it is demonstrable that nondisclosure causes foreseeable harm, a duty can be 
constructed with recognition of harm at its core, a formulation consistent with the role of 
negligence in setting standards for persons whose carelessness may cause injury. 
Furthermore, the recognition of harm provides succinct justification for breaching doctor-
patient confidentiality and is consistent with the GMC guidelines on confidentiality, which 
advise disclosures can be made when there exists a risk of foreseeable harm to a non-
patient.
74
  The proposed duty would therefore integrate elements of professional guidance, 
the crucial distinction being that the duty would create an obligation; the GMC’s 
guidelines do not. 
A duty to disclose can thus be formulated in a manner consistent with the 
traditional foci of negligence, although a possibility remains that the courts could accept an 
interests-based duty instead.  The probability of this outcome is low, however.  Duties to 
protect rights and interests do exist within the UK’s legal system but they are not prevalent 
in negligence.  This question is whether a system built around recognition and remedying 
of harms can be used as a foundation for a duty vindicating an interest.  A duty could arise 
through application of human rights legislation, which has become somewhat influential 
within domestic law.
75
  However, the extent of its influence on the development of 
negligence is open to debate.  The most prominent human right insofar as negligence is 
concerned is arguably Art 6 ECHR, as it guarantees the right to a fair trial and prevents the 
creation of blanket immunities for public authorities and services.
76
  Art 6 places a duty 
upon the court to act compatibly with convention rights and this duty is set out in the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  It is unusual for human rights to achieve recognition through 
common law duties, although the duty on the court means human rights are capable of 
influencing common law decisions.  Thus it may be that claimants argue knowing about 
genetic risks is an aspect of their Art 8 right to respect for private and family life or, in 
extreme circumstances, potentially their Art 3 right to freedom from inhumane and 
degrading treatment,
77
 but such interests are not protected in negligence. 
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This is not to say that interests-based duties have not arisen in negligence and the 
argument in favour of a duty protecting the interests of blood relations may find support in 
Reeves v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis.
78
  The case arose as a consequence 
of a man committing suicide in police custody, despite the attending officers being 
forewarned that he may attempt suicide.  An assessment conducted shortly after the man 
arrived at the police station indicated he was suffering neither psychiatric illness nor 
clinical depression, but officers were nonetheless instructed to observe him frequently.  
Following one check, the flap in his cell door was inadvertently left open and the man tied 
his shirt through the spyhole on the exterior of the door and hung himself.   
The claimant – the administratrix of the deceased’s estate – argued that the police 
had been negligent in their actions.  The defendant conceded that a duty was owed to the 
man while he was in custody, which meant the House of Lords was not required to explore 
the content of the police’s duty to detainees.  The focus was instead on whether suicide 
constituted a novus actus interveniens.  Had their Lordships assessed the content of the 
duty to detainees it is suggested they would have struggled to reconcile it with traditional 
principles of negligence.  A duty arguably existed in the circumstances because of the 
rights of the detainee, not the harm caused by the defendant.  The duty cannot be 
reconciled with the man’s interest in bodily integrity because ‘the defendant’s action was 
not wrongful relative to that right.’79 
For a duty to exist between two parties there must be a correlation between the 
negligent act and the frustrated interest because the claimant cannot recover ‘unless the 
defendant’s action is a wrong in relation to that right.’80  In plain terms, the interest a duty 
vindicates must be the interest the defendant negligently frustrates.  Thus in Reeve the duty 
cannot flow from an interest in bodily integrity because the negligence did not interfere 
with that particular interest.  A starker illustration can be found in Palsgraf v Long Island 
Railway Co.  Here the action was based in the claimant’s interest in bodily integrity, 
which, it was argued, the defendant infringed through their negligent handling of box of 
fireworks that fell onto the tracks and exploded.  The resultant shockwave caused a set of 
scales at the far end of the station to fall from their mount and strike the claimant.  The 
claimant’s ‘right to her bodily security was not disputed’, but it was concluded that ‘the 
defendant’s action was not wrongful relative to that right’, because the negligent act 
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actually infringed another’s interest in property and not the claimant’s bodily integrity.81  
The absence of correlativity between the frustrated interest and the harm meant that no 
duty was owed to the claimant. 
In Reeves, the negligence of the officers in leaving the cell door flap open did not 
physically threaten the detainee.  His interest in bodily integrity was therefore not 
infringed.  A better explanation of the basis of the police’s duty is the detainee’s Art 2 right 
to life, since because he was a known suicide risk the negligence of the officers constituted 
a failure to safeguard his Art 2 right.  The House of Lords and the Court of Appeal both 
appear to support this interpretation as they conclude that since officers were aware of the 
risk of suicide, it was a risk they were under a duty to mitigate and, therefore, in leaving 
the flap open and providing the man with a means to commit suicide, had failed to 
discharge their duty.  The courts, it would seem, impliedly accepted a duty with the 
purpose based on protecting the detainee’s interest rather than remedying a harm. 
The subsequent decision in Orange v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
82
 supports 
an interest-based interpretation of the duty in Reeves.  Orange also concerned the suicide 
of a detainee, however, the facts diverged from those in Reeve because the police were not 
forewarned that the man was a suicide risk.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the 
defendants had taken all reasonable precautions, taking account of the higher rate of 
suicides among remand prisoners, and dismissed the claim.  The actions of the police had 
not infringed the detainee’s Art 2 right and a lack of forewarning meant that there was no 
correlativity because the defendant’s actions did not infringe the claimant’s interests in the 
circumstances.  As Latham LJ summarised, ‘the special and unusual duty [in Reeves] is 
one which is only owed where the authorities know, or ought to know, of a suicide risk in 
an individual prisoner’s case.’83 
This brief analysis demonstrates a potential within negligence to recognise duties 
concerned with vindicating an interest as opposed to remedying harm.  However, as was 
noted in Orange, these duties are exceptional.  The interest protecting by the duty in 
Reeves was also an immutable right.  An interest in knowing about genetic risks is not 
immutable, nor is it legally recognised at present.  A question therefore remains about 
whether this interest could be the basis of a Reeves-type duty.  The courts conservative 
approach to the duty of care suggests that it is unlikely, but the decision in Reeves 
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demonstrates that negligence is capable of vindicating interest, so it cannot be completely 
ruled out. 
The predominant focus in negligence remains the remedying of harms.  This thesis 
examines nondisclosure of genetic risks within this traditional framework and does not 
argue in favour of an interests-based approach to duty.  A person’s interest in knowing 
about genetic risk is not at present considered a fundamental interest.  Thus the courts are 
unlikely to accept frustration of such an interest as a basis of a duty of care.  The analysis 
here reflects this improbability.   
Situating a duty to disclose with the traditional negligence framework of 
recognising and remedying of harms, however, raises a fundamental question about what 
the harm is within the context of nondisclosure.  This question is significant and it is one to 
which this thesis will return to in chapter four. 
 
The Common Law and Disclosure of Information – The Duty to Patients 
Situating a duty to disclose within the traditional harm focused framework of negligence 
provokes the question, how has negligence thus far grappled with issues relating to 
disclosure?  There are two strands of case law that are relevant when answering the 
question.  The first relates to disclosure within the doctor-patient relationship.  The second 
concerns disclosure of risk to third parties.  The immediate focus is case law involving 
patients; case law involving third parties is examined in the subsequent sections. 
A patient’s fundamental grievance when bringing an action regarding a failure to 
disclose can be summarised as: ‘[y]ou did not inform me of the risk which has eventuated; 
but for your failure, I would not have consented to the procedure; you have failed in your 
duty of care and, as a result, I have sustained injury.’84  Consent is the interest at the core 
of this strand of claim.  Jackson explains this is because the tort of negligence is: 
 
‘incapable of recognising a patient’s inherent interest in material information, and 
so informed consent becomes a route for patients to seek financial compensation 
for unfortunate but blameless medical outcomes.’85   
 
The action, however, does not flow from a lack of consent, which would create a claim in 
battery.
86
  Instead, it is a result of negligence on the part of the clinician when obtaining the 
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consent.  Specifically, it is the failure to disclose certain risks which would have affect the 
patient’s giving of consent had they known about them.  A problem with this type of claim 
is that 
 
‘Doctors who exercised all due care and skill in the performance of an operation 
will be found liable for the consequences of an accident which they could have 
done nothing to prevent just because their pre-operation disclosures were 
inadequate.’87 
 
The difficulty for the courts is deciding whether or not the patient was sufficiently 
informed in the circumstances and ‘[t]here has been a significant amount of uncertainty 
over the years about the precise ambit of a doctor’s duty of disclosure and how it is to be 
judged’.88  One pressing issue with an ex post facto assessment of disclosure is that it could 
be ‘coloured by hindsight’,89 with the court, in effect, being asked to rule on the credibility 
of the claimant. 
The sufficiency of disclosure is also closely linked with the doctrine of informed 
consent.  An in-depth analysis of informed consent is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
suffice to say the doctrine was rejected by the courts in Sidaway v Board of Governors of 
the Bethlem Royal Hospital as forming ‘no part of English law’,90 but commentators argue 
that it is ‘now part of the lore of medical ethics and its repetition among even the highest 
ranks of the judiciary means that we must accept it’.91  Mason and Laurie suggest that 
following the House of Lords decision in Chester v Afshar
92
 ‘the question is no longer, “is 
the doctrine of informed consent coming to the United Kingdom?” but rather “what can we 
do to improve upon the American model?”’93  The decision in Chester may put domestic 
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law within touching distance of a doctrine of informed consent, but it is important to note 
that the decision related to causation, not breach, therefore any inferences drawn regarding 
informed consent must be drawn cautiously. 
Consent and disclosure are symbiotic elements of the doctor-patient relationship, 
however, this thesis is not concerned with issues of informed consent.  The focus here is 
the scope the duty of disclosure to patients in English law, particularly what should be 
disclosed and when that disclosure should be made. 
The duty of disclosure first arose in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee,
94
 although the judgment is rather more famous for establishing the ‘responsible 
body’ test for breach of duty in cases of professional and medical negligence.  The issue in 
Bolam regarding disclosure was whether the clinician had been negligent in not disclosing 
the risks of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).  McNair J drew attention to whether or not 
sufficient information had been provided to the claimant in his direction to the jury, 
explaining they had to decide whether in adopting a practice of saying very little and 
waiting for questions from the patient, ‘they were falling below a proper standard of 
competent professional opinion … of whether or not it is right to warn.’95  McNair J went 
on to explain that the jury may find that: 
 
‘when a doctor is dealing with a mentally sick man and has a strong belief that his 
only hope is submission to electroconvulsive therapy, the doctor cannot be 
criticised if he does not stress the dangers, which he believed to be minimal’.96  
 
The direction implied that clinicians were not negligent when they were acting in the 
patient’s best interest, providing that those actions were consistent with ‘a responsible 
body of medical opinion.’ 97   Disclosure to patients is therefore subject to the same 
threshold as other types of medical negligence and ‘any argument as to what needs to be 
disclosed … hinges upon whether or not the Bolam principle applies.’98  McNair J, in his 
direction to the jury, appeared to favour a paternalistic approach to information disclosure: 
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if a clinician believed it was in the best interests of their patient to withhold particular 
details, they could not be criticised for doing so. 
The Bolam approach to disclosure was adopted in subsequent cases,
99
 but these 
invariably dealt with alleged batteries or other types of medical negligence in conjunction 
with arguments of insufficient disclosure.  What the patient ought to be told was modeled 
paternalistically and no breach of duty existed providing the level of disclosure was 
consistent with the views of a responsible body of medical opinion. 
The House of Lords were finally given an opportunity to evaluate the duty of 
disclosure on its own merits in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital.
100
  The case concerned 
a failure to disclose a (statistically slight) risk of spinal injury and was an opportunity to 
reconsider the role of Bolam in defining what constituted adequate disclosure.  In the Court 
of Appeal, Donaldson MR strongly asserted that ‘the definition of the duty of care is not to 
be handed over to the medical or any other profession’ as it was ‘a matter for the law and 
the courts.’101  Browne-Wilkinson LJ was also skeptical about the role of the medical 
profession in determining the standard of care regarding medical disclosure, arguing that 
‘the assumption of the role of advisor, whether or not such advice involves any special 
skill or judgement, carries with it the duty to disclose material or unusual risks.’ 102  
However, despite notable reservations, he eventually conceded that ‘there are good 
grounds for holding that in relation to doctors the duty to disclose risks should be 
approached on a different basis from that applicable to ordinary professional men’.103  
Donaldson MR also accepted ‘the Bolam test as the primary test of liability for failing to 
disclose sufficient information to the patient’.104  The House of Lords were less critical of 
Bolam, with only Lord Scarman arguing that such cases should be decided by reference to 
‘whether in the circumstances … a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk.’105  On the role of Bolam, he said that he found ‘the 
implications of this view of the law … disturbing’ as it left ‘the determination of a legal 
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duty to the judgement of doctors.’106  Lord Diplock reached a conclusion at the other 
extreme, stating that deciding when a patient 
 
‘should be voluntarily warned and the terms in which such a warning, if any, 
should be given … is as much an exercise of professional skill and judgement as 
any other part of the doctor’s comprehensive duty of care to the individual patient 
… The Bolam test should be applied.’107 
 
Lord Bridge (with whom Lord Keith agreed) also accepted that ‘a decision [about] what 
degree of disclosure of risks is best calculated to assist a particular patient make a rational 
choice … must primarily be a matter of clinical judgement.’108  Lord Templemen agreed, 
stating where a doctor conscientiously endeavoured to explain the arguments for an against 
a major operation ‘the court will be slow to conclude the doctor has been guilty of a breach 
of duty … merely because the doctor omits some specific item of information.’109 
The decision in Sidaway perpetuated the paternalistic approach to risk disclosure.  
What should be disclosed remained a matter of clinical judgement, irrespective of the 
patient’s wants or wishes.  Lord Bridge and Lord Templemen did, however, accept that 
Bolam was not a panacea for liability.  Lord Bridge explained: 
 
‘the judge might in certain circumstances come to the conclusion that disclosure of 
a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of 
the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.’110 
 
Lord Templemen said: 
 
‘the court must decide whether the patient has suffered harm from a general danger 
inherent in the operation or from some special danger.  In the case of a general 
danger the court must decide whether the information afforded to the patient was 
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sufficient to alert the patient to the possibility of serious harm of the kind in fact 
suffered.’111 
 
It is plain from the judgments in Sidaway that elements the Court of Appeal and House of 
Lords were uncomfortable with applying Bolam to cases involving information disclosure, 
yet notwithstanding these reservations it was confirmed as the appropriate threshold for 
claims regarding the nondisclosure of risks to patients.  Despite the impression of unease in 
Sidaway it is noteworthy that ‘the ranks continued to be closed whenever the [Bolam] 
principle was directly questioned.’112  However, in late 1990s and into the new millennium 
the analysis of nondisclosure shifted from the perspective of the clinician towards a more 
patient orientated standard where ‘rigid adherence to the Bolam standard is no longer the 
approach’.113 
In Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust
114
 the defendant failed to disclose 
a statistically slight risk of foetal death to an overdue mother, who had expressed a desire 
to either induce birth or undergo caesarian section.  The defendant did, however, cite the 
risks involved in inducing labour and the lengthy recovery period associated with 
caesarians.  Sadly, the child died in utero as a consequence of the delayed birth and the 
claimant alleged the doctor was negligent in not disclosing the 0.1 to 0.2 per cent risk 
associated with the delay.  The Court of Appeal dismissed her claim, ‘endorsed Sidaway as 
the law and accepted Bolam as the relevant test’115 but, as Jackson highlights, ‘did appear 
to move a little closer to the “reasonable patient” test’.116  Delivering the judgment of the 
court, Lord Woolf MR said: 
 
‘if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgement of a reasonable 
patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the 
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patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient can 
determine for him or herself as to what course he or she should adopt.’117 
 
However, Lord Woolf’s statement was at odds with the ultimate conclusion in Pearce118 
and though it ‘appears to indicate a more robust commitment to the patient’s right to 
information’,119 in answering the question ‘significant to whom?’, Lord Woolf ‘appeared 
to rely upon the doctors’ judgement of whether the risk was “significant”, and not Tina 
Pearce’s own assessment of whether the risk was sufficiently material that it would have 
affected her decision to accept medical advice and proceed to a natural birth.’120  Despite 
this Pearce is seen as taking a step back from Bolam.  In the subsequent decision of Wyatt v 
Curtis,
121
 Sedley LJ explained that Lord Woolf’s formulation refined Lord Bridge’s test by 
recognising that 
 
‘what is substantial and what is grave are questions on which the doctor’s and 
patient’s perception may differ, and in relation to which the doctor must therefore 
have regard to what may be the patient’s perception.’122 
 
In Chester v Afshar,
123
 Lord Steyn approved of Lord Woolf’s approach, stating that in 
‘modern medical law paternalism no longer rules and a patient has a prima facie right to be 
informed by a surgeon of a small, but well established risk of serious injury as a result of 
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that surgery.’124  The rejection of paternalism as a ruling principle implies a shift towards a 
patient oriented assessment of risk disclosure.  This is supported by the judgment of Lord 
Hope, who felt that that the purpose of disclosure was to engender self-determination.  He 
explained: 
 
‘the [patient’s] right to make the final decision and the duty of the doctor to inform 
the patient if the treatment may have special disadvantages or dangers go hand in 
hand … The function of the law is to protect the patient’s right to choose … it must 
ensure that the duty to inform is respected by the doctor.’125 
 
The decision in Chester may represent an endorsement of a patient oriented approach to 
disclosure in the doctor-patient relationship, but the focus of the case was causation and 
not breach, thus any inferences must be cautiously drawn.  The indication, however, is that 
the courts are prepared to engender liability where information is withheld and have gone 
as far as upholding liability where clinicians have failed to disclose alternative treatments. 
In Birch v University College London Hospital NHS Foundation Trust,
126
 the 
patient suffered a stroke as a result of a cerebral catheter angiogram, which was conducted 
to discern whether the patient had a posterior communicating artery aneurysm.   The 
angiogram was an invasive procedure and had a slight risk of a stroke, yet an MRI offered 
an alternative method of diagnosis without such risk.  The defendant was negligent for not 
disclosing the risks and alternative procedure available because ‘even though one [the 
angiogram] was thought to be slightly more effective than the other at ruling out a 
potentially serious condition, they both broadly could have reached a similar diagnosis.’127 
This sensibly means that while a clinician owes a duty to disclose alternative elective 
treatments they would not have to do so in all circumstances, nor disclose ineffective 
alternatives; the gist of the duty is that patients should be provided with information about 
realistic alternatives to the treatment proposed with lower risk factors, enabling the patient 
to choose whether or not to accept the higher risk. 
Although a first instance decision, Birch suggests that the duty of disclosure is 
moving away from the paternalism of the Bolam test, with the question ‘what should be 
                                                        
124
 [2005] 1 AC 134 at 143. 
 
125
 Ibid., at 190. 
 
126
 (1999) 48 BMLR 118. 
 
127
 Heywood, above, n 88, p. 31. 
 
 94 
disclosed?’ being assessed from a patient oriented perspective.  The scope of the duty 
therefore appears to reflect the depth of information necessary for self-determination in 
any given circumstance.  This is much broader than a duty to disclose genetic risks to 
family members, which is concerned with preventing harm.  The duty to patients is 
focused on matters of autonomy and self-determination.   
 
A Duty to Disclose to Third Parties 
There is a paucity of case law on the complexities of genetic information.  The domestic 
courts have, however, limited experience of a duty to disclose risks to third parties.  This is 
a stark contrast to US jurisprudence, which has tackled the issue of disclosure to third 
parties and, to some extent, the familial entanglements involving genetic information.  But 
though it has upheld liability to parties beyond the doctor-patient relationship, American 
tort law has not devalued the importance of the clinical obligation of confidentiality.
128
  US 
case law therefore provides a useful steer when evaluating how English tort law could 
recognise a duty to disclose genetic risks.  For this reason, it is important to briefly 
examine the key decisions from the US judiciary. 
 
US Jurisprudence 
The duty to disclose to parties beyond the therapeutic relationship flows from the seminal 
judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Tarasoff v The Regents of the University of 
California,
129
 which concerned the murder of the claimant’s daughter by her ex-lover, a 
former psychiatric patient of the defendants.  During the course of his treatment, the 
patient had on numerous occasions communicated to his psychiatrists that he intended to 
kill the victim upon release, yet no attempt was made to warn the victim of the threat the 
patient posed.  The Supreme Court of California was unsympathetic to the defendants and 
upheld a duty to the victim, Justice Tobriner stating: 
 
‘When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should 
determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he 
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against 
such danger.  The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or 
more various steps, depending on the nature of the case.  Thus it may call for him 
to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to 
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notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances … once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable 
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a 
serious risk of danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.’130 
 
A duty of care arose because the non-patient victim was an identifiable third party whose 
jeopardy arose from a risk that was known to the defendants.  It was breached because the 
psychiatrists failed to disclose the threat to either the victim or those likely to warn her of 
the risk.  The court rejected an argument that the defendants’ obligation of confidentiality 
prevented them from discharging such a duty, stating that ‘the confidential character of 
patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent that the disclosure is 
essential to avert danger to others.’131  The crucial element of the decision in Tarasoff was 
that it created liability in absence of a traditional relationship of proximity between the 
parties.  In this case, there existed neither physical closeness nor an antecedent relationship 
and, therefore, the action should have failed for not establishing sufficient proximity 
between claimant and defendant.  However, the court held that the identifiable nature of 
the victim was such that it made the parties ‘neighbours’ and, consequentially, the victim 
was owed a duty of care. 
The decision in Tarasoff was influential and has been described by commentators 
as ‘one of the single most celebrated cases in the recent history of American tort law’.132  
Furthermore, ‘in more than thirty years since this seminal decision, Tarasoff-type duties 
have been widely accepted throughout the [United States] and imposed through either 
common law or statute’.133  It has subsequently been extended in a number of judgments, 
notably in Durflinger v Artiles,
134
 which held that a psychiatrist could owe a duty to 
disclose to a finite class of identifiable victims, and Reisner v The Regents of the 
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University of California, where it was held that a clinician owed a duty to sexual partners 
of a woman with HIV, despite the class of potential victims being unidentifiable.
135
 
However, Knoppers contends that judgments such as Tarasoff and Durflinger offer 
little in terms of guidance in respect of the nondisclosure of genetic information, arguing 
that 
 
‘it is the patient’s actions which are likely to harm others in the case of a threat of 
violence, in the case of genetic conditions, the patient is not putting relatives at risk 
by carrying the gene mutation because the relatives already have the mutation or 
not.’136 
 
Yet this is arguably a narrow interpretation of the Tarasoff-type duty, which Laurie instead 
suggests are actually examples of situations where a defendant ‘is privy to important 
information through the medium of a patient which could be used to protect third parties 
from harm.’137  The common position in the patient violence and genetic risk scenario is 
that the defendant institution (other than the patient themselves) is the only party capable 
of providing a warning to those who are at risk, and judgments in the American courts 
appear to support Laurie’s broader interpretation. 
A duty to disclose has been upheld in cases involving contagious diseases, with 
some decisions predating the creation of the Tarasoff duty.
138
  The duty has also been 
extended to non-contagious diseases where relatives share the same epidemiological risk.  
In Bradshaw v Daniels
139
 a clinician was held to owe a duty to the patient’s wife to warn 
her of the risks of exposure to the source of her husband’s disease – Rocky Mountain 
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spotted fever.
140
  Reversing the appellate court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
concluded that it was appropriate ‘to impose upon a physician an affirmative duty to warn 
identifiable third parties in the patient’s family against foreseeable risks emanating form 
the patient’s illness.’141 
A Tarasoff duty has also been raised in the context of familial genetic information.  
In Pate v Threlkel
142
 the claimant alleged that her mother’s doctor was negligent in his 
failure to disclose that the strain of cancer he had treated her mother for (medullary thyroid 
carcinoma) was genetically transmissible.  The claimant argued that had she been apprised 
of the hereditary nature of the disease she would have sought genetic testing and, if 
necessary, early preventative treatment.  Nondisclosure of the condition’s genetic 
component had prevented her from doing so.  The Supreme Court of California rejected 
the claimant’s submissions, holding that a clinician did not owe a duty to members of a 
family to disclose genetically transmissible conditions that a patient was undergoing 
treatment for.  It considered that to require clinicians ‘to seek out and warn various 
members of a patient’s family would often be difficult or impractical and place a heavy 
burden upon the physician.’143  Furthermore, the court held that were  such a duty to exist 
it would be discharged by merely informing the patient that, firstly, their condition is 
genetically transmissible and, secondly, their blood relations should seek screening and/or 
treatment.  This perspective on the discharge of the duty is consistent with that adopted in 
Reisner, where it was decided that informing the patient of her HIV status would have 
fulfilled the duty to her sexual partners.  Thus the implication in Pate was that a duty to 
disclose would arise when a clinician failed to disclose to the patient that their condition 
was genetically transmissible, although this permutation of the facts has yet to be litigated. 
The applicability of a duty to disclose to genetic conditions was then revisited by 
the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division in Safer v Estate of Pack,
144
 in which 
the claimant learned that her father had previously suffered and died from retroperitoneal 
cancer, a condition that the claimant was undergoing treatment for.  As in Pate, there was a 
hereditary risk to the claimant’s health and her father’s doctor had failed to disclose this 
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fact to her, which, it was alleged, amounted to negligence as it deprived the claimant of 
screening, prompt detection and treatment.  Drawing analogies with contagious disease 
litigation and Tarasoff duties, the court concluded that ‘[i]n terms of foreseeability … there 
is no essential difference between the types of genetic threat at issue here and the menace 
of infection, contagion or threat of physical harm.
145
  Furthermore, it considered that ‘[t]he 
individual or group at risk is easily identified, and substantial future harm is easily 
identified or minimized by a timely and effective warning.’146  The judgment in Safer 
therefore imposes a duty on clinicians towards those individuals ‘known to be at risk of 
avoidable harm from a genetically transmissible condition.’ 147   The court was not 
persuaded by the arguments in Pate regarding the burden such a duty would place upon 
medical professionals, expressly distinguishing the earlier judgment, stating that ‘a duty to 
warn of avertable risk from genetic causes … is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of 
justice.’148 
 
UK Jurisprudence 
A Tarasoff scenario has yet to be litigated in the UK.  One of the closest permutations of 
facts is at present found in Palmer v Tees Health Authority.
149
  The claim was brought by a 
mother whose daughter was abducted and murdered by a former patient of the defendants, 
who had previously confessed during therapy to having sexual feelings towards children.  
The patient had been released as an outpatient but had failed to attend his recent hospital 
appointments.  He also resided in the same street as his victim.  However, the Court of 
Appeal found the parties to be insufficiently proximate for a duty of care to exist in respect 
of mother or daughter, as the victim was perceived to be at no greater risk than any other 
child, placing her within a potentially indeterminate class of ‘at risk’ individuals.  As 
Stuart-Smith LJ summarised: 
 
‘it is at least necessary for the victim to be identifiable … to establish proximity … 
it seems to me that the most effective way of providing protection would be to give 
warning to the victim … so that some protective measure can be made … and the 
                                                        
145
 Ibid., at 1192. 
 
146
 Ibid. 
 
147
 Ibid. 
 
148
 Ibid. 
 
149
 [2000] PIQR P1. 
 
 99 
most effective precaution cannot be taken because the defendant does not know 
who to warn.  This consideration suggests to me that the Court would be unwise to 
hold that there is sufficient proximity.’150 
 
The conclusion in Palmer may at first blush appear to preclude the possibility of a Tarasoff 
type duty in English tort law.  However, the judgment is consistent with American 
jurisprudence.  In Thompson v County of Alameda
151
 a juvenile offender with a known 
propensity for violence towards children was temporarily released into his mother’s 
custody, whereupon he murdered a young boy.  The offender had previously intimated to 
his doctors that he would kill one of the children that lived in his neighbourhood if 
released, though he never identified a specific victim, merely the geographical proximity.  
The Supreme Court of California held that a Tarasoff duty could not extend to an 
unidentifiable victim, even if the locality from which they would be drawn was known.  
The victim did not become identifiable by virtue of residence in a specified location. 
The judgment in Thompson and Court of Appeal decision in Palmer might initially 
appear to be at odds with the earlier American decision of Durflinger, wherein it was held 
a Tarasoff duty could extend to an identifiable class of victims.  However, the judgments 
can be reconciled because Durflinger extended the duty to disclose only where the class 
was finite.  The duty arose in that case because the threat was to the perpetrator’s family 
and not the wider public, as was the case in Thompson and Palmer.  The distinction 
appears to be based upon the practicability of discharging the duty of care: if a patient 
makes a directed threat against their nephew or niece or the neighbour’s child then the 
clinician’s duty can be discharged by warning the identified victim or (in all likelihood) 
their parents, whereas if a patient broadly threatens to murder a child who resides in the 
borough of Southwark, the clinician’s duty becomes potentially impossible to fulfill.  The 
suggestion is that had the claimant’s daughter in Palmer been identifiable or one of a finite 
class of victims, then a duty of care would have arisen. 
The supposition that a Tarasoff type victim would have succeeded in Palmer is 
leant further weight by the judgments in Bromley v United Kingdom
152
 and K v Secretary 
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of State for the Home Department,
153
 where the necessity of being an identifiable victim is 
again made apparent.  Dismissing a pre-action application for disclosure under the Civil 
Procedure Rules, Smith J observed in K: 
 
‘This claimant cannot claim any special relationship of proximity.  She cannot 
show that the Secretary of State should have been any more aware of her, as a 
potential victim … than any other member of the public … The facts relating to 
proximity are simple and are not in dispute.  Miss K was an ordinary member of the 
public with no special relationship of proximity to the Secretary of State.’154 
 
At first instance, Holland J concurred.  He said: 
 
‘Any range of contemplated victims would be remote, extensive and indirect 
depending upon that third party[’s] … choice as to whether to obey the law or 
whether to commit some (and if so, what) crime involving a person or persons 
whose identity was wholly speculative … Essentially, the claimant could not be 
identified as a potential “victim” and consequently was outwith the proximity that 
is a key element of a duty of care situation.’155 
 
In the Court of Appeal, it was implied in the speech of Laws LJ that an identifiable victim 
would succeed in their action, as in such circumstances a nexus would exist between the 
parties.  He stated: 
 
‘in third agency cases the law in principle looks for a ‘special relationship’ between 
claimant and defendant before it will find a duty of care … [a] factor in the case to 
provide a nexus between claimant and defendant … [Where] the damage which the 
claimant suffers is directly occasioned by the defendant’s acts or omissions, such a 
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nexus will generally be taken to be present … [otherwise] the nexus will have to be 
found on the particular facts.’156 
 
Ultimately the appeal was dismissed because there was ‘no true nexus shown between 
claimant and defendant’.157  Arden LJ likewise implied an alternate outcome where the 
victim is identifiable, explaining that the ‘need to show proximity (meaning closeness of a 
relevant kind between the appellant and the respondent) … cannot be established simply 
by showing the knowledge on the part of the respondent was of a glaring danger to the 
public’.158 
The necessity of an identifiable victim if a duty to disclose is to be established is 
further underlined by the decision in W & Others v Essex County Council,
159
 in which the 
claimants were foster parents engaged by the local authority, and their four biological 
children.  A fifteen-year-old boy whom had been placed in the household by the defendant 
had sexually abused the children.  The parents had previously stated that they would not 
foster any child suspected of, or known to commit, sexual abuse and the defendant had 
offered assurances that no such child would be placed with them.  However, the defendant 
failed to disclose that the boy had received a caution for indecent assault and was, at the 
time, being investigated on suspicion of rape.  Hooper J, at first instance, concluded ‘that 
social worker placing a child with foster parents has a duty of care to provide the foster 
parents such information as a reasonable social worker would provide’.160  This conclusion 
was supported in the Court of Appeal by Judge LJ who agreed that ‘there is a duty to make 
enquiries and provide information to the foster parents before the placement is made’,161 
but also held that ‘the local authority assumed responsibility for the accuracy of its positive 
assurances to the parents’.162  Lord Slynn in the House of Lords proffered the Delphic 
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observation that ‘the risk was obvious.’163  The children were identifiable victims, as the 
family members were in Durflinger.  The offender resided with them at the behest of the 
defendant but knowledge about the risk posed by the boy was not disclosed to the parents 
and, unlike in Palmer, the defendant could have exercised the most effective precaution 
because they knew precisely who to warn. 
An identifiable victim also arose on the facts in Selwood v Durham County 
Council, a case that also bears some similarities to Tarasoff.
164
  Herein the claimant was 
employed as a social worker for the local authority, which collaborated closely with two 
NHS trusts to provide integrated social care and mental health services.  The claimant was 
assigned a case concerning a young girl whose father suffered from mental health 
problems and had a history of violent behaviour.  The father was a patient of the NHS 
trusts and, during treatment, told his doctors that he wished to harm the social worker 
involved in his daughter’s case.  He then later stated he would ‘kill her on the spot’ if he 
saw her.  Despite the severity of the threat and the patient’s known history of violence, 
neither the claimant nor her employer was apprised of the situation.  When the patient was 
temporarily discharged from hospital, he attacked the claimant with a knife, inflicting 
serious injuries.  The claimant sued her employer and the NHS trusts in negligence, but it 
was held at first instance that neither trust owed her a duty of care in respect of the actions 
of a third party.  However, the Court of Appeal allowed the claimant’s appeal and sent the 
matter to trial, Dame Smith, delivering the judgment of the court, concluding that: 
 
‘this appellant was not one of the world at large; she was one of a small group of 
social workers, working in close proximity and cooperation with the second and 
third defendants’ own employees … the judge erred in failing to consider the 
special position of this appellant.  I have done so and I conclude that it would be 
open to a trial judge, taking the particular relationship between the parties into 
account, to conclude that it was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on 
the NHS trusts.’165 
 
Dame Smith’s reasoning bears similarities to that in Tarasoff and, particularly, Durflinger, 
where it was held that a defendant could owe a duty of care to a finite group of identifiable 
victims.  The claimant in Selwood argued that she was in a position of quasi employment 
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with the NHS as a result of the collaboration between Durham Council and the trusts in 
respect of social work and mental health and a duty was owed on this basis.  However, it 
may also be argued that because she had been the specific target of the threats, the claimant 
was an identifiable victim – as had been the case with the patient’s ex-girlfriend in 
Tarasoff.  It was therefore fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care because the 
NHS trusts (and only the trusts) were in a position to take the most effective precaution: 
namely to issue a warning to the claimant and her employers.  This contrasts with the 
situation in Palmer where such a precaution could not be taken because of the victim was 
one of a potentially infinite group of persons who were at risk. 
It is therefore apparent that a duty to disclose is a possibility within English tort 
law, as demonstrated by the judgments in Palmer, W and Selwood.  Judicial willingness to 
oversee such an extension has, however, been reserved thus far, a state evidenced in 
particular by the Court of Appeal’s unwillingness to be drawn on whether or not an 
identifiable victim would have outright succeeded in Palmer, although Selwood does 
indicate that persons in a ‘special position’ can be owed a Tarasoff-type duty.  By contrast, 
American tort law has established a duty to disclose, including in respect of genetically 
transmissible diseases, while maintaining the importance of the doctor-patient relationship 
and the obligation of confidentiality therein. 
It is clear from the cases discussed here that while a body of case law is developing 
in respect of disclosure to patients, litigation has yet to arise in respect of family members 
who are not informed of medical risks.  Such a duty was articulated in America in Safer v 
Estate of Pack and the paucity of domestic cases mean that this judgment and the case law 
following Tarasoff will be invaluable – if only persuasive – guides as to how to approach 
the unique challenges posed by the shared genetic heritage of the family unit. 
4.  Defining ‘Harm’ 
 
 
Introduction 
Negligence is actionable upon proof of harm; it is fair to say – as Stapleton1 and Chico2 do 
– that harm constitutes the gist of a claim in negligence and ‘completes the cause of 
action’. 3   Therefore any argument relating to a duty of care must begin with two 
preliminary questions.  Firstly, what kind of harm has the claimant suffered – physical, 
mental, financial, a setback to other interests?  Secondly, does the injury complained of 
surpass a minimum threshold of harm?  Stapleton calls this minimum threshold the ‘gist 
damage’.  Gist damage is the lynchpin of a claim and, while actual recovery is not limited 
to this core harm, in absence of such there is no action in negligence.  A simple illustration 
of this point is provided by a claim involving a broken leg.  In this example, the pain and 
suffering caused by the break are compensable non-pecuniary losses; however, no 
actionable claim would exist without the physical injury.  The claimant’s broken leg is the 
‘gist damage’.   
Given that harm is fundamental in proving liability in negligence, it is something of 
a surprise that – among the conceptual elements of the tort – it ‘is by far the least 
developed’.4  On the one hand there is some justification for this position because physical 
injuries – the mainstay of negligence – are self-evident and it is unnecessary for the courts 
to provide detailed commentary on the concept of harm in these circumstances.  However, 
when difficulties regarding the definition and categorisation of harm have arisen the issue 
has not been conceptualised in its own right but repackaged as a question of either duty or 
causation.  To a certain extent it does ‘not matter under which heading the courts address 
questions of this kind’, but a ‘lack of conceptual clarity may adversely affect the way in 
which these questions are formulated and dealt with.’ 5   Stapleton has argued that a 
coherent doctrine on the notion of damage is necessary, contending that harm is a word 
                                                        
1
 Stapleton, J., ‘The gist of negligence’ (1988) 104 LQR 213. 
 
2
 Chico, V., Genomic Negligence: an interest in autonomy as the basis for novel negligence claims 
generated by genetic technology (Routledge-Cavendish, London: 2011). 
 
3
 Nolan, D., ‘New forms of damage in Negligence’ (2007) 70(1) MLR 59-88, 59. 
 
4
 Deakin, S., et al, Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law, 7th ed. (OUP, Oxford: 2007), p. 106. 
 
5
 Ibid., p. 107.  Markesinis and Deakin highlight the issue of loss of a chance as an example of this 
conceptual difficulty.  By relying on a balance of probabilities approach in Hotson v East Berkshire 
Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750, the court eschewed the question of whether ‘“loss of a 
chance” fell within the definition of compensatable damage.’ 
 
 105 
‘bandied about in a number of different contexts, usually without clear definition yet 
equally without apparent awareness of the importance of precision in its use.’6  She further 
argues that precision in the definition of harm is important because ‘[a] fundamental 
question … in determining the outer limit of the scope of the tort of negligence is that of 
what damage is or could be recognised as constituting the minimum for an actionable 
claim.’7 
Although it is acknowledged that harm is an underdeveloped concept in the tort of 
negligence, it is not the aim of this chapter to explore the broader philosophies of damage 
in negligence, nor propose a coherent set of principles relating to the definition of harm.  
Instead the focus here is specifically on the issue of minimum actionable damage – ‘gist 
damage’ – and what injury may constitute this threshold in a claim concerning the 
nondisclosure of the proband’s genetic risk. 
Thus far commentators have attempted to define the gist damage relevant to a 
broad range of genetic torts.  Two notable attempts to present a coherent thesis regarding 
the injury suffered by claimants are made by Chico and Brownsword.  Chico proposes the 
courts recognise an interest in autonomy and that interference with this interest would 
constitute the gist of the negligence action.  Brownsword advances a broader interest in 
human dignity as a potential definition of harm in the genetic context.  It is with an 
analysis of these conceptualisations of harm that this chapter begins.  One key objection to 
these formulations of harm that will be explored is their focus on the ability of the 
individual to be self-determinate and eschewing of the physical burdens of the genetic 
condition.  If compensatory damages are awarded in recognition of this interference with 
the claimant’s ability to choose, arguably this will not recognise the debilitating effect of 
the manifestation of a (potentially) avoidable or minimisable condition.  The eventuation 
of the disease is ostensibly more damaging to the individual than the restriction of the 
ability to exercise a choice.   
This chapter will also consider harm formulated as a lack of preparedness and 
expose the frailties of such a broad approach.  Thereafter, the presentation of harm as a 
loss of a chance to avoid the genetic condition and a loss of a chance to receive medical 
treatment will be considered.  The difficulties the all-or-nothing approach of the balance of 
probabilities and the courts reluctance to extend loss of a chance arguments to personal 
injury law will be discussed.  Finally the chapter will explore whether or not the 
eventuation of a genetic condition can itself constitute the gist damage.  The main 
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complaint against this approach is that the defendant does not cause the condition, but it is 
suggested in the case law that a defendant need not always directly cause harm to be liable 
in negligence.  The approach to genetic conditions adopted in American torts jurisprudence 
– where failure to disclose a genetic risk has led to liability – will also be considered.  It 
will be argued that conceptualising the gist damage in genetic nondisclosure cases as the 
eventuation of the condition is the most appropriate way in which to reconcile the issue of 
undisclosed genetic risks with the concept of harm in negligence. 
 
Defining harm as an Interference with Autonomy 
Chico posits that genetic information ‘may be extremely useful in making significant life 
decisions … [and] where relevant genetic information about a person exists, but is not 
disclosed to her, she may feel harmed by this failure.’8  She argues that were a claimant to 
bring a claim in negligence at present, it would not be recognised because causing a loss of 
a chance (i.e. a loss of a chance to avoid the disease or seek medical treatment) is not a 
recognised harm in personal injury claims unless it surpasses the critical point of balance – 
in other words, the lost chance must have been, prior to the defendant’s negligence, in 
excess of 50 per cent.  This chapter will return to the concept of lost chances; it is suffice 
to state at this point that unless the lost chance exceeds 50 per cent, a claim will be rejected 
because, on a balance of probabilities, the negligence is not the cause of the harm.  Thus 
the claimant will have suffered no gist damage upon which to found a claim. 
Chico argues that in absence of judicial recognition of lost chances of avoiding 
personal injury, an alternate interpretation of harm must be advanced and proposes that 
‘[w]hatever the implications of not knowing … the individual might feel that a failure to 
inform her of the personal genetic risk is an interference with her autonomy’. 9   The 
underlying rationale is that in order to be an autonomous individual it is necessary to know 
relevant information about oneself and a claimant might therefore be injured if their 
autonomy is curtailed because the proband’s doctor withheld information.  This argument 
is not dissimilar from that employed in litigation concerning patients’ consent (or lack 
thereof) to medical treatments.  Here the claimant’s argument is that ‘[y]ou did not inform 
me of the risk which has eventuated; but for your failure I would not have consented to the 
procedure … [and] sustained injury.’10  Through recognising a duty in these circumstances, 
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the courts have acknowledged that ‘respect for a person’s autonomy requires her to be 
informed of relevant risks before she consents to a medical intervention.’11  If the failure to 
disclose genetic risks to the proband’s relatives is interpreted as an interference with 
autonomy, then the harm suffered is the not knowing relevant information about oneself 
and if autonomy is viewed from an intrinsic perspective – i.e. that being an autonomous 
person is in itself valuable – then ‘it is irrelevant whether the genetic disease has, or will, 
manifest or the extent to which is can be prevented.’12  Thus once the claimant discovers 
that genetic risks have been withheld from her ‘she might feel aggrieved on the basis that it 
amounts to a failure to treat her as a mature and capable adult who able to cope with 
knowing information about her own genetic risks.’13 
Although ‘knowing available relevant information is in itself important in being an 
autonomous person’,14 an intrinsic perspective of autonomy is difficult to reconcile with 
the necessity in personal injury claims of a negative outcome befalling the claimant.  It is 
trite that a restriction of an individual’s autonomy is undesirable, but it cannot, as Chico 
argues, ‘result in harm, irrespective of whether further adverse consequences flow from the 
failure to respect autonomy’.15  Such an interpretation of harm would create a tort arguably 
concerned with the protection of the exercise of an interest and not the recognition and 
remedying of a harm.  Since one of the primary functions of negligence as a tort is to 
remedy the adverse consequences of the defendant’s careless acts through compensatory 
damages, if the claimant has not been harmed per se but merely had their possible options 
reduced then it may be argued that there is no harm (in the traditional sense) worthy of 
compensation.  For ‘harm’, whether physical or mental, to constitute gist damage, a certain 
threshold must be met.  Physical injuries must be a negative physiological change and 
cannot be benign
16
; psychological harm must constitute a recognised psychiatric disorder.
17
  
It is therefore difficult to reconcile the intrinsic perspective of autonomy, a curtailing of 
possibilities, with the necessity for the adverse outcome at the core of negligence. 
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If the restriction of the claimant’s autonomy by nondisclosure is accepted as being 
deleterious in and of itself, the courts could adopt an approach similar to that applied in 
wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth litigation and award a conventional sum in 
recognition of the interference.
18
   An infringement of the claimant’s autonomy would thus 
become compensable but, again, in absence of an adverse outcome, the extent of 
compensation is unlikely to be significant (and could even be paltry), which may militate 
against attempting to vindicate autonomy through an action in negligence.  A distinction 
between the intrinsic perspective of autonomy and the compensable interference in 
wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth litigation is that there remains an adverse outcome 
in the latter (the pain, suffering and discomfort of pregnancy, if not the birth of a health 
child).  
Rejecting the intrinsic perspective of autonomy as a formulation of harm, an 
alternative proposition is ‘what it [autonomy] might have made possible rather than the 
value of experiencing autonomy per se.’19  This interpretation would be ‘akin to that which 
English negligence law recognises with respect to nondisclosure of medical risks.’20  As 
outlined above, the issue in doctor-patient disclosure litigation is that had the patient’s 
autonomy been respected and the undisclosed risk (which by this point has eventuated) 
been disclosed, the patient would not have elected to undergo the given procedure and, 
consequentially, not suffered the adverse outcome.
21
  In the context of undisclosed genetic 
risks, the interference with autonomy could be characterised as preventing the claimant 
from availing themselves of screening and/or treatment for the condition identified in the 
proband’s genome.  If the interference is considered sufficient to constitute gist damage, 
then the claimant has a cause of action.  Since recovery is not limited to the gist damage 
but encompasses consequential harm as well, it becomes possible for a claimant to present 
the manifestation of a treatable genetic conditional as being consequential – and thus 
compensable – damage.  An analogy can be drawn with Chester v Afshar,22 wherein the 
claimant was not apprised of a statistically low risk of spinal injury inherent in the 
procedure she was to undergo.  When the risk eventuated the claimant sued and the core 
issue for the courts was whether the defendant had caused her harm.  The key point for 
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current purposes is that the risk was inherent in the operation and not caused by the 
defendant’s negligence – genetic conditions could similarly be characterised as inherent in 
the claimant’s genome.  In Chester, the majority in the House of Lords held a common 
view that the Chester-type action was ‘essentially concerned with protecting the patient’s 
right to choose – that is, her autonomy.’23  However, full compensation, rather than a sum 
reflecting the frustration of the claimant’s self-determination, was awarded.  In the context 
of genetic risks, if the gist damage is constituted as an interference with autonomy and the 
underlying rationale of the majority in Chester applied, it (arguably) becomes irrelevant 
that the clinician does not cause the disease providing the risk could potentially be avoided 
through disclosure.  Chico, however, argues that in this scenario the loss is the ‘inability to 
be able to choose to avoid the risk … as opposed to the genetic condition itself.  Thus, the 
damages awarded would reflect the interference with autonomy, as opposed to the direct 
physical aspects of the genetic condition.’24  Her point here is that while the value of 
autonomy may be construed as what it makes possible, what it facilitates might not be the 
averting of the condition.  She argues that ‘[p]eople can make rational decisions to undergo 
treatments or undertake avoidance measures even though they know that the chance they 
will make any difference to the manifestation of the risk is low’.25  Alternately, a person’s 
autonomy may be interfered with even when there is nothing that can be done – or there is 
no desire on the part of the individual to seek treatment – where the withheld information 
is relevant to decisions about one’s life.26 
The problem with casting the net so wide is that it becomes increasingly difficult to 
argue that an interference with autonomy is harm that is compatible with a claim in 
negligence.  If an individual’s autonomy is not respected and the consequences of that 
infringement are adverse (i.e. that a risk which could have been avoided eventuated) then 
negligence could facilitate recovery for both gist damage and consequential harm.  A 
similar argument might be advanced where the interference prevented the claimant 
availing herself of treatment (i.e. chemoprevention) that would have minimised or reduced 
the risk of the genetic condition manifesting.  However, if the interference is couched as 
preventing the effective exercise of general decisions in respect of one’s life (as opposed to 
medical treatment) then it is debateable that such could form the gist of a negligence claim.  
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Accepting a broad conception of autonomy would mean that gist damage in these claims 
would be difficult to accurately and consistently define.  For example, a claimant could 
validly argue that the nondisclosure of a genetic risk interfered with their autonomy 
because they did not go on a round the world cruise or elected to have children when 
knowledge of the risk would have dissuaded them.  Both of these scenarios are valid in that 
the claimant’s autonomy has been infringed but the question is which should give rise to a 
compensable claim.  Is the definition of gist damage any interference with autonomy that 
curtails the claimant’s ability to choose?  If this is correct, what type of interference (if 
any) would be considered de minimus?  A limit is necessary to maintain the practicability 
of negligence, but the question is where should such limits be drawn.  Chico suggests the 
caveat ‘important decisions’27 but this only raises a further question: important to whom?  
What is important in the context of an individual’s life is a subjective notion, the person 
who does not go on a round the world cruise and the one who would not have had children 
are both equally aggrieved, their autonomy equally infringed by the withholding of the 
proband’s genetic risks, thus how can it be convincingly argued that one is deserving of 
compensation and the other not? 
A further problem is that this broad interpretation of harm would require 
recognition of a new head of damage in tort.  Autonomy as a principle has no doubt 
influenced certain judicial decisions
28
 and the judiciary has recognised (and emphasised) 
the ‘growth in autonomy-based arguments over the last 20 years’.29  Furthermore, the 
prevalence of autonomy in medical law has also led to commentators considering whether 
the law is moving towards recognising a tort of infringement of autonomy.
30
  However, 
infringing autonomy does not currently constitute a recognised harm in negligence.
31
  Thus 
it cannot be argued that a defendant has negligently infringed the claimant’s autonomy.   
Self-determination is, however, a key component in cases concerning doctor-
patient risk disclosure.
32
  Yet while the underlying rationale may be characterised as one of 
respecting patient autonomy, the gist of these claims is couched as being that the patient 
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would not have consented to undergo the operation had the doctor elected to disclose the 
risk.  Therefore the risk would not have eventuated.  The manifesting of physical or mental 
harm is significant in these cases and an argument based solely on an interference with 
autonomy (where no adverse outcome occurs) would likely be viewed unfavourably.  If an 
autonomy-based interpretation of harm is to be successfully applied to claims for the 
nondisclosure of genetic risks then it would need to be couched in similar terms, i.e. that 
the risk would not have eventuated had the doctor disclosed the relevant information.  If 
autonomy is accepted as forming the gist damage on this basis then, per Chester, the 
eventuating risk would be consequential damage despite not being a direct result of the 
defendant’s negligence.  The problem here is that few genetic conditions can actually be 
avoided per se, thus requiring an opportunity to avoid the risk could restrict the scope of a 
duty to disclose to a point where it is broadly inapplicable.  Therefore instead of avoiding 
the risk outright, the threshold would need to be that therapies could have minimised or 
reduced the risk in a more than minimal way. 
A final, conceptual criticism of a broad, autonomy-based construction of harm is 
that it is not representative of the injury sustained by the claimant when information about 
the proband’s genetic risks is withheld.  Although the autonomy of blood relations has 
been infringed because they cannot (arguably) act autonomously in absence of full 
information, the injury is not truly to their autonomy.  While there is a restriction of choice, 
the actual harm is a corporeal interference with the claimant’s health.  It is foreseeable that 
in practice the point at which claimants will become aware that information has not been 
disclosed is the point that genetic conditions begin to manifest, as occurred in the 
American case of Safer v Estate of Pack.
33
  It might be suggested that formulating the harm 
as an interference with the individual’s autonomy is to digress from the practical 
implication of nondisclosure on the proband’s blood relations.  In Safer, for instance, the 
complaint was not that the father’s doctor had infringed the claimant’s autonomy but that 
his failure to disclose had injured her health.  If, as Chico argues, the loss is ‘the 
interference with autonomy … as opposed to the genetic condition’ and the damages 
awarded do not reflect the physical aspects of the condition, then the consequences of the 
doctor’s negligence become an elephant in the room.  An avoidable or reducible risk has 
eventuated, harming the claimant’s health, but the complaint in law is that the individual 
was denied the opportunity to choose whether to avoid or reduce the risk.  To construct 
harm in a way that does not account for the manifesting of an avertable or reducible risk, 
either as gist or consequential damage, is antithetical as it undervalues physical health and 
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wellbeing.  Autonomy is important and intimately bound up with medical decision-making 
but to create a duty based on a concept of harm that values autonomy above physical and 
mental health is counterintuitive. 
 
Defining harm as an interference with Human Dignity 
A second interpretation of the harm caused by the nondisclosure of genetic risks is an 
interference with human dignity.  The concept is closely related to the principle of 
autonomy as ‘the failure to treat an individual as an autonomous person could interfere 
with her sense of self respect and dignity’34 and their application as the basis of tortious 
claims share some similarities.  Dignity, however, is arguably a broader concept than 
autonomy, a multifaceted thing, and herein lies one of the key objection to this formulation 
of harm, a point to which we will return. 
An interest in human dignity is proposed as the basis of claims arising from genetic 
technologies by Brownsword,
35
 who argues that such a general principle ‘offers a real 
prospect of novel claims at least being brought forward and given serious consideration.’36  
He suggests that ‘the flexibility of such a cause of action gives it some chance of staying 
connected to rapid technological development.’37  However, Kuhse is sceptical about the 
relevance of human dignity, arguing that it has ‘a very dubious role in contemporary 
bioethical discourse’ and, furthermore, that ‘[i]t is a slippery and inherently speciesist 
notion, it has a tendency to stifle argument and debate and encourages the drawing of 
moral boundaries in the wrong places.’38  Brownsword too recognises that human dignity 
is ‘an elusive concept, used in many senses by moral and political philosophers.’ 39  
However, he notes that ‘[i]n modern debates … it regularly appears in two very different 
roles, in the one case acting in support of individual autonomy … in the other case, acting 
as a constraint on autonomy’. 40   He identifies these two ‘roles’ as human dignity as 
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empowerment and human dignity as constraint.  Brownsword’s argument is based upon 
human dignity as empowerment and thus it is this interpretation that is considered here.
41
 
The conception of human dignity as empowerment ‘is very closely linked with 
modern human rights thinking.’42  Human dignity is one of the foundational ideas of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the preamble providing that ‘recognition 
of the inherent dignity and of equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family’.  Art 1 of the Declaration similarly proclaims ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.’  The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
acknowledges dignity, stating in Art 1 that signatories of the convention ‘shall protect the 
dignity and identity of all human beings’.  The Human Genetics Commission also 
incorporated the concept of dignity in the fundamental principles it applied to personal 
genetic information, stating that ‘[r]espect for persons affirms the equal value, dignity and 
moral rights of each individual.’43  Brownsword advances these fundamental principles 
and declarations as evidence it is recognised each and every human being has inherent 
dignity.  He further explains it is this inherent dignity that is the foundation of the 
possession of inalienable human rights.  Thus, conceived as empowerment, human dignity 
is ‘much more than a background implication that we can tease out of a number of 
particular rights … [but] the infrastructure on which the entire superstructure of human 
rights is constructed.’44  Brownsword argues that ‘a regime of tort law self-consciously and 
explicitly equipped with such a conception of human dignity’ could respond to perceived 
wrongs generated by genetic technologies.
45
  Applying this argument to the context of 
nondisclosure, it could be argued that the failure to disclosure pertinent genetic information 
amounts to an interference with the dignity of the proband’s blood relations, as it prevents 
them from leading an autonomous life because they lack significant information that may 
impact upon their free choices. 
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Whether human dignity is conceived as empowerment or constraint, both 
interpretations immediately raise the same question: why would it be necessary to 
recognise an interest in human dignity, when – in the modern context – dignity appears to 
be synonymous with autonomy.  Dignity as empowerment ostensibly permits an individual 
to lead an autonomous life and make autonomous decisions and a tort based upon this 
empowerment would vindicate the interest when the ability to act autonomously is 
negligently infringed.  As Laurie writes, privacy, liberty and autonomy ‘prescribe the way 
in which individuals are to be treated in Western society … [and] these constructs are all 
adjuncts to a view of human dignity that is prevalent in our society.’46  Therefore it may be 
argued that it is preferable to protect the concepts encapsulated by the label ‘dignity’ on an 
individual basis as opposed to through recognition of a broad cause of action that will 
possibly fall prey to a lack of certainty.
47
  Brownsword recognises this inherent issue, 
noting that the ‘obvious problem with such a generalised principle or open-ended cause of 
action … is that it leaves too much to interpretation.’48  Achieving judicial consistency 
may therefore prove to be a problematic and a piecemeal approach can lead to conceptual 
and practical difficulties.
49
  If the interest protected by a tort is not definable with some 
degree of certainty, then it becomes difficult for defendants to effectively discharge the 
corresponding duty. 
The approach of the judiciary to extending the duty of care is also notably cautious 
and a concept as broad as human dignity is likely to be viewed sceptically.  The prospect 
of judicial scepticism is supported by the reservations of the Court of Appeal towards a 
generalised tort for breach of privacy in Wainwright v Home Office, wherein Mummery LJ 
explained: 
 
‘I foresee serious definitional difficulties and conceptual problems in the judicial 
development of a “blockbuster” tort vaguely embracing such a potentially wide 
range of situations … the creation of a new tort … could give rise to as many 
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problems as it sought to solve.  A more promising and well trod path is that of 
incremental evolution, both at common law and statute … of traditional nominate 
torts pragmatically crafted as to conditions of liability, specific defences and 
appropriate remedies, and tailored to suit significantly different privacy interests 
and infringement situations.’50 
 
Given the prevailing caution to extending the duty of care and judicial aversion to ill-
defined concepts, the recognition of harm as an interference with human dignity is (at 
present, at least) an unlikely development.  Brownsword, however, contends that because a 
dignity-based tort would be ‘very closely related to existing notions of human rights and 
the importance of individual autonomy … [it] would not represent major changes of 
direction for either English or American tort law.’51  This point is true enough yet the 
compartmentalised nature of UK law means that the constituted elements of dignity 
(autonomy, equality etc.) are defined and protected separately.
52
 
 Defining harm as an interest in human dignity also raises the same conceptual 
objection as an interest in autonomy, namely that – in the context of nondisclosure of 
genetic risks – it does not adequately reflect the injury that the claimant will complain of.  
Like with autonomy, the gist damage is the interference with human dignity (and the 
underlying ability to exercise free choice) and not the onset of the genetic condition, 
therefore damages would reflect the infringement of dignity (which in itself would raise an 
issue of quantum – what is sufficient compensation?) and not the physical burden of the 
disease.  Again, the condition could be characterised as consequential damage, but if the 
harm is located within a framework of human dignity it is not certain that the physical 
manifestation of a genetic disease will be seen as consequential and, therefore, 
compensable.  The courts may view an infringement of empowerment-dignity as solely 
limiting the claimant’s ability to freely choose – the value of which in these circumstances 
would have been to choose to undergo screening and preventative treatment.  Therefore the 
loss of the ability to choose to seek medical interventions would be compensable harm but 
the genetic condition eventuating would not be.  The risk in this outcome is that it reduces 
the clinician’s culpability to the restriction of free choice and absolves them of culpability 
for the ultimate consequence of their negligence – the manifestation of a genetic risk that 
could have been avoided or minimised through disclosure. 
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Defining harm as a lack of Preparedness 
Another way in which the harm caused by nondisclosure of genetic risk may be articulated 
is as a lack of preparedness.  This concept is linked to both autonomy and dignity and 
essentially the claimant would be arguing that the disclosure had denied them the 
opportunity to prepare for the onset of their condition.   Preparedness could be 
characterised as the process of allowing the claimant to come to terms with their future, but 
it might also be presented as an inability to make informed decisions about one’s life (for 
example, to stop delaying that trip up the Amazon River).  It is, therefore, a broad and 
flexible concept, a trait that it shares with the concept of human dignity discussed in the 
preceding section.  
However, there are three principle objections to this interpretation of harm.  The 
first is that the benefits of disclosure in absence of a therapeutic response are debatable.  
Evidence exists both supporting and refuting the benefits of disclosure engendering 
preparedness,
53
 however, there is an inherent risk that disclosures made with this purpose 
in mind could have more of a negative impact than a positive one.  As Laurie elucidates ‘if 
disclosure is made to avoid ancillary harm such as psychological upset there is less of a 
guarantee that the harm in question will, de facto, be avoided.’54  Thus there exists an 
inherent uncertainty regarding the positive benefits of disclosure for the purposes of 
preparedness, which raises a question about the appropriateness of a duty premised upon 
what may fairly be labelled a temperamental concept. 
A second objection is that, from a legal perspective, a duty to disclose based on 
preparedness is undesirable because of the uncertainty it would introduce.  Defining 
sensible (and fair) boundaries would prove difficult and the breadth of potential harms 
would expose the medical profession to claims arising as a result of claimants’ individual 
(and largely unpredictable) responses and values.  Preparedness is, without doubt, a 
subjective concept, and the values and benefits that each individual attaches to being 
informed of potentially ‘shared’ genetic risks will vary considerably from person to person.  
Thus, one claimant may contend that they have suffered injury as a result of nondisclosure 
because they were not prepared psychologically for the onset of the condition.  However, 
another may justifiably argue that they have been harmed because, if they had known 
about their deleterious genetic heritage, their life plans would have been better informed.  
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Consequentially, they would have indulged in a round-the-world cruise at an earlier point 
in time because such pursuits are now prohibited by their condition.  In both instances, the 
claimants have arguably experienced harm.  The question is, do justifiable reason exist to 
acknowledge a claim in one instance and not the other?  At first blush, the claimant who 
suffers psychological upset may be viewed more favourably than the one who cannot 
realise their life’s ambition.  However, the inability to achieve an ambition or goal that 
would – had a disclosure been made – have been realised is arguably no less of an injury if 
the harm is the lack of preparedness afforded to the individual. 
The third objection to preparedness is that negligence relies upon objective notions 
of harm and these are difficult to reconcile with a concept that is as subjective as 
preparedness.  Whether or not a person feels sufficiently ‘prepared’ will be strongly 
influenced by perceptions and values that will be highly individualised.  The anticipated 
variation in the value of foreknowledge, and the potentially broad interpretation of a lack 
of preparedness, means that it will be difficult to apply a definite scope to the concept.  
Any attempt is to draw acceptable boundaries will likely to be insufficiently representative 
of the spectrum of claimants’ grievances.  Even if preparedness was deemed a workable 
legal concept, it is foreseeable that quantifying damages fairly and consistently would 
prove extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible. 
 
Defining harm as a loss of a chance 
Another alternative definition of the harm caused by the nondisclosure of genetic risks – 
and one that has roots in negligence – is as a loss of a chance of avoiding the condition.  
Thus if ‘there is a greater than 50 per cent chance that the claimant could have avoided the 
particular condition if she had known about the risk, she could argue that the manifestation 
of the genetic condition itself constitutes harm.’ 55   One particular difficulty with this 
approach, however, is that ‘there are currently few genetic conditions which can be 
avoided’,56 but if, as Laurie argues, the harm cannot be the disease itself since ‘the HCP in 
no way causes the condition from which the relatives might suffer’57 then it logically 
follows to phrase the harm as a loss of a chance and not as the manifestation of the disease.  
The problem facing claimants is that the courts have been extremely reluctant to accept 
arguments in personal injury based upon a loss of a chance of avoiding physical harm. 
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The leading authority on this point is Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority.
58
  
The claimant, a young boy, fell from a tree and sustained an injury to his hip, which was 
subsequently misdiagnosed.  The misdiagnosis resulted in treatment being delayed and, by 
the time a correct diagnosis was reached, the claimant suffered necrosis of the hip joint, 
leaving him permanently disabled.  The injury caused by the fall carried with it a 75 per 
cent chance of the claimant developing necrosis, however.  The negligent diagnosis denied 
him a 25 per cent chance of recovery.  In other words, he had suffered a loss of a one in 
four chance of avoiding necrosis.  The claimant argued that the defendants had caused him 
loss and he was entitled to damages proportionate to the lost chance of recovery, but the 
House of Lords rejected his claim.  On the balance of probabilities, the fall was responsible 
for his injury and not the negligence of the doctor – in their Lordships’ opinion the injury 
was legally (if not medically) inevitable when the claimant fell from the tree.  The decision 
is peculiar in one respect in that it disregarded the significance of the claimant’s chances of 
recovery.  These were one in four and, in alternate contexts such as gambling, would be 
viewed as favourable.  There is an obvious disconnect in the law here: on the one hand, 
doctors are expected to disclose risks that are statistically slight (ten per cent risk of a 
stroke was highlighted by Lord Bridge in Sidaway, a one to three per cent risk was the root 
of the claim in Chester), but on the other clinicians are not regarded as being liable for 
reducing a patient’s prospects of recovery merely because these did not pass the point of 
balance and thus are not legally certain.  The obvious criticism here is that there are few 
certainties in medical treatment and any attempt by the courts to impose such is 
disingenuous. 
Despite criticism from Lords Nicholls and Hope, the House of Lords affirmed 
Hotson as the leading authority on loss of a chance in Gregg v Scott.
59
  Here doctors had 
negligently failed to diagnose a cancer patient reducing his prospects of recovery from 42 
per cent to 25.  The claimant argued that their negligence had caused him to lose the 
chance of a cure (which in terms of cancer is characterised as survival for ten years) but the 
majority rejected the claim because it did not satisfy the balance of probabilities.  Baroness 
Hale, in particular, argued that it would be problematic to permit loss of chance arguments 
because ‘almost any claim for loss of an outcome could be reformulated as a claim for a 
loss of a chance of that outcome.’60  This, it seems, is the principle objection to arguments 
premised upon a loss of a chance, since it might enable claims to succeed in part where 
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they would otherwise fail.  A claimant could thus ‘recover 100 per cent if he proved on a 
balance of probabilities the loss of the outcome … [but] would still recover something if he 
lost that argument but proved he had nonetheless lost some chance of a better outcome.’61  
It could effectively lead to a ‘heads you lose everything, tails I win something situation.’62 
Lords Hope and Nicholls in the minority thought that the claimant had lost 
something of value and the law ought to recognise the wrong inflicted.  Lord Nicholls 
argued forcefully that to deny recovery ‘would be irrational and indefensible.’ 63   He 
explained: 
 
‘The loss of a 45% prospect of recovery is just as much a real loss for a patient as 
the loss of a 55% prospect of recovery.  In both cases the doctor was in breach of 
his duty to his patient.  In both cases the patient was worse off.  He lost something 
of importance and value.  But, it is said, in one case the patient has a remedy, in the 
other he does not.  This would make no sort of sense.  It would mean that in the 
45% case the doctor's duty would be hollow.  The duty would be empty of 
content.’64 
 
His Lordship makes a compelling point that differentiating between chances above and 
below the point of balance could render the doctor’s duty of care empty of content in 
particular circumstances.   This is because where the claimant’s initial chance was less than 
50 per cent the law does not regard the deleterious outcome as a consequence of the 
doctor’s negligent actions.65  He further added that while ‘losing a chance of saving a leg is 
not the same as losing a leg … that is not a reason for declining to value the chance for 
whose loss the doctor was directly responsible.’66 
It should be noted that the outcome of Hotson and Gregg are at odds with the 
approach to loss of a chance in economic loss, where a lost opportunity to litigate a claim, 
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gain employment and negotiate a more profitable business deal are recoverable.  Chico 
therefore suggests that the difficulty ‘is not with loss of chance per se, rather something to 
do with extending this head of damage to personal injury’,67 an opinion supported by 
Baroness Hale’s reticence in Gregg.  Weir has also argued that while ‘[l]osing a chance of 
a gain is a loss like the loss of the gain itself, alike in quality just less in quantity: losing a 
chance of not losing a leg is not the same thing as losing a leg.’68  Yet Weir’s assessment 
does not countenance the value of the chance of saving, in his example, the claimant’s leg.  
If the issue is considered from the claimant’s perspective then it can be argued that the 
opportunity to save their limb, even if this opportunity is less than 51 per cent, is valuable 
and therefore loss of such should be compensable.   
In the alternative, the loss of a chance (and therefore the gist damage) where the 
proband’s genetic risks are not disclosed could be articulated as a loss of a chance to 
acquire medical treatment, as opposed to a loss of chance of avoiding the condition 
outright.  If an underlying purpose of a duty to disclose is to protect of the health of those 
who may share a patient’s genetic risks, then the harm complained of might be 
characterised as the denial of medical treatment and the consequential benefits (i.e. 
treatment) that nondisclosure represents.  The following provides an illustration: a patient 
undergoes genetic screening and is identified as possessing a mutation on the BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 gene, which increases the chances of them developing breast cancer by between 
50 and 80 per cent.  Knowledge of the risk means that an individual can opt to undergo 
preventative therapies, such as a mastectomy or chemoprevention.
69
  If the clinician does 
not disclose this information to the proband’s relatives, and they go on to develop breast 
cancer, the nondisclosure has denied those individuals the opportunity to seek appropriate 
medical interventions.  It might be argued that this loss of a chance harms the claimant 
because it prevents mitigation of genetic risk, the eventuation of which could be seen as 
consequential to the gist damage because the lost chance may have reduced the probability 
of the condition manifesting.  In one sense, this interpretation of harm is simply word play, 
a shifting of the onus from avoiding the genetic disease to having access to treatments that 
might have made avoiding the disease possible.  Yet if the harm cannot be the disease itself 
because ‘the HCP in no way causes the condition’70 then it may be preferable to avoid 
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characterising the loss of a chance as a chance of avoiding the disease.  If a nondisclosure 
denies a claimant access to preventative treatment then the doctor’s actions – while not 
solely responsible for the onset of the condition – contribution to its eventuation.  The 
same logic could be applied to the facts in W & Others
71
 because, though the council did 
not cause the sexual abuse, they denied the claimants the chance of mitigating the risk by 
failing to disclose the chequered past of the perpetrator (the foster child) to the claimants’ 
parents.  Articulating the harm as a lost chance of acquiring medical treatment also limits 
the scope of the duty in an arguably sensible way: a disclosure would not be expected in 
absence of treatment because the benefits of disclosing genetic risks in such circumstances 
are debatable.
72
 
Interpreting the loss of a chance as a lost chance of medical intervention is 
premised on an assumption that prevention (or risk reduction) is preferable to lengthy, 
invasive therapies, or, alternatively, that early intervention is beneficial to claimants who 
are at risk – a fact starkly demonstrated by poor survival rates for suffers of pancreatic 
cancer in the UK, who are often diagnosed too late and the cancer is inoperable.  The 
starting point if this interpretation of harm is acceptable would not be whether the 
claimant’s prospects of recovery were beyond the point of balance but whether or not 
treatment would have been available had the genetic risk been disclosed.  The initial 
enquiry is thus restricted to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer.  However, thereafter the case law on 
loss of a chance suggests that the statistical significance of the treatment would be a 
relevant consideration for the court.  Therefore if the treatment has only a 25 per cent 
chance of averting the onset of a condition then the chance is below the point of balance it 
would fail a typical analysis of the issue.  Relying on percentage chances to impose legal 
(as opposed to factual) certainty would ignore that ‘there is something valuable in having 
the opportunity to try all you can to prevent a genetic disease’73 but it is not anticipated that 
the courts would move away from the all-or-nothing approach of the balance of 
probabilities.  Thus although categorising the harm as a loss of a chance of medical 
treatment may appear initially sensible, the knotty issue of probability and the necessity of 
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legal certainty mean that it is unlikely to avoid the core problem with losses of chance: the 
need to surpass the point of balance. 
Whether there is a sustainable basis for continuing to differentiate between 
negligence causing an individual to lose a 51 per cent chance and negligence denying a 
(still statistically significant) 49 per cent chance of recovery remains a moot point and one 
the Court of Appeal has stated should be left to the Supreme Court.
74
  In principle, denying 
a chance of recovery, treatment or avoiding a risk outright should be compensable harm 
because a possibility of recovery (such as the 25 per cent chance in Hotson) is of value to 
the claimant.  However, Baroness Hale’s practical concerns about permitting claims for 
loss of a chance are not insignificant.  As a result, claims concerning nondisclosure of 
genetic risks, where the chance of avoiding, treating or recovering from the condition are 
lower than 50 per cent, are unlikely to succeed. 
 
Defining harm as the Genetic Condition 
It has been argued that the harm complained of when genetic risks are not disclosed to a 
patient’s relatives cannot be the genetic condition itself.  This is because ‘the HCP in no 
way causes the condition from which the relatives might suffer’.75  The question is whether 
this argument is sustainable or whether genetic conditions can amount to actionable harm 
for the purposes of a negligence claim.   
The principle objection to a genetic condition forming the gist of a claim appears to 
be that the defendant’s negligence does not cause the deleterious outcome.  In other words, 
the non-disclosure does not cause the condition, it is a product of the claimant’s genes and 
thus outside the defendant’s control.  At first blush this is an appealing and, ostensibly, 
well grounded argument.  But this objection fails to address the fact that liability in 
negligence does not always appear to depend upon the defendant’s conduct being the direct 
source of the harm suffered by the claimant.  Two cases that illustrate this point are 
Chester v Afshar and Birch v University College London Hospital NHS Trust.
76
  
In Chester, the defendants failed to disclose a (statistically slight) risk of spinal 
injury, exposing the claimant to a risk of injury that, had the risk been disclosed, might 
have been avoided due to the claimant seeking a second opinion and delaying the 
procedure.  On this point the claimant argued that ‘had she delayed her operation until a 
later time then, even if she would eventually have had it, the odds she would have faced 
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would have been 1-2 per cent.’77  Lord Hoffmann thought this argument illogical, since the 
claimant could not definitively prove she would not have had the operation.
78
  But as 
Stapleton explains ‘the fact that, against the a priori probabilities, Miss Chester happened 
to “win” the syndrome when she had the operation … does not affect the odds that attach 
to the hypothetical later operation which, but for the breach, she might have undergone 
after a delay.’79  In plain terms the probability of avoiding the risk was between 98-99 per 
cent, thus had she been apprised of the risk, even if later she had undergone the procedure, 
it was statistically likely she would have avoided harm.  
A critical point for current purposes was that the risk was inherent in the proposed 
surgery and not dependant on the defendant’s negligence.  When the risk eventuated, the 
claimant successfully sued and recovered for the physical injuries she had sustained.  
Despite awarding damages for the claimant’s spinal injury, the House of Lords 
characterised the harm suffered as being a loss of autonomy, thus suggesting the gist of the 
claim was the principle of patient autonomy, which had been interfered with through a 
failure to disclose the risk.  There is some merit to this for, as Lord Bingham noted, the 
rationale behind a duty to disclose is ‘to enable adult patients of sound mind to make for 
themselves decisions intimately affecting their own lives and bodies’.80   
However, it has been suggested that the majority were attempting to make the 
decision in Chester ‘more palatable’81 by defining the harm in terms of autonomy.  A 
pertinent question is whether the claimant would have had an actionable claim in absence 
of physical injury.  One might argue that the gist of the claim is the breach of autonomy 
but it is difficult to sustain this line of argument if an interference with the claimant’s self-
determination does not constitute a freestanding claim.  If the interference is only 
actionable once an adverse outcome occurs then the adverse outcome, not the interference 
with autonomy, is the gist of the claim. 
In the context of genetics, genetic diseases may therefore constitute harm even 
though nondisclosure does not directly inflict the injury.  In Chester, the negligence was 
not the root source of the adverse outcome but, as Stapleton notes, ‘breaches of the 
obligation to warn patients will tend to increase the incidence of the medical risk 
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occurring’, because a greater number of individuals are likely to run the undisclosed risk 
and, thus, a higher percentage will come to harm.
82
   The outcomes – spinal injury or 
genetic disease – are non-coincidental.  If treatment is available for a genetic condition 
then nondisclosure increases the incidence of the disease through denying access to those 
preventative therapies.  As with the spinal injury in Chester, a genetic disease can therefore 
be characterised as an adverse outcome ‘about which a warning was required by the 
content of the duty’.83  This, in turn, means ‘there is room for the obligation to warn to be 
seen as grounded in the deterrence of outcomes injurious to physical integrity, which of 
course has long been an interest uncontroversially protected by the tort of negligence.’84  In 
the context of genetics, outcomes injurious to physical integrity would constitute the 
eventuation of risks that could otherwise have been avoided or minimised.  Thus genetic 
diseases may constitute harm despite the fact that the negligence does not inflict them. 
A useful analogy can be lifted from the case of SAAMCO, where Lord Hoffmann 
discussed the example of a mountaineer recuperating from an injury to his leg.
85
  Applied 
to the present context, imagine the attending physician negligently fails to disclose a 
weakness in the mountaineer’s leg and he is injured whilst climbing a mountain because 
his leg collapses.  If the treatment he has received is presumed not to be negligent, the 
doctor has in no way caused the weakness in the leg, but the injury sustained as a result of 
that undisclosed weakness forms the crux of an action in negligence.  It is the eventuating 
of a risk that could have been avoided or minimised by disclosure that constituted the gist 
damage.  If the weakness is substituted for a treatable genetic risk – say, breast cancer – 
arguably the same conclusion can be made out: the doctor does not create the deleterious 
genetic trait, but nondisclosure allows the risk to eventuate.
86
 
Further support can be drawn from the case of Birch, where the defendants failed to 
disclose (i) the risk of a stroke inherent in undergoing a catheter angiogram and (ii) that an 
MRI represented a low risk alternative.  The patient underwent the angiogram and suffered 
a stroke.  Thereafter she successfully sued. 
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In Birch – as in Chester – the claimant’s action hinged on the presence of an 
adverse outcome.   Had she not suffered a stroke no claim in negligence would have arisen 
because the doctor’s negligence would not have caused harm.  Thus the gist of the action 
was the eventuating risk and not the interference with the claimant’s autonomy.  The 
judiciary is demonstrating an increasing respect for autonomy in the medical context but it 
is unlikely that compensable harm would have existed in either Chester or Birch had the 
respective procedures been completed without adverse consequences.  Although the 
claimants could argue (from a moral if not legal perspective) that their self-determination 
had been restricted, there would have been no ‘loss’ in the accepted sense; the claimants 
would not have been adversely affected by the nondisclosure of the risk.   
Thus the gist damage was the stroke, an adverse outcome that eventuated because 
of the nondisclosure, but, crucially, the risk was not created by the defendant’s failure to 
warn but inherent in the proposed procedure.  For this reason it can be said that the doctors 
in no way caused the stroke, just as it can be said that they do not cause genetic disease.  
However, the nondisclosure in Birch meant the claimant could not avoid or minimise the 
risk of a stroke.  In this sense, the nondisclosure ‘causes’ harm because ‘breaches of the 
obligation to warn patients will tend to increase the incidence of the medical risk 
occurring’.87  Therefore the doctor’s negligence need not be the source of the injury in 
order for it to constitute the gist of an action in negligence.  The source of the injury in 
Birch was the angiogram, in Chester it was the operation, but in both cases the defendants 
were liable for the eventuation of the undisclosed risk.  Thus whilst the source of a genetic 
condition may be characterised as the individual’s genes, the eventuation of an undisclosed 
genetic risk – providing treatment existed for the said condition – is potentially gist 
damage. 
Support for this line of reasoning can also be drawn from cases concerning physical 
injuries inflicted upon the claimant by a third party.  In these types of circumstance, it is 
axiomatic the defendants are not directly the source of the harm.  But liability accrues 
because the actions of the third party constitute an eventuation of an undisclosed risk, 
which could have been avoided or minimised by disclosure.  The eventuation – the 
physical injury – is the gist damage. 
In the landmark American case Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California,
88
 
the defendants failed to warn the claimant’s daughter about the risk posed to her by an ex-
boyfriend.  The ex-boyfriend had for a time been a psychiatric patient in the defendants 
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care and, during therapy, he had confessed to his psychiatrist that he intended to kill the 
victim once discharged.  Despite the obvious severity of this threat, the defendants 
exercised few precautions and, significantly, made no attempt to apprise the claimant’s 
daughter of the risk.  The claimant alleged that the defendants had been negligent in failing 
to warn her daughter about the risk her ex-boyfriend posed.
89
  The Supreme Court of 
California found in her favour. 
The harm in Tarasoff can be formulated in the same manner as that in Birch and 
Chester.  It was the eventuation of the undisclosed risk, which in this case was the victim’s 
murder.  It is trite that the ex-boyfriend was the killer – and in this sense the literal ‘source’ 
of death – but disclosure could have facilitated the victim avoiding or minimising the risk 
to her person.  The defendants’ failure to disclose meant she was unaware of the danger 
and, in this sense, an analogy can be drawn with an individual who is unaware they are at 
risk of a genetic condition.  In both instances the source of the harm is not the defendants’ 
negligence but their inaction plays a not insignificant part in the risk eventuating, because 
harm could have been ‘easily identified or minimized by a timely and effective warning.’90 
The failure to warn of the risk posed by a third party was again at issue in Selwood 
v Durham County Council.
91
  The claimant was a social worker employed by a local 
authority involved in close collaboration with two NHS trusts to provide integrated social 
care and mental health services.  The claimant’s was assigned to a case involving a young 
girl whose father suffered from mental health problems and had a history of violent 
behaviour.  The father was a patient of the NHS trusts and, during treatment, told his 
doctors that he wished to harm the social worker involved in his daughter’s case.  He later 
stated he would ‘kill her on the spot’ if he saw her.  Despite the severity of these threats 
and the patient’s known history of violence, neither the claimant nor her employers were 
warned of the risk.  When the patient was temporarily discharged from hospital, he 
attacked the claimant with a knife, inflicting serious injuries.   
It is axiomatic that the defendants in Tarasoff and Selwood were not the source of 
the claimants’ injuries, but those injuries were the gist of the negligence actions.  As in 
Chester and Birch, the nondisclosure of risk meant the claimants could not avoid or 
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minimise the harm.  Though the nondisclosures of physical and medical risks are 
distinguishable in some ways,
92
 the gist damage is consistently the adverse outcome – the 
eventuating of an undisclosed risk.  While the defendants are not the source of the 
deleterious consequences the claimants experience,
93
 it is the adverse outcomes, not the 
nondisclosure, which discloses an action in negligence. 
It has been noted that, in the context of genetics, it is thought that a genetic 
condition cannot constitute harm because ‘the HCP in no way causes the condition’.94  
However, it is apparent that a doctor does not need to be the source of a condition in order 
to be liable in negligence.  Instead, a doctor may be culpable for the physical burden of a 
disease where an undisclosed risk of said disease (which, with disclosure, may have been 
avoided or minimised) eventuates.  The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division 
appeared to endorse this proposition in Safer v Estate of Pack.
95
  Here the claimant 
discovered that her father had previously suffered and died from retroperitoneal cancer, a 
condition that she was also undergoing treatment for.  The condition was hereditary and it 
was contended that this was known at the time the defendant had treated the claimant’s 
father.  It was alleged that the doctor ‘was required, by medical standards then prevailing, 
to warn those at risk so that they might have the benefits of early examination, monitoring, 
detection and treatment, that would provide opportunity to avoid the most baneful 
consequences of the condition.’96  In finding for the claimant, the court concluded that 
circumstances involving genetic conditions were analogous to litigation concerning 
contagious disease
97
 and Tarasoff, stating: 
 
‘We see no impediment, legal or otherwise, to recognizing a physician's duty to 
warn those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a genetically transmissible 
condition. In terms of foreseeability especially, there is no essential difference 
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between the type of genetic threat at issue here and the menace of infection, 
contagion or a threat of physical harm.’98 
 
The New Jersey Superior Court did not engage in a philosophical assessment of the 
concept of harm – which, perhaps, reiterates Nolan’s point that harm is generally 
subsumed into either questions of duty or causation – but equating genetic risks with risks 
of infection, contagion and physical harm is clearly indicative of the court considering the 
eventuation of the risk to be the gist of the action.  The court’s reference to ‘substantial 
future harm’99 is also telling and reinforces the point.  Because the complaint is couched in 
terms of avoiding ‘the most baneful consequences of the condition’,100  the substantial 
future harm that the court refers to can only be the physical manifestation of the genetic 
condition itself.  Genetic diseases are therefore capable of constituting gist damage despite 
the fact that the tortfeasor is not the source of the condition.  It is the fact that 
nondisclosure prohibits individuals from taking steps to minimise a risk that shifts 
responsibility for an adverse outcome to the defendant. 
The decision in Bradshaw v Daniels
101
 lends further credence to this interpretation 
of harm.  Here a clinician was held to owe a duty to the patient’s wife to warn her of the 
risks of exposure to the source of her husband’s disease – Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever.
102
  The husband’s disease was non-contagious but the doctor negligently failed to 
disclose his wife was at the same epidemiological risk and she later died from the 
condition.  In common with genetic diseases, the doctor in Bradshaw could in no way be 
said to be the source of the condition, but he was ‘in a position to know of a risk that may 
not be obvious to others’.103  The gist of the action was again the adverse outcome that 
could have been avoided had a timely warning been given.  Reversing the appellate court’s 
decision, the Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded that it was appropriate ‘to impose 
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upon a physician an affirmative duty to warn identifiable third parties in the patient’s 
family against foreseeable risks emanating from the patient’s illness.’104 
The decisions in Safer clearly indicates that the American judiciary has accepted 
genetic diseases can constitute the gist of an action in negligence.  This outcome can be 
reconciled with a paradigm of liability wherein the defendant is not the source of the harm 
but, through a failure to warn against a risk, becomes responsible for an adverse outcome.  
In the cases cited above, the literal source of the harm complained of was either a third 
party (Tarasoff and Selwood), a non-negligent operation (Chester and Birch), a non-
negligent exposure (Bradshaw) or a deleterious genetic trait (Safer).  The defendants in 
these examples can in no way be said to inflict the harm, but their failure to disclose 
known risks meant that harm could not be avoided or minimised.  Thus responsibility for 
the adverse outcomes that eventuated shifted to the defendants.  The gist of an action in 
negligence can therefore be an adverse outcome that the defendant failed to warn against.  
This rationale means that genetic diseases can form the gist of an action in negligence, 
because nondisclosure prevents claimants from minimising or avoiding an adverse 
outcome, which, in this case, is the eventuating of a genetic disease.  The court in Safer 
found ‘no essential difference between … genetic threat … and the menace of infection, 
contagion or a threat of physical harm’,105 as it is common to these examples that harm can 
be ‘easily identified or minimized by a timely and effective warning.’106  It is therefore 
argued that the eventuating of genetic risks can be the gist of a negligence action and that 
such is not a radical departure from the formulation of harm all ready present in cases of 
undisclosed physical and medical risks. 
A notable criticism of defining harm as the undisclosed risk of the genetic 
condition developing into the genetic condition itself is that it considerably limits the scope 
of the duty of care.  It might be suggested that an action based on autonomy would allow 
recovery in wider circumstances, which, in turn, may have the indirect effect of promoting 
more widespread disclosure of genetic risks from within the healthcare profession.  In 
contrast, having to ‘wait’ for the genetic risk to develop into the condition before there is a 
valid claim would serve to limit the actual number of cases that could be brought.  Since 
                                                        
 
104
 Bradshaw, above, n 101. 
 
105
 Safer, above, n 82, at 626. 
 
106
 Safer v Estate of Pack 677 A 2d 1188 (New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division 1996), at 
1192. 
 
 130 
not every genetic risk materialises, the proband’s blood relations could only litigate in very 
narrow circumstances. 
It is acknowledged that the proposed definition of harm is more limited in scope 
than some of the other possible interpretations discussed here.  An autonomy-based harm, 
for example, would permit recovery in a wider range of circumstances because ‘harm’ is 
not dependant on the genetic condition eventuating.  But autonomy-based claims would 
require recognition of a new head of damage.
107
  Defining harm as the eventuation of a 
genetic disease grounds a duty to disclose ‘in the deterrence of outcomes injurious to 
physical integrity, which of course has long been an interest uncontroversially protected by 
the tort of negligence.’108  Thus creating a duty to blood relations can (potentially) be 
characterised as an extension of the protections for an interest that is all ready legally 
recognised. 
A further hurdle the proposed definition overcomes is that something with no 
perceptible effect on health or capability is generally not actionable damage.  For this 
reason, the courts are likely to be sceptical about formulating harm as the failure to 
disclose a genetic risk indicating future ill health.   An adverse outcome is, thus far, a 
necessary ingredient of negligence, a point emphasised by Grieves v FT Everard & 
Sons.
109
  The claimants had been exposed to asbestos during the course of their 
employment and had subsequently developed plural plaques.  However, the plaques did 
not affect the claimants’ health, only indicated a potential of future disease.  The House of 
Lords explained that damage is an abstract notion of being worse off – physically, mentally 
or economically – so that compensation is appropriate and, since the plaques were benign, 
they were not actionable damage.  Thus not knowing of a risk of future ill health is, on this 
basis, insufficient to constitute harm.  The necessity of an adverse outcome is therefore 
consistent with current rules of tort. 
It is therefore proposed that the eventuating of a genetic condition can be ‘harm’ 
for the purposes of an action in negligence. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined several possible interpretations of the harm caused by 
nondisclosure of genetic risks.  It has examined the relative strengths and frailties of harm 
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defined as an interference with autonomy or human dignity, a lack of preparedness and a 
loss of a chance.  It has been argued – contrary to established lines of thinking – as 
possible for the genetic condition itself to constitute the gist of the claim.  Support has been 
drawn from both domestic and American case law involving undisclosed risks of harm and 
it is argued that a defendant need not be the source of a harm for liability to accrue in 
negligence.  This approach is particularly apt because it appears to been recognised in the 
American decision of Safer v Estate of Pack, which involved nondisclosure of a genetic 
risk.  In reaching a conclusion favouring the claimant, the court drew analogies between 
genetic risks, risks of physical violence and contagious diseases.  This interpretation of 
harm is argued as grounding a duty to disclose to blood relations in physical integrity, an 
interest that is a mainstay of negligence as a tort.  Thus formulating the harm as an 
eventuation of risk can be reconciled with established interests in tort. 
5. PROXIMITY, POLICY AND THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
 
A Duty to Disclose 
Descendants of a common gene pool will, inevitably, share a percentage of genetic traits.  
Thus genetically screening a patient will simultaneously reveal information about their 
genetic heritage and that of their blood relations, since deleterious traits in the proband’s 
genome may also be present in their relatives’ DNA.  Consequentially the proband’s 
doctor will possess information relevant to both the health of their patient and persons 
beyond the therapeutic relationship.  This raises the question: should genetic information 
be disclosed to family members?  It is suggested here the answer is ‘yes’ where treatments 
are available for the relevant condition, especially when expedient diagnosis is crucial to 
successful therapeutic intervention.
1
  The next question is how should the law respond?  In 
absence of legislation, novel claims are invariably articulated through the law of torts and, 
as explained in previous chapters, the disclosure of information between doctor and patient 
has already been the subject of claims in negligence.  This suggests negligence may be an 
appropriate vehicle for claims by family members injured by the nondisclosure of genetic 
risks. 
If it is accepted that negligence is an appropriate means for remedying harm 
suffered by family members when genetic risk are not disclosed, the question becomes 
how the courts should construct a duty of care in these situations.  It is trite that a duty 
must be considered ‘from three perspectives, namely (a) foreseeability of the harm that 
ensues, (b) the natures of the relationship of the parties, usually called the element of 
proximity, and (c) the question whether it is fair just and reasonable that the law should 
impose a duty’.2  The first of these ‘perspectives’ – harm – was considered within the 
genetic context in the preceding chapter.  This chapter will explore the other key elements 
of the duty of care – proximity and whether it is fair, just a reasonable – and how these 
may apply to familial genetic risks. 
 
Proximity and Neighbourhood 
Proximity – the inference of legal ‘neighbourhood’ – was described by Lord Atkin in 
Donoghue as existing when a claimant is ‘so closely and directly affected by my acts that I 
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
                                                        
1
 For example, in cases where the proband is identified as genetically at risk of pancreatic cancer, 
which is inoperable in 90 per cent of cases as a result of late diagnosis and only three per cent of 
patients survive beyond the five year mark. 
 
2
 Elgusouli-Daf v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335 per Steyn LJ at 
345. 
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my mind to the acts or omissions … in question.’3  A duty of care is not owed to the world 
at large and the courts have traditionally relied on physical closeness or antecedent 
relationships as indicators of sufficient proximity between parties, thereby controlling the 
scope of potential liabilities.  However, neither physical nearness nor an antecedent 
relationship exist between the proband’s doctor and their blood relations and ‘it is plainly 
not sufficient’ that a doctor-patient relationship ‘exists between the defendant and [a] third 
party’.4  It is therefore inadequate to demonstrate in isolation that a clinician’s failure to 
disclose genetic risks closely and directly affects the proband’s relatives.  Claimants must 
also prove that they ought reasonably to have been ‘in contemplation as being so 
affected’.5  In other words, the proband’s family must demonstrate that they are directly 
affected by, and identifiable victims of, the defendant’s negligence.  The underlying 
reasoning for such a requirement was enunciated by Stuart-Smith LJ in Palmer, wherein he 
observed that ‘the most effective way of providing protection would be to give [a] 
warning’ and, where the victim is unidentifiable, ‘the most effective precaution cannot be 
taken because the defendant does not know who to warn.’6  To construct a duty to disclose 
in terms which did not require the claimants to be identifiable would make such a duty 
difficult to discharge and could, in the extreme, expose the medical profession to a high 
number of claims.  In conjunction with the necessity of a therapeutic response to the 
identified condition, a requirement that claimants are identifiable victims will impose a 
sensible limitation upon the scope of a duty to disclose, ensuring that it remains both a 
practicable and acceptable burden upon clinicians. 
The concept of an identifiable victim/claimant was first explored by the New York 
Court of Appeals in Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co,
7
 where the claimant sustained 
injury whilst waiting on the defendant’s railway platform.  Negligence on the part of the 
station guards had resulted in a box of fireworks being dropped on the tracks.  The 
fireworks exploded and the consequent shockwave dislodged a set of scales hung at the 
opposite end of the platform, which struck the claimant as they fell.  One of the reasons the 
court dismissed the claimant’s action was because she was not an identifiable victim of the 
negligent act, Cardozo J concluding that a claimant must be able to establish ‘that the act 
                                                        
3
 [1932] AC 562 at 580. 
 
4
 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [2000] PIQR P1 per Stuart-Smith LJ at 12. 
 
5
 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 532. 
 
6
 Palmer, above, n 4, at 12. 
 
7
 (1928) 248 NY 339. 
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as to him had possibilities of danger so many and so apparent as to entitle him to be 
protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended.’8 
Stuart-Smith LJ expressed a comparable opinion in Palmer v Tees Health 
Authority,
9
 which concerned the abduction and murder of the claimant’s daughter by one 
of the defendant’s psychiatric outpatients, who had previously expressed having sexual 
desires towards children.  He stated that in absence of direct contact between the parties ‘it 
is at least necessary for the victims to be identifiable … to establish proximity’.10  The 
Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that the claimant’s daughter was not an identifiable 
victim but a member of an indeterminate class of potential victims, which was insufficient 
to establish a relationship of proximity.  A similar decision was expressed in Bromley v 
United Kingdom,
11
 where the claimant’s daughter was an ordinary member of the public 
chosen at random by her murderer and, in K v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,
12
 a rape victim’s pre-trial application for disclosure under the Civil Procedure 
Rules was dismissed because the claimant could not ‘show that the Secretary of State 
should have been any more aware of her, as a potential victim … that any other member of 
the public’.13  When K’s negligence action against the Secretary of State reached the Court 
of Appeal, Laws LJ also concluded that there existed ‘no true nexus between claimant and 
defendant’.14  The outcome differed in W & Others because the risk posed by the fostered 
boy to the family’s biological children was obvious and the victims were readily 
identifiable, therefore the possibility of abuse ought to have been within the defendant’s 
contemplation when placing the child with the family.  The conclusions in Tarasoff, 
Durflinger and Safer were reached on a comparable premise.  In each instance the 
‘individual or group at risk is easily identifiable’,15  either because the perpetrator had 
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 Ibid., at 345. 
 
9
 [2000] PIQR P1. 
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 (Unreported) ECHR 23
rd
 November 1999.  The claimant’s daughter was murdered by a man who 
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specifically identified them or through straightforward reference to degrees of 
consanguinity. 
The question arising is therefore whether or not the proband’s family are 
identifiable victims.  Distinguishing the decisions in Palmer, Bromley and K because a 
family does not constitute a general, at risk class, and drawing upon Tarasoff, Durflinger, 
Safer and W & Others, it is apparent that the proband’s family may be identifiable victims 
within the context of the nondisclosure of genetic risks as they are ‘known to be at risk of 
… harm from a genetically transmissible condition’.16  Theoretically speaking, an entire 
family could share a deleterious genetic trait but the chances of a trait being shared are 
highest within the nuclear family.  Beyond immediate blood relations, the gene pool 
diversifies, diluting the chances of a particular trait be inherited.  Thus the chances of the 
proband sharing genetic risks with their cousin are appreciably lower than with their 
sibling.  A patient’s extended family are therefore less likely to be capable of establishing 
themselves as identifiable victims for the purposes of a duty to disclose, unless extremely 
compelling evidence to the contrary can be produced.  Restricting any presumption about 
who constitutes an identifiable victim to the proband’s nuclear family means that the scope 
of a duty to disclose remains manageable and, arguably, a justifiable burden upon 
clinicians.  Although Mason and Laurie contend that distinguishing claims by 
‘straightforward reference to the degree of consanguinity’ is ‘an unsophisticated 
approach’, 17  if a duty to disclose is to remain practicable it is a necessary control 
mechanism as seeking out and warning the various members of the proband’s extended 
family ‘might often be difficult or impractical and place a heavy burden upon the 
physician’.18  The duty to disclose must be a justifiable imposition and it is arguably not so 
if it is so burdensome that it interferes with the actual provision of healthcare. 
Of course, even if members of the proband’s immediate family are identifiable 
victims, they must also demonstrate that they were closely and directly affected by the 
nondisclosure of the patient’s genetic risks.  This is arguably a straightforward causal 
exercise when the claimant is an identifiable victim, and will be satisfied where it is 
demonstrable that nondisclosure denied access to treatment.  In this respect, consideration 
of proximity overlaps with the question of whether harm is foreseeable as there can be no 
                                                        
16
 Ibid. 
 
17
 Mason, J.K, Laure, G.T., Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 9th ed. (OUP, 
Oxford: 2013), p. 223. 
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injury,
19
 nor sufficient proximity, if there is no treatment available for the condition 
identified in the proband’s genome.  Therefore a proximate relationship would not exist if 
the proband has Huntingon’s disease because there is no treatment presently available, yet 
if the deleterious trait indicates cancer then treatment is available and a decision not to 
disclose will directly effect the proband’s relatives because it denies them the opportunity 
to seek medical intervention.  Moreover, as negligence is not assessed with the benefit of 
hindsight, any consideration of available treatments is primarily retrospective – temporally 
fixed at the time of the proband’s test – although there must be latitude to take account of 
treatments that, whilst not currently available, will become so a reasonable time after the 
results are known.
20
  However, there can be no duty to subsequently review the decision 
not to disclose, as it is necessary to impose ‘some intelligible limits to keep the law of 
negligence within the bounds of common sense and practicality’.21  To require clinicians to 
continuously review whether nondisclosure closely and directly affects the proband’s 
immediate relatives is plainly too onerous a burden and inconsistent with public policy, the 
underlying force behind any assessment of proximity.
22
 
 
Fair, Just and Reasonable 
A determinative question in respect of any duty of care is whether it is fair just and 
reasonable to impose it.  This aspect of the Caparo formula takes account of the policy 
factors that militate for and against the imposition of tortious liability in the given 
circumstances.
23
  The policy issues at hand determine whether questions of foreseeability 
and proximity are construed restrictively or expansively and are fundamental in the 
creation of new duties of care.  There are six policy issues relevant to a duty to disclose: 
doctor-patient confidentiality, psychiatric harm, the interest in not knowing, the 
vulnerability of family members, nonfeasance and the protection of the NHS. 
 
Doctor-Patient Confidentiality 
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 Since the adverse outcome that eventuates – the genetic condition – could not be avoided or 
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Confidentiality is ‘one of the cornerstones’ of the doctor-patient relationship.24  Its origins 
lie in the Hippocratic Oath and its current ethical basis is the Declaration of Geneva, which 
obliges clinicians to ‘respect the secrets confided in them’.25  A duty to disclose will – in 
effect – require a clinician to breach doctor-patient confidentiality, restricting the 
proband’s interests in the common law obligation to respect confidences, the Data 
Protection Act and Art 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
It is important to reiterate at this juncture that while there is overlap between 
confidentiality and privacy, the two concepts are not synonymous.  As Laurie explains, 
confidentiality ‘is concerned as much with the protection of a relationship as with personal 
information’. 26  Privacy ‘requires no relationship and is concerned with the interests that 
encompass … personal information’.27  Moreover, the protection of health is a legitimate 
infringement of Art 8, although whether this restriction applies to personal health or public 
health is a moot point.  What constitutes a legitimate restriction of confidentiality is, 
however, somewhat opaque.  Although it is permissible to breach confidentiality and make 
a disclosure when it is in the public interest, what constitutes a public interest justification 
is context dependent.  The uncertainties of the public interest defence were discussed at 
length in chapter two, alongside exceptions to data protection law, thus they will not be 
revisited in depth here.  The same chapter made a case for justifying disclosing genetic 
information by reference to a public interest in preventing harm and Art 2 ECHR, thus a 
basis (potentially) exists for interfering with patient interests in confidentiality and data 
protection.  A duty to disclose would be consistent with these public interests but also 
recognise the interests of the proband’s blood relations. 
Although justifications for breaching confidentiality in this context do exist, it is 
important to recognise that any obligation to breach confidentiality may negatively affect 
the dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship, which, as Pattinson notes, ‘depends on 
trust.’ 28   Rose J encapsulated these potential risks in X v Y & Others, 29  wherein he 
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observed that without respect for medical confidentiality ‘doctors will be discredited … for 
future patients will not come forward if doctors are going to squeal on them’.30  The Court 
of Appeal differed somewhat in their conclusion in W v Egdell,
31
 opining that in certain 
circumstances a doctor ‘owes a duty not only to his patient but also a duty to the public’,32 
which, in the context of Egdell, amounted to placing ‘before the proper authorities the 
results of his examination if, in his opinion, the public interest so required’.33  The House 
of Lords subsequently delivered what is regarded as the leading ruling on confidentiality in 
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2).
34
  Their Lordships took the opportunity 
to explain that the legal foundation of confidentiality is ‘a public interest that confidences 
should be preserved’, but that the interest is not absolute and can ‘be outweighed by some 
other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure’.35  The question therefore is 
whether the disclosure of genetic risks furthers a countervailing public interest and whilst it 
is irrefutable that avoiding or minimising harm or upholding Art 2 rights is in the public 
interest, the moot point is whether or not these interests incorporate the (mainly) personal 
interest in seeking medical intervention to avoid or minimise genetic risks.
36
  Alternatively, 
disclosure could be argued as in the public interest if it improves access to healthcare or 
enables a greater number of individuals to receive therapies that might be – in comparison 
to invasive procedures – more cost-effective, thus influencing development of genomic 
medicine and the economic position of healthcare providers.  For example, if drug 
therapies were to reduce the number of patients requiring chemotherapy by a quarter – and 
presuming these therapies proved to be more cost-effective than surgical intervention and 
chemotherapy – disclosure may fundamentally and positively affect the budgets of 
healthcare providers. 
The issue for the courts to consider in the context of a duty to disclose is whether or 
not the disclosure of genetic risks is a justifiable restriction of doctor-patient 
confidentiality.  If the public interest in avoiding harm and/or protecting Art 2 rights is 
interpreted as encompassing familial genetic risks, then it is suggested that limiting the 
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proband’s interest in confidentiality is a justifiable measure.  Furthermore, the international 
declarations and conventions produced thus far envisage some restrictions upon the rights 
of the proband.  Art 26 of the European Convention of Biomedicine
37
 states that the rights 
therein can be restricted ‘for the protection of public health’ and this qualification extends 
to the articles of its additional protocol on genetic testing in healthcare.
38
  It is important to 
note that both the Convention and its additional protocol are couched in terms that are 
patient-centric, foregoing explicit mention of family interests in genetic information and 
risks.  However, Art 16(4) of the protocol does acknowledge that in ‘exceptional cases, 
restrictions may be placed by law on the exercise of the [proband’s] rights’, which may be 
read as including the prevention of injury to the proband’s relatives from genetically 
transmissible conditions, although pedants will rightly note that whether such is an 
‘exceptional case’ is a matter of perspective.  UNESCO’s Declaration on Human Genetic 
Data also acknowledges that the proband’s interests are not without limit and permits 
nonconsensual disclosure ‘for an important public interest reason in cases restrictively 
provided for by domestic law’, and, on a broader legal spectrum, Art 8(2) ECHR lists ‘the 
protection of public health’ as a legitimate reason for restricting an individual’s right to 
respect for privacy. 
The GMC’s 2009 guidelines on confidentiality suggests that the medical profession 
also recognises that doctor-patient confidentiality is not absolute, indicating that a patient’s 
medical information may be disclosed without consent where a ‘failure to disclose may 
expose others to risk of death or serious harm.’39  However, whilst the guidelines do 
expressly address genetic information and risks, they provide little meaningful content, the 
guidelines simply directing clinicians to balance their duty of care to the patient against 
their duty to help protect others from serious harm.
40
   The question here is how a balance 
is to be struck between these two duties and this is not addressed in the guidelines, which 
suggests the GMC considers it a matter of clinical judgement.  The lack of content in the 
guidance may also be interpreted as unwillingness on the part of the GMC to provide a 
framework regarding the disclosure of genetic risks, beyond acknowledging that such 
information may need to be disclosed. 
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The judiciary has previously been asked to strike a balance between competing 
interests in information.  As discussed in chapter two, the courts have developed a line of 
case law concerning when confidential information may be disclosed, therefore this 
particular policy issue in creating a duty to disclose is not one with which the courts will be 
unfamiliar.  In fact, it may be that the judiciary is one of the more appropriate bodies to 
adjudicate on confidentiality within this context because of its roots in the common law.  
American jurisprudence indicates that a carefully drawn duty to disclose can be balanced 
with doctor-patient confidentiality, with the latter retaining its traditional importance but 
yielding ‘to the extent that disclosure is essential to avert danger to others’.41 
 
Psychiatric Harm 
Although it is argued throughout this thesis that disclosing information regarding the 
proband’s genetic risks to their immediate family has positive results, it is also recognised 
that ‘exposure to unsolicited information concerning future ill health, especially when 
nothing can be done to alleviate the condition, can result in significant mental trauma’.42  
Such a risk is clearly illustrated by the abortive attempt to screen newborns for alpha1-
antitrypsin deficiency (A1AD) in Sweden between 1972-1974.  A1AD is an autosomal 
recessive disorder caused by deficient production of alpha1-antitrypsin, a protein inhibitor 
produced in the liver that protects tissue (primarily in the lungs and liver) from the effects 
of the enzymes of ‘inflammatory cells’, which function to break down bacteria and host 
tissue. The condition typically manifests as asthma-like symptoms, such as wheezing, 
shortness of breath, rhonchi,
43
 and rales;
44
 in later life it can lead to emphysema, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, degradation of lung tissue, cirrhosis, and liver failure.  The 
aims of the Swedish programme were to (i) identify children with A1AD at an early stage; 
(ii) provide counselling to the parents regarding their child’s condition; and (iii) ‘to provide 
an opportunity to protect the affected children from concentrated air pollutants (mainly 
cigarette smoke), in the hope of preventing or postponing lung disease in adulthood’,45 and 
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by the conclusion of the programme in 1974, 200,000 newborn babies had undergone 
screening for the relevant genetic markers. 
Despite the commendable aims of the programme and considerable uptake, 
universal A1AD screening proved unsuccessful and was discontinued when follow-up 
studies indicated ‘that more than half of the families with affected children suffered 
adverse psychological consequences’. 46   The majority of parents ‘reacted negatively 
(usually with fear and anxiety) to the first news of the child alpha1 deficiency’, these 
reactions ‘were typically strong and long lasting’ and, significantly, neonatal diagnosis did 
not ‘have a desirable effect on … parental smoking’.47  In fact, if anything, it increased it.48  
Furthermore, when a follow-up was conducted between 5 and 7 years after screening, 
approximately 50% of mothers and 33% of fathers were assessed by a psychiatrist as 
having made a poor to very poor emotional adjustment to their child’s condition.  Mothers 
also ‘reported significantly poorer mental and physical health’.49 
Potential psychological responses to the disclosing of genetic information represent 
a broad spectrum, ranging from anxiety to fear, guilt, depression, self-harm and, at the 
extreme, suicide.  An international study conducted in 1999 found that the rate of suicides 
among individuals identified as possessing the genetic markers for Huntington’s disease is 
ten times greater than the national average for the United States.
50
  The Danish Council of 
Bioethics has cautioned of the risk of disclosure of genetic risks leading to 
‘morbidification’: ‘the notion of “falling victim” to some inescapable “fate” uncovered by 
genetic examination’. 51   However, the difficulties and respective failures must be 
contrasted with the success of neonatal screening for Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy 
(DMD) in Wales,
52
 which suggests psychiatric harms flows as much from how the 
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information is communicated and the support available as from the content of the 
information itself. 
If – as discussed in the previous subsection – the public interest in preventing harm 
and Art 2 ECHR are accepted as favouring disclosure of genetic risks to blood relations, it 
follows that where the disclosure may cause psychological trauma it becomes inconsistent 
with these justifications.  The question, therefore, is whether the risk of psychological 
harm is outweighed by the benefits of disclosing the proband’s genetic information.53  
Once again this returns the analysis to the availability of treatments because, as Laurie 
explains, ‘the availability of a cure carries with it the certainty that disclosure can 
incontrovertibly avert harm … this can only be seen as a good thing for the third party to 
whom the disclosure is made.’54  When a therapeutic response is available the risk of 
psychological harm being caused by disclosure is arguably outweighed by the possibilities 
of treatment.  However, ‘if the treatment is ineffective, painful or difficult to come by, the 
grounds are less firm’.55   If disclosure were to be made in absence of treatment, perhaps 
with the aim of facilitating preparedness, then ‘there is less of a guarantee that the harm in 
question will, de facto, be avoided’.56  Therefore disclosure to persons with genetically 
transmissible conditions for which treatments are available may be justifiable even if there 
is a risk of psychological trauma, however, where the proband is identified as possessing 
genetic markers for an untreatable disease, the psychological risks of disclosure are not 
offset by the benefits of medical intervention. 
It is therefore a necessity that treatment exists for the deleterious genetic traits 
identified if the imposition of a duty to disclose is to be fair, just and reasonable.  In the 
absence of treatment, a duty may be imposed to engender preparedness, but arguments 
suggesting a duty to ‘engender preparedness are suspect for the simple fact that it is far 
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from clear that these ends are achievable, and indeed disclosure in such cases might lead to 
additional harms.’57 
 
The Right Not to Know 
It is axiomatic that some among the proband’s relatives will not want to know about their 
family’s genetic heritage.  The possibility of psychiatric harm, or ethical, moral or 
religious factors may mean that some family members would rather not know about the 
proband’s genetic information and, consequentially, their own.  An interest in not knowing 
is recognised in Art 10(2) of the Convention on Biomedicine, which states that ‘the wishes 
of the individual not to be informed shall be observed’, and the additional protocol 
correspondingly states in Art 16(3) that ‘[t]he wish of a person not to be informed shall be 
respected’.  UNESCO has also recognised a ‘right’ not to know in its Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights, wherein it is stated: 
 
‘The right of every individual to decide whether or not to be informed of the results 
of genetic examination and the resulting consequences should be respected.’58 
 
Both UNESCO’s declaration and the Convention on Biomedicine adopt proband centric 
language, couching the interest in not knowing in terms of patient choice and rights, 
eschewing the interests that family members may have in not knowing about the proband’s 
genetic risks.  It is an interesting omission and one that is perpetuated by the GMC’s 
confidentiality guidelines, which ‘also ignores the possibility of relatives having an interest 
in not knowing’.59  However, the right not to know may arise as an element of privacy 
under Art 8 ECHR, although there is no case in point. 
The lack of a basis for a right not to know is problematic because whilst one is 
clearly envisaged, certainly in respect of the patient, it has not been sufficiently defined.  
As Chico explains, the interest in not knowing cannot be general – incorporating ‘unknown 
unknowns’, information that essentially lacks a degree of foreshadowing – because such 
‘would expose health professionals to liability on the basis of unpredictable individual 
evaluations of the desirability of the disclosure.’ 60   In addition, Chico notes that 
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‘[p]ractically speaking, there cannot be a coexisting interest in knowing and an interest in 
not knowing’,61 although she contends that an interest in not knowing could be recognised 
where an individual has previously indicated ‘in a way readily discoverable by health 
professionals, that she does not want to know information about her genetic risks.’62  
Equally, the interest in not knowing may be recognised and upheld where an individual is 
offered knowledge of genetic risks and rejects it.  This latter scenario brings into question 
whether an interest in not knowing – in absence of a clear opt-in or opt-out – is practicable, 
because ‘in the very process of asking “Do you want to know whether you’re at risk…?” 
the geneticist has already made the essence of the information known’.63  It has also been 
argued that the interest in not knowing is inconsistent with the courts’ continuing respect 
for personal autonomy as ‘to choose meaningfully we require full information about the 
range of options available and … this paradigm breaks down in the context of an interest in 
not knowing’.64  But if the courts are continuing to show respect for personal autonomy, 
why should they not recognise an autonomous decision to proceed in ignorance?  Is the 
choice to know or not know (given that what is learned cannot be unlearned) any less 
meaningful in terms of personal autonomy than electing, on the basis of full information, 
to undergo one treatment over another? 
Because the act of asking whether an individual wants to know about their genetic 
heritage may reveal the thrust of the information, to fully respect relatives’ interest in not 
knowing it may be necessary to operate on a presumption that family members do not wish 
to know about the proband’s identified risks.  This approach is undesirable because it 
would undermine the extension to tort law proposed here: a duty to disclose would become 
superfluous if the default presumption is that everyone wishes to exercise their right not to 
know. 
The Convention on Biomedicine and UNESCO’s declaration on Human Genetic 
Data appear to pursue a middle ground in this respect, permitting restriction of the ‘right’ 
contained therein for ‘the protection of public health’65 and ‘an important public interest 
reason’.66  If these restrictions are interpreted as applying only insofar as is necessary, then 
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the question is not which is the overreaching interest but – as with doctor-patient 
confidentiality – how to achieve an effective balance between two competing interests.  In 
other words, if the public interest is in avoiding harm, then the private interest in not 
knowing may yield only insofar as is necessary to avoid or minimise the predicted harm 
and, thereby, uphold the public interest.  In the context of genetic risks, harm can be 
avoided or minimised by providing information on the proband’s genetic risks and inviting 
family members to seek testing; thereafter, relatives can either undergo testing or assert 
their right not to know. 
Studies that have investigated the acceptability of disclosing genetic information to 
family members support such an approach to balancing the interests in knowing and not 
knowing.  A 2006 study in Australia found that family members did not consider it a 
breach of privacy nor autonomy to receive a letter disclosing that they may be genetically 
at risk of cancer, even when respondents declined to receive any further information.
67
  
Moreover, it was found that when clinicians disclosed the presence of genetic risks the 
uptake of genetic testing was double (46 per cent) that when no contact was attempted (23 
per cent), or where contact was attempted indirectly through a letter to be delivered by the 
proband (26 per cent).
68
 
It is axiomatic that an individual’s ability to control the information they receive is 
an important aspect of personal autonomy and privacy, yet a balance must be struck with 
the countervailing public interests that may favour disclosure of genetic risks.  Studies are 
indicative that disclosure by clinicians will lead to an increase in the uptake of genetic 
screening, which, in turn, will lead to an increase in the accessibility of preventative 
therapies or early medical intervention and, potentially, furthers the pursuit of the public 
interests in avoiding harm and protecting Art 2 rights.  If, however, no treatments are 
available for a particular condition then the public and private interests align, as the harm 
that can potentially be avoided is psychiatric.  Of course, in this latter scenario, the duty to 
disclose would not be engaged because no treatment exists and therefore nondisclosure 
does not cause the claimant harm. 
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The Vulnerability of Family Members 
As Mulheron writes, family members ‘at risk of manifesting diseases are vulnerable’.69  
This is because  
 
‘generally they have to rely upon HCPs who are in a stronger position by virtue of 
the information that they possess about the diseased patient, and about which the 
non-patient knows nothing and cannot ascertain for himself.’70 
 
In the Australia case of BT v Oei,
71
 the claimant’s sexual partner was infected with HIV 
but his physician did not competently diagnose him.  The claimant was thus exposed to a 
risk of contracting HIV due to the clinician’s negligence.  The claimant was vulnerable in 
this instance because she had no way of ascertaining for herself that her partner was HIV 
positive, therefore the clinician was held to owe her a duty of care.  In Bradshaw v 
Daniels,
72
 a clinician was held to owe a duty of care to warn a patient’s wife of the risks of 
exposure to the source of her husband’s non-contagious disease (Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever) because she had the same epidemiological risk.  Parker argues that the claim by the 
wife’s estate succeeded because ‘the relationship puts the physician in a position to know 
of a risk that may not be obvious to others’,73 although it is important to note that the court 
did not express their judgment in such terms. 
In the context of the nondisclosure of genetic risks, the patient’s family are not 
placed in harms way as in BT, where the clinician’s negligence put the claimant at risk of 
contracting HIV.  By contrast, genetic risks cannot be contracted and, as has been 
previously indicated, the nondisclosure is not the root of the disorder.  Instead the 
proband’s family are vulnerable because, post genetic screening, clinicians will possess 
information that is indicative of risk to their long-term health.  If a clinician does not 
disclose genetic information and a family member goes on to develop the identified 
condition, then they occupy a similar position to the claimant in Bradshaw, in that, had 
they been warned of the risk, they could have sought preventative therapies or earlier 
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treatment.  Therefore, when considering the policy issues relevant to a duty to disclose, it 
is necessary to take account of the vulnerable position of the proband’s immediate 
relatives.  In the circumstances presented here, where treatments are available for a 
condition and a clinician is aware of a familial risk, a patient’s relatives will be vulnerable 
to a condition that may otherwise be avertable (or manageable) if no disclosure is made.  
This was precisely the circumstance that arose in Safer,
74
 where the clinician did not 
disclosure the hereditary nature of his patient’s cancer, which the patient’s daughter, 
unaware of the risk, went on to develop.  It was judged in that case that, had a timely 
disclosure been made, the claimant’s cancer could have been averted or minimised. 
 
Nonfeasance 
It is a general principle of English tort law that a person is not liable for a failure to act.  As 
Lord Keith explained in Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong,
75
 there is no 
‘liability in negligence on the part of one who sees another about to walk over a cliff with 
his head in the air and forebears to shout a warning’.76  Liability can arise for omissions in 
limited circumstances but, in the context of genetic risks, it is axiomatic that the defendant 
has not created the source of the risk,
77
 nor assumed responsibility for the welfare of 
family members.
78
 
The line between misfeasance and nonfeasance can, however, be somewhat 
difficult to draw.  Thus what may originally appear to be an omission may actually be 
treated as a positive act by the courts.  The exemplar here is the conduct of the driver who 
fails to break for a red light, which can be phrased both as an omission and a positive act.
79
  
The nondisclosure of genetic information may therefore be treated as misfeasance as 
opposed to nonfeasance, however, it is more likely to be viewed as an omission, analogous 
to the actions of the priest and the Levite who passed the traveller by: ‘an omission which 
was likely to have as its reasonable and probable consequences damage to health … but for 
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which the priest and the Levite would have incurred no civil liability in English law’.80  
The question therefore is why should a clinician owe a duty of care to the proband’s 
immediate family when the conduct complained of is potentially an omission? 
The answer, it is suggested, is because clinicians, by virtue of the proband’s genetic 
test, have specific knowledge of the prospective risks to long-term health of the patient’s 
family.  In Stovin v Wise,
81
 Lord Hoffmann observed that 
 
‘[a] duty to prevent harm to others or to render assistance to a person in danger or 
distress may apply to a large and indeterminate class of people who happen to be 
able to do something’.82 
 
His Lordship then posed the perennial question: ‘[w]hy should one be liable and not 
another?’83  The risk of indeterminate liability militates against a general duty to render 
assistance.  However, in the context of genetic risks, knowledge of the risks and therefore 
the capacity to ‘do something’ are not applicable to an indeterminate class.  Instead, the 
proband’s genetic test results will be restricted to a finite group of medical practitioners.  
Therefore, drawing upon the decisions in Tarasoff, Durflinger, Palmer and W & Others, 
clinicians will have specific knowledge of risks to an identifiable group of victims, which 
is not available to the population at large.  Consequentially it is suggested that 
nondisclosure is capable of amounting to negligence because no one else, with the 
exception of the proband, is capable of disclosing genetic information to family 
members.
84
 
Knoppers, however, argues that judgments such as Tarasoff, Durflinger and Palmer 
offer little in terms of guidance regarding nondisclosure of genetic risks because: 
 
‘it is a patient’s actions which are likely to harm others in the case of a threat of 
violence, in the case of genetic conditions, the patient is not putting relatives at risk 
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by carrying the gene mutation because the relatives already have the mutation or 
not’.85 
 
This is arguably a narrow view, which ignores that these cases are examples of situations 
where the defendant ‘is privy to important information through the medium of a patient 
which could be used to protect third parties from harm’.86  Furthermore, aside from the 
patients themselves, the defendant institutions were the only other party privy to the risks 
facing the victims.  Whether or not the victims were identifiable was crucial in this regard.  
In Tarasoff and Durflinger a duty of care was imposed because the defendant’s failure to 
disclose caused harm to an identifiable victim, whereas the appeal in Palmer was 
dismissed because the omission posed a risk to a general class and it was not possible to 
give an effective warning. 
It is therefore suggested that when the defendants have specific knowledge of a risk 
to an identifiable victim, a duty of care can exist in respect of the omission to disclose 
because the ability to ‘do something’ is restricted to a finite group of medical 
professionals, therefore circumventing the risk of indeterminate liability which generally 
discourages the imposing of duties in respect of nonfeasance. 
 
Protecting the NHS 
Another policy consideration that may weigh upon the court’s mind when assessing a duty 
to disclose is the protection of the National Health Service (NHS).  It is foreseeable that 
genetic screening will be offered through the NHS, therefore a question arises about 
whether a duty to disclose would open the proverbial floodgates and expose the NHS to a 
high volume of litigation. 
This policy consideration is linked with the problem of indeterminate liability 
discussed in relation to nonfeasance and it has all ready been explained why this is not a 
prohibitive issue in relation to genetic screening.  However, the courts may also consider 
the potential impact of a legal duty on genetic medicine and screening within mainstream 
healthcare.  It is possible that a duty to disclose could engender defensive practice, 
dissuading clinicians from offering genetic screening to their patients because they are 
unwilling to expose themselves to potential liabilities.  Alternatively, the NHS, in general, 
may be unwilling to risk depleting its finite budget through litigation and could, as a result, 
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restrict the availability of genetic screening.  Either scenario would effectively neuter the 
development of clinical genetics, which is an undesirable outcome.  
Although these are prima facie valid concerns, they do not withstand close scrutiny.  
The purpose of a duty to disclose is to engender disclosure of genetic information to 
members of a patient’s immediate family when a treatment is available for the disorder in 
question.  By limiting the duty’s scope to identifiable claimants, the obligation is not too 
burdensome.  This was the position in Safer v Estate of Pack, where it was felt that persons 
at risk of genetically transmissible diseases were readily identifiable and contacting these 
persons did not place too burdensome an obligation upon the clinician.  Furthermore, in 
this form the duty is dischargeable through the provision of a warning of the identified 
genetic risks to those most likely to share those deleterious traits.  The only point at which 
clinicians would be exposing themselves to liabilities would be when they did not disclose 
treatable risks to the proband’s immediate family, thus there will be only a small number 
of potential claimants in any one case.  Furthermore, as liability is contingent on the 
genetic condition manifesting and not all relatives will develop the condition, the number 
of potential claimants is greater than those who will have a valid claim against the 
clinician.  A final point is that despite creation of the Tarasoff-type duty and the extension 
of this to genetic risks, there is no available evidence of high levels of defensive practice in 
the US. 
The concern in respect of the NHS budget is also unconvincing because 
encouraging disclosure and, thereby, uptake of early intervention or preventative therapies 
may be in the economic interest of healthcare providers.  Careful consideration of the 
economics of disclosure is warranted before it can be definitively claimed that there are 
financial benefits, but there is evidence underlining the potential gains.  An example of the 
potential positive economic impact is tamoxifen, which the NHS plans to offer to woman 
at risk of breast cancer following the release of guidelines by the National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence.
87
  The drug is relatively inexpensive, costing approximately £130 for 
a five-year course, which compares to an annual cost of breast cancer treatment of around 
£12,000.
88
  If healthcare providers were to effectively discharge their duty, and patient’s 
relatives act on the information provided – which is more likely if a clinician makes the 
disclosure – the economics of the situation may work in the favour of institutions like the 
NHS and not lead to litigation that will place additional strain on their finite budgets. 
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An argument based upon an opening of the floodgates or inhibiting the 
development of genetic medicine does not, therefore, appear a convincing reason to refuse 
to create a duty to disclose. 
 
Conclusion 
The shared nature of genetic information means that tensions will inevitably arise between 
a clinician’s duty of confidentiality to the proband and the potential to avert harm to 
immediate members of their family.  Disclosure of genetic risks may allow individuals to 
seek preventative therapies or to undergo prompt treatment and – as genetic screening is 
increasingly integrated into mainstream healthcare – the traditional paradigm of doctor-
patient relationships will become an increasingly difficult to sustain.  The important 
question is how to balance the interests of patients and their immediate family when it 
comes to genetic risks.  It is suggested that the tort of negligence could be extended and a 
duty to disclose developed, providing a clear indication of when genetic risks should be 
disseminated beyond the doctor-patient relationship and to whom.  In order to establish 
sufficient proximity, it will be necessary for the claimants to establish themselves as 
identifiable victims who are closely and directly effected by the nondisclosure, which, it is 
suggested, will limit liability to immediate relatives unless members of the proband’s 
extended family can raise compelling reasons to the contrary.  In respect of the third limb 
of the Caparo test – whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care – a 
number of policy issues have been identified and considered.  It has been argued that none 
represent a barrier to liability for nondisclosure but it remains necessary to impose ‘some 
intelligible limits to keep the law of negligence within the bounds of common sense and 
practicality’. 89   This need for limits again returns to the crux of the argument: that 
treatment has to be available for the disorder in question if a duty to disclose is to arise. 
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6. BREACH OF DUTY AND A DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
 
Introduction 
It has been proposed in the proceeding chapters that a healthcare practitioner should owe a 
duty to disclose genetic information – specifically risks of disease – to the blood relations 
of the proband.  If a duty is established between clinician and family members, the next 
question is how the courts should assess breach.  The answer is not straightforward 
because medicine is an inexact science, which incorporates a significant amount of 
discretion, and the courts have recognised this through refusing to hold a healthcare 
practitioner negligent simply because another would have acted differently in the 
circumstances.  In the context of disclosing genetic risks, the traditional approach to breach 
in clinical negligence claims is capable of incorporating both disclosure and nondisclosure 
as non-negligent behaviour providing both are backed by a responsible body of medical 
opinion.  Effectively such a conclusion empties a duty to disclose of content, since a failure 
to disclose a genetic risk would not constitute a negligent act.  A more nuanced approach 
to breach is therefore necessary if the proposed duty is to have any value. 
The staring point is what should constitute a breach of duty in the context of not 
disclosing genetic information.  A simplistic (and unhelpful) answer is the act of failing to 
disclose information pertaining to genetic risks.  However, a breach of duty is not merely 
an act but an act which falls below the appropriate standard for the given circumstances.  
Therefore it is not sufficient that a healthcare practitioner fails to disclose a genetic risk, 
doing so must constitute a failure to uphold the appropriate standard of care if the law is to 
recognise such an act as a breach of duty. 
The issue of breach in medical negligence has traditionally been assessed with the 
test from Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,
1
 which draws upon the 
testimony of responsible bodies of medical opinion to determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct is below the appropriate professional standard for the situation.  The so-called 
Bolam test is thus a starting point for the assessment of breach in the context of the 
nondisclosure of genetic risks.  Application of the Bolam test simpliciter is, however, 
problematic.  This is because absent a unilateral policy regarding the disclosure of genetic 
risks, it is possible for both disclosure and nondisclosure to be supported by opposing 
bodies of medical opinion and the courts are reluctant to conclude a practice is negligent 
because an alternate exists.  Therefore if a duty to disclose is to have content it is necessary 
for the courts to move beyond the Bolam test.  One potential avenue is to apply the 
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qualification to Bolam in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority.
2
  In Bolitho it was 
said that a body of medical opinion supporting a contested practice must be capable of 
withstanding ‘logical analysis’3 and failure to do so would be evidence of a breach of duty.  
The question, however, is what is actually meant by ‘logical analysis’ since varying 
interpretations have been advanced, including a test of reasonableness and an analysis of 
the risks and benefits inherent in a particular conduct. 
The unavoidable necessity of recognising clinical discretion may mean that 
applying the Bolam test to nondisclosure of genetic risks is impractical and thus an 
alterative means of assessing breach must be sought.  A potential alternative to Bolam may 
be drawn from claims concerning the nondisclosure of medical risks, which have 
gravitated away from a standard of care based upon responsible medical opinion.  Instead, 
breach in these cases is assessed by reference to what a reasonable patient would want to 
know in the circumstances.  In the context of the nondisclosure of genetic risks, it is 
possible that a modified form of the reasonable patient approach might be a more 
appropriate test of breach than Bolam, particularly if a unilateral opinion on disclosure is 
lacking.  However, the longstanding nature of the Bolam test means it cannot be 
discounted as a method for assessing breach, therefore both potential approaches and how 
these may apply in claims concerning a duty to disclose must be considered. 
 
Bolam 
The case of Bolam concerned an application of electroconvulsive therapy without the 
administration of a relaxant drug or the use of physical restraints, the consequences of 
which were that the patient’s involuntary movements while undergoing the therapy caused 
him serious injuries, including a fractured pelvis.  The patient sued alleging that the lack of 
use of restraints or relaxant amounted to negligence but the court held that no breach of 
duty had occurred.  The defendant had acted in accordance with ‘a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’,4 thus his actions 
had not fallen below the appropriate standard of care in the given circumstances. 
 The crux of the Bolam test is that a clinician delivering treatment in a way that is 
practiced (or considered acceptable practice) by others in their field is not negligent, even 
if an alternate school of thought exists unless ‘it [the practice] has been proved contrary to 
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what is really substantially the whole of informed medical opinion.’5  In this way the 
Bolam test accounts for the fact that medicine is an inexact and an ever-changing science 
incorporating a strong element of discretion.  A clinician could not conduct surgery using 
eighteenth century practices – such as forsaking anesthetics and antiseptics6 – but they 
would not be precluded from pursuing one course of conduct merely because an alternate 
body of opinion existed.  Therefore in Bolam the doctor’s conduct – conducting 
electroconvulsive therapy without restraints or relaxant drugs – was not negligent simply 
because another body of opinion favoured an alternate approach.   
 In the subsequent judgment of Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority
7
 the House of Lords reiterated that ‘in the realm of diagnosis and treatment 
negligence is not established by preferring one respectable body of professional opinion to 
another’. 8   For a breach of duty to be established there has to be evidence that the 
clinician’s conduct fell below the appropriate standard of care accepted in their area of 
practice, not that he or she acted in accordance with a body of medical opinion with which 
the judge does not agree. 
Thus the Bolam test poses something of a conundrum in respect of genetic 
information.  The assessment of breach accounts for clinical discretion and divergent 
opinion, meaning negligence is not proven because there existed an alternative approach to 
the problem at hand.  For this reason the Bolam test is unlikely to be sympathetic to the 
proband’s blood relations where a genetic risk has not been disclosed.  The discretionary 
element of Bolam means that providing a responsible body of medical opinion supports 
nondisclosure, it is a justifiable response to the circumstances.  The courts would only be 
likely to reject medical opinion supporting nondisclosure if such is ‘contrary to what is 
really substantially the whole of informed medical opinion’ and the difficulty here is that 
there is no clear agreement regarding disclosure.  Research on the opinion of medical 
geneticists in America illustrates the issue.
9
  Although in excess of two thirds of 
respondents felt they bore responsibility for warning blood relations of genetic diagnosis, 
and a quarter considered disclosing information when the proband refused, only a minority 
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actually did.
10
  The core reasons for nondisclosure were presented as emotional issues, 
confidentiality and legal liability.  It is extremely difficult – if not nigh impossible – to 
argue that refusing to disclose information pertaining to a patient because of doctor-patient 
confidentiality is against informed medical opinion – it is, after all, in the public interest to 
preserve confidences – which returns us to the importance of identifying a countervailing 
public interest that favours disclosure.
11
 
Unless a ‘joint account’ 12  approach to healthcare and, specifically, genetic 
information is adopted or consensus is achieved with respect to disclosure, claimants will 
find it difficult to demonstrate a breach of duty.  The significance of doctor-patient 
confidentiality in medical practice – and the diverse opinions regarding reconciliation with 
genetic information
13
 – means that consensus on disclosure will be difficult to achieve.  
And, as Lord Scarman explain in Maynard, where two bodies of medical opinion exist, 
advocating opposite courses of action: 
 
‘a judge’s “preference” for one body of distinguished professional opinion to 
another also professionally distinguished is not sufficient to establish negligence … 
Failure to exercise the ordinary skill of a doctor (in the appropriate specialty, if he 
is a specialist) is necessary.’14 
 
Mason and Laurie explain that, in this way, ‘Bolam provides some protection for the 
innovative or minority opinion or, indeed, the individual clinical judgement call’.15  The 
refusal of the judiciary to attribute negligence based upon a preference for one body of 
opinion over another is laudable, in one respect, as it permits clinical practice to develop 
and diversify without fear that innovation will amount to negligence because it departs 
from established practice.  If the courts were unwilling to accept divergent opinions there 
would be a serious risk that clinical development would be stymied by legal interference, 
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which is disadvantageous to patients in the long-term because new therapies would not be 
pioneered.
16
  For example, it would be unlikely that genomic medicine and (in years to 
come) gene therapies would be integrated into mainstream healthcare if departure from 
established medical practice amounted to proof of negligence. 
Yet at the same time the courts can be justly criticised for adhering to the Bolam 
test.  The strongest criticism of the approach is that it engenders a paternalistic approach to 
medical negligence claims by permitting a defendant’s contemporaries to determine the 
appropriate standard of care attributable to the circumstances.
17
  A paternalistic approach is 
not to be portrayed as a universal negative, however, as it offers a degree of legal 
protection to pioneering clinicians who may otherwise be found negligent because they 
deviate from the accepted norm.
18
  Yet it is undeniable that the medical profession is able 
to exert an influence upon the law through reference to common practice that other 
defendants – for example, motorists19 – are not.  Critics ‘have persistently argued that 
doctors themselves should not dictate whether conduct is negligent; this should be a matter 
for the courts.’20  The judiciary, on occasion, has made a comparable point21 and, in other 
commonwealth jurisdictions, the courts have departed from a profession-reliant test for 
breach of duty.
22
 
The paternalistic nature of Bolam is an important element in the problem it will 
pose in respect of nondisclosure.  Although the courts willingness to account for clinical 
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innovation and discretion is not necessarily a negative, their reluctance to judge opposing 
bodies of medical opinion means both nondisclosure and disclosure are potentially 
justifiable responses to the identification of a prospectively shared genetic risk.  This is 
dependent on each being consistent with responsible bodies of medical opinion, but that is 
not unforeseeable.  The problem with this outcome is that it could empty a duty to disclose 
of content, for providing nondisclosure finds support in a responsible body of medical 
opinion, existence of a countervailing opinion does not demonstrate negligence.  The 
reasons medical geneticists have elected not to disclose
23
 – which are only examples of the 
justifications for nondisclosure – are difficult, if not impossible, to portray as being 
contrary to informed medical opinion.  Thus Bolam could render a duty to disclose legally 
superfluous because a defendant’s conduct is unlikely to constitute a breach of duty. 
 
Bolitho 
The problems posed by the Bolam test mean that an alternate method for scrutinising 
breach is necessary if the duty to disclose is to possess any legal value, otherwise it will be 
a hollow shell of an obligation.  There are two approaches the courts could potentially 
adopt to avoid this outcome.  This thesis will return to the assessment of breach in doctor-
patient disclosure cases further below.  The immediate question will be whether the House 
of Lords decision in Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority
24
 could be applied to 
prevent a duty to disclose being emptied of content.  The judgment in Bolitho is ‘regarded 
by some commentators as representing a significant nail in Bolam’s coffin’25 and ‘initially 
thought to be the missing link in the standard of care in clinical negligence cases which 
would pave the way for the courts to reject medical opinion if it could not withstand 
“logical scrutiny”.’26  Thus the crucial question becomes not whether nondisclosure is 
consistent with a responsible body of medical opinion, but whether nondisclosure when 
treatment is available – and any opinion supporting such conduct in these circumstances – 
can be rejected for not withstanding logical analysis.  
Bolitho arose from a failure to intubate a child suffering respiratory arrest, which 
ultimately led to the child’s death.  The defendant had failed to attend the child during this 
time and it was accepted that such conduct was negligent.  It was accepted that intubation 
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would have alleviated the child’s condition and his death would then not have occurred, 
yet it was contested by the defendants that had the clinician attended the child she would 
not have elected to intubate and thus her negligence did not cause the child’s death.  The 
doctor’s proposed action (i.e. the non-intubation) was supported by a responsible body of 
medical opinion and, despite the ‘hypothetical and self-serving nature’27 of the defendant’s 
evidence, the House of Lords concluded that the health authority was not liable for the 
child’s death, the decision reinforcing the earlier point from Maynard that a finding of 
negligence is not satisfied merely because a preferable body of medical opinion exists.  
However, their Lordships introduced an important caveat to the established elements of the 
Bolam test, explaining that while 
 
‘in the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the field are of a 
particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion … if, in a 
rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of 
withstanding logical analysis the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is 
not reasonable or responsible.’28 
 
The decision represents a judicial restatement of the court’s role as final arbiters of what 
constitutes negligence and commentators have argued that it ‘undoubtedly devalues the 
trump card which Bolam presented to the medical profession’,29 although it is recognised 
that this is ‘only in limited circumstances.’30  But for all its heralded importance,31 the level 
of impact Bolitho has had in cases concerning the standard of care in medical practice is 
limited, although the number of cases in which Bolitho has been invoked is ‘not quite so 
low as to be labelled “rare”.’32  The limited impact demonstrates a continued reluctance on 
the courts behalf to question the evidence of medical professionals.  In the context of 
genetic risks and disclosure, any argument drawing upon Bolitho must be made with 
caution because ‘logical analysis’ appears to be an exception rather than a necessity.  
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Research by Maclean in Bolitho’s formative years found – between 1998 and 2001 – 64 
litigated cases concerning standard of care, with Bolitho referenced in 25 first instance 
decisions and four Court of Appeal hearings.  Those figures would indicate that ‘Bolam is 
far from dead’ 33  and suggest Bolitho has not fundamentally altered the principles 
governing breach in medical negligence claims.  More than a decade on, the number of 
cases applying Bolitho is ‘not quite so low as to be labelled “rare”’34 and the courts appear 
‘increasingly determined that the Bolam principle is not extended’,35 but there continues to 
exist a reluctance to abandon Bolam in respect of medical opinion.
36
  There is ‘a sense that 
Bolitho … is being used as a “back-up” position’, though Bolam can no longer be regarded 
as ‘impregnable’.37  
Although phrased as a question of ‘logical analysis’, the scrutiny required by 
Bolitho does not appear confined to ‘the avoidance of contradiction and other logical 
error’.38  Commentators have argued that this is necessary because a defendant’s actions 
may be simultaneously logical but unreasonable.
39
  This, of course, runs both ways and a 
doctor may well decide to embark on a course of action that does not, prima facie, appear 
logical.  This does not, and should not, automatically mean that action undertaken was 
unreasonable in a legal sense; a lack of logic should not equate to negligence.  
Commentators have further noted that logic 
 
‘is an unusual criterion on which to assess what is, essentially, a matter of clinical 
judgement and it seems unlikely that the courts will be able to retain control over 
health care standards if the rely on “logic” alone.’40 
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The difficulty of a pure logic approach was highlighted in Wisniewski v Central 
Manchester Health Authority, wherein Brooke LJ said: 
 
‘It is quite impossible for a court to hold that the views sincerely held by doctors of 
such eminence cannot logically be supported at all … and the views of the 
defendants’ witnesses were views which could be logically expressed and held by 
responsible doctors.’41 
 
If an opinion presented to the court is cogent and well reasoned, it is difficult to argue that 
it does not withstand logical analysis.  Bolam provides a good example of this paradox.  
Here a body of medical opinion supported the approach of the doctor who did not use 
relaxant drugs during electroconvulsive therapy.  The basis of this opinion was that the 
drugs represented a risk to the patient’s health and it is difficult to argue that such is not 
cogent and logical.  It may not be reasonable if the comparative risks of applying the 
relaxant are outweighed by the risks of undertaking therapy without it, but it could not be 
said that the opinion did not withstand logical analysis.  The nondisclosure of genetic risks 
give rise to the same problem – from one perspective, it is not reasonable to withhold 
information that may benefit the health of non-patients (i.e. by enabling access to 
preventative treatments), but to do so on the basis of protecting confidentiality and, by 
extension, the doctor-patient relationship is a cogent and logical position to adopt.  This 
would preclude a finding of a breach of duty because the claimant could not demonstrate 
the opinion failed to withstand logical analysis.  Thus Bolitho cannot rely on an analysis of 
logic alone if it is to address the difficulties of Bolam in the context of genetics. 
The Court of Appeal alluded to this being the case in Carter v Ministry of Justice,
42
 
wherein it was said that professional opinion could be rejected if it did not ‘withstand 
logical analysis and is thus unreasonable’,43 indicating that the qualification in Bolitho is 
concerned with ascertaining whether an opinion is both logical and reasonable, although 
Pattinson and Mulheron note that an analysis of the case law using reasonableness is not 
without its own difficulties.
44
  The case of Marriott v West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority
45
 also implies that the criteria in Bolitho has been interpreted as a question of 
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reasonableness rather than logic but ‘the situation is still not clear as … it retained the 
language of “logic”.’46  The decision in Jones v Conwy and Denbighshire NHS Trust,47 
however, suggests that the distinction between logic and reasonableness has been collapsed 
and it was held that a delay in ordering a CT scan was neither illogical nor unreasonable.  
It is therefore unclear what the actual focus of the Bolitho qualification is and establishing 
the appropriate focus of the scrutiny is important in respect of nondisclosure if the 
shortcomings of the Bolam test are to be addressed.
48
  In Bolitho, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
stated: 
 
‘the judge, before accepting a body of opinion as being responsible … will need to 
be satisfied that, in forming their views, the experts have directed their minds to the 
question of comparative risks and benefits and have reached a defensible 
conclusion on the matter.’49 
 
It is therefore implicit in Bolitho that for a body of medical opinion to withstand logical 
analysis, the body, in forming its opinion, must be seen to have adequeately weighed the 
risks and benefits attributable to the contested course of action.  This is illustrated by the 
outcome in Penney v East Kent Health Authority,
50
 wherein the claimants developed 
cervical cancer after receiving negative results from screening.  The issue was whether or 
not abnormalities present in the claimants’ slides should have been reported.  The 
defendants argued that the abnormalities were open to interpretation and their experts were 
of the opinion that the results could be reported as negative.  The trial judge, however, held 
that the Bolam test did not apply because no screener acting with reasonable care could 
have been certain that the abnormalities were not pre-cancerous – a finding with which the 
Court of Appeal agreed.  In addition, Pepitt J stated that had Bolam applied to the 
circumstances, the claimants would have succeeded because the defendants’ opinions were 
not logical.  The ‘experts’ did not possess the ability to distinguish between pre-cancerous 
and benign cells.  Accordingly it can be inferred that the body of opinion would have been 
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held to have insufficiently weighed the risks and benefits of the course of action adopted.  
There is clearly very little benefit in reporting a negative result before abnormalities have 
been properly assessed, while the risk of abnormalities being pre-cancerous is self-
evident.
51
 
 In the context of genetic information it can similarly be argued that not disclosing 
deleterious genetic traits for which treatment is available amounts to insufficiently 
weighing the risks and benefits involved in the circumstances.  While there is a distinction 
between reporting a definite negative when a smear test is inconclusive and disclosing 
genetic information when relatives may share the proband’s deleterious trait, the risks and 
benefits are somewhat analogous.  In both scenarios there is a risk that individuals will not 
be able to seek swift or preemptive intervention because they are unaware of the facts of 
their situation.  As has been highlighted throughout this work, if genetic information is 
disclosed then the proband’s blood relations can seek screening and preventative therapies 
that would otherwise not be available to them.  In Penney, knowing that pre-cancerous 
cells were present in the smear test would have facilitated comparable access to screening 
and treatment. 
A further illustration of the weighting of risks and benefits is provided by Marriott 
v West Midlands Health Authority.
52
  Here the claimant suffered a head injury and was 
rendered unconscious for approximately half an hour.  He was taken to hospital but 
discharged.  However, the following week he was lethargic, suffered headaches and a loss 
of appetite.  The claimant was examined by a GP who concluded there was nothing amiss 
yet four days later his condition deteriorated and he lost consciousness.  It was thereafter 
discovered that he had a hematoma but, despite surgery to remove it, the claimant was 
rendered permanently disabled.  At first instance the judge held that, while the courts 
should be reluctant to depart from an ‘apparently careful and prudent’ opinion, the decision 
not to refer a patient who had suffered head injury  
 
‘where he continues to complain of headaches, drowsiness etc., and where there 
continues to be a risk of the existence of an intracranial lesion which could cause a 
sudden and disastrous collapse, is not reasonably prudent.’53   
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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion, Beldem LJ stating that ‘it could 
not be a reasonable exercise of a general practitioner’s discretion to leave a patient at home 
and not refer him back to hospital.’54  The risk of a blood clot in the circumstances was 
statistically low but the consequences were dire should that small risk eventuate.  It is 
implied by the courts’ judgment that the defendant had not adequeately weighed the risks 
and benefits of referring the patient back to hospital given his symptoms. 
The decision in Marriot – while indicative that the courts will reject medical 
opinion where the need arises – was based upon what can be fairly termed as a nonsensical 
decision.  The risk of head injury in the circumstances and the symptoms the claimant was 
manifesting necessitated further investigation and failure to do so was illogical and 
irresponsible.  Thus Marriot does not provide clarification in respect of the disclosure of 
genetic information and since Penney was not decided on this point – Pepitt J’s comments 
being obiter – it is persuasive not authoritative.  The question therefore is how the analysis 
of risks and benefits may apply in circumstances concerning the disclosure of genetic risks 
to the proband’s blood relations. 
Certainly a body of opinion cannot be described as failing to withstand logical 
analysis if the risks of disclosure outweigh any potential benefits.  Thus a failure to 
disclose genetic markers indicating incurable diseases – such as Huntington’s disease, 
which may provoke powerful, negative reactions from individuals
55
 – could not amount to 
a breach of duty.  Furthermore, any argument that disclosure could be made to engender 
preparedness is moot because, as Laurie explains, while the 
 
‘availability of a cure carries with it the certainty that disclosure can 
incontrovertibly avert harm … if disclosure is made to avoid an ancillary harm such 
as psychological upset there is less of a guarantee that the harm in question will, de 
facto, be avoided.’56 
 
The disclosure of genetic information carries an inherent risk of psychological upset to the 
recipient, as discussed in preceding chapters.  Where there is no therapeutic response 
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available to patients with a particular condition then few, if any, benefits exist justifying 
disclosing of the deleterious genetic trait.  Where disclosure poses a serious psychological 
risk to the recipient – for example, promotion of suicidal tendencies – therapeutic privilege 
would also excuse a clinician from making a disclosure.  The basis of invoking the 
therapeutic privilege is so doctors can do what is beneficial for the patients and avoid 
harming them, which is a possible outcome of disclosing untreatable genetic risks.  If the 
disclosure of certain information is perceived as harmful to their patient, a doctor may be 
justified in withholding the information under ethical principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence.  A body of opinion advocating the withholding of information where it is 
likely to harm cannot be characterised as incapable of withstanding logical analysis, thus 
there would be no breach of duty for failing to disclose untreatable risks. 
However, Penney and Marriott suggest that when medical opinion has overlooked 
a particularly important benefit or significant risk (either statistically or in terms of 
potential harm should it eventuate) then the opinion may fail to withstand logical analysis 
and the clinician’s duty will have been breached.  Thus where treatment is available for a 
genetic condition, it may be open to the courts to hold nondisclosure as illogical because 
the risks of not disclosing outweighed the risks of breaching confidentiality.  The difficulty 
in reaching such a conclusion is that an opinion in favour of nondisclosure for reasons of 
confidentiality remains cogent and logical: confidentiality is a cornerstone of medical 
practice and necessary to preserve the trust between doctor and patient that facilitates 
effective treatment.   
Respect for clinical discretion can also complicate scrutiny of the logic of a body of 
medical opinion because it may be argued that ‘the fact that distinguished experts in the 
field are of a particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of that opinion’.57  The 
problem with this point of view is that it conflates the questions of reasonableness with 
credibility and raises the hurdle claimants must overcome.  Arguably, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to demonstrate an opinion cannot withstand logical analysis if it is 
considered reasonable because defendant’s expert is perceived as a credible authority.58  In 
Burne v A,
59
 the Court of Appeal did accept that a judge could reject an opinion on what 
was a responsible course of action providing that the experts delivering that opinion were 
given the opportunity to justify the practice.  However, in Wisniewski v Central 
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Manchester HA,
60
 the Court of Appeal – despite finding for the claimant – took the 
opportunity to reaffirm that a body of opinion could only be rejected in rare 
circumstances.
61
  Brooke LJ explained that it was ‘quite impossible for a court to hold that 
the views sincerely held by doctors of such eminence cannot logically supported at all.’62  
The implication of Brooke LJ’s statement is that the courts should continue to show 
deference to the medical profession in matters of clinical judgment, which again highlights 
the paternalism of Bolam and the problem of logic as a criterion for assessing breach.  
Burne is consistent with this position because, arguably, it becomes increasingly difficulty 
to dismiss an opinion as incapable of withstanding logical analysis if experts must be given 
sufficient opportunity to explain and justify a contested practice, particularly if questions 
of credibility and reasonableness are conflated. 
Thus the question is how the courts will judge an opinion supporting nondisclosure 
where a therapeutic response is available for the identified genetic condition.  Adopting a 
‘risks versus benefits’ analysis, a body of opinion may be rejected for failing to weight 
such properly.  For example, if the proband is predisposed to bowel cancer and the risk of 
developing the cancer can be reduce by a daily dose of aspirin, then there is arguably a 
clear benefit to informing members of the proband’s immediate family who may also be at 
risk.
63
  A body of medical opinion supporting nondisclosure in such circumstances might 
be rejected on the basis that it does not withstand logical analysis but there is no certainty 
here.  A lot would depend on the comparative risks and benefits of disclosure and 
nondisclosure; for example, if a body of opinion were to argue that the risk of 
psychological upset prohibits disclosure of deleterious genetic traits, the risks and benefits 
may be presented as being insufficiently weighted because the possibility of psychological 
upset is offset by the availability of treatment.  However, an opinion supporting 
nondisclosure for reasons of doctor-patient confidentiality cannot be easily dismissed, 
although the logic of the opinion may turn on the level of disclosure required.  If, for 
example, it is unnecessary to identify the patient, then the breach of confidentiality is 
arguably less intrusive and poses fewer risks than the presence of undiagnosed genetic 
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diseases.  Furthermore, the fact disclosure is supported by a public interest may weigh in 
the claimant’s favour.64 
An alternate justification for nondisclosure might be that healthcare professionals 
do not believe sufficient benefit is derived from the treatment (for example, a daily dose of 
aspirin in the case of bowel cancer), or have reservations concerning the side effects of the 
available treatment.  In these circumstances, would the courts consider the comparative 
risks and benefits to have been incorrectly weighted?  Since the courts are unwilling to 
express a preference where two bodies of medical opinion conflict, deference to medical 
discretion may operate to deny a breach in the circumstances.  If, however, the disorder in 
question were breast cancer and the treatment option was a double mastectomy then 
arguments relating to a lack of benefit may be presented as illogical, although arguments 
regarding doctor-patient confidentiality would remain.
65
  
Viewed objectively, the scrutiny of risks and benefits associated with the contested 
practice is an apparently sensible approach to the question of breach.  However, as 
Heywood cautions, for it to function adequately ‘the courts have to be prepared to engage 
carefully in this assessment in order that it retains any meaningful content’, further 
highlighting that ‘the rhetoric of Bolitho does not match the outcome [of the case].’66  
Jones also observes that the question of logical analysis can be somewhat hollow, since 
 
‘notwithstanding the very clear statements of principle in Bolitho, there is no 
evidence that their Lordships undertook an analysis of the balance of risk nor is it 
apparent why the balance came down against the plaintiff’s claim’.67 
 
Although there is evidence to suggest that the courts have subsequently engaged in an 
analysis of the risks and benefits associated with contested medical practices, scrutiny of 
expert opinion continues to remain exceptional.  Thus there is no certainty that a body of 
opinion supporting the nondisclosure of genetic risks when treatment is available will be 
held as failing to withstand logical analysis.  If, however, the question of disclosing genetic 
information is perceived as accessible to the lay person – meaning that, in the eyes of the 
court, it lacks the technicality and complexity attributed to other medical procedures – then 
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the judiciary may be more willing to engage in an analysis of expert opinion.  Thus if there 
existed a clear precaution against an adverse outcome that was ‘obvious as a matter of lay 
common sense’ then the doctor’s conduct may be negligent even though a responsible 
body endorsed it.
68
  This possibility has been recognised by the judiciary.  In French v 
Thames Valley Strategic Health Authority,
69
 Beatson J noted 
 
‘it is more likely that the courts will find a practice unreasonable where a case does 
not involve difficult or uncertain questions of medical treatment or complex, 
scientific or highly technical matters, but turns on failure to take a simple 
precaution, the need for which is obvious to the ordinary person considering the 
matter’.70 
 
In the pre-Bolitho case of Hucks v Cole,
71
 a doctor prescribed a five-day course of 
medication to a new mother complaining of sores and yellow spots on her fingers and toes.  
The doctor ceased treatment once there was visible improvement despite the fact that the 
sores contained an infection capable of causing puerperal fever, which the claimant then 
developed.  The doctor’s alleged breach was in failing to dispense penicillin, which would 
have treated the infection and prevented the subsequent fever.  A body of medical opinion 
supported the doctor’s conduct, but Sachs LJ in the Court of Appeal did not consider every 
precaution to have been taken given advances in medical science at the time.  He rejected 
the body of opinion because it demonstrated ‘a residual adherence to out-of-date ideas’ that 
‘on examination do not really stand up to analysis’.72  Since penicillin would have treated 
the initial infection and prevented puerperal fever, prescribing it to the patient constituted a 
precaution ‘obvious as a matter of lay common sense’.73   
The critical issue is whether a particular decision is considered accessible to the 
layperson; when it is, the courts are more willing to subject a decision to scrutiny.  Recent 
examples of finding a clear precaution not being taken include failing to consult with more 
experienced specialists about a patient's condition;
74
 failing to ask a series of leading 
                                                        
68
 Mulheron, above, n 31, p. 620. 
 
69
 [2005] EWHC 459. 
 
70
 Ibid., at 112. 
 
71
 [1993] 4 Med LR 393.  The actual decision was handed down in 1968. 
 
72
 Ibid., at 399. 
 
73
 Mulheron, above, n 31, p. 621. 
 
 168 
questions (via telephone) to a mother whose child was ill;
75
 failing to maintain ‘good lines 
of communication’ between hospital and cytogenetic laboratory regarding genetic testing 
of a sample;
76
 and failing to assign a negative status to slides where the ‘absolute 
confidence’ threshold could be met.77  In Lowe v Havering Hospitals NHS Trust,78 the 
clear precaution the defendant failed to take ‘was as simple as a more rigorously arranged 
series of medical appointments for the patient’.79  Where there is uncertainty or a decision 
is technically complex or experts disagree regarding the risks involved in a precaution, the 
courts are less willing to subject the conduct in question to scrutiny.  Thus in Macey v 
Warwickshire HA there was no breach in respect of a failure to intubate a baby 
experiencing respiratory difficulties; although opinion differed regarding the risks of 
intubation, both opinions were considered logical and rational.
80
  Likewise, in French, 
differing opinions were put forward in respect of the handling of preeclampsia.  The area 
was complex and technical and thus was not considered accessible to the layperson. 
The decision to disclose genetic risks (or not to disclose them, as may be the case) 
when a therapeutic response is available may be a practice that is accessible to the 
layperson.  Warning the proband’s blood relations of a deleterious genetic trait – and thus 
facilitating access to screening and treatment – can certainly be characterised as a 
precaution that is ‘obvious as a matter of lay common sense’.  Alternately, it could be 
portrayed as an area of mild technicality, but disclosure concerns dissemination of 
information as opposed to technically complex matters of treatment.  In French, Beaston J 
highlighted the disclosing of risks involved in a proposed treatment as being an area 
accessible to the ordinary person, thus it can be implied that disclosure of genetic risks is 
likewise accessible.  It is possible that the courts will be more willing to subject decisions 
concerning disclosure to scrutiny.  However, given the judiciary’s longstanding deference 
to the medical profession when it comes to standards of care, and the fact that it can be 
argued as ‘quite impossible for a court to hold that the views sincerely held by doctors … 
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cannot logically supported at all’,81 opinions supporting the nondisclosure of genetic risks 
may not be sufficiently scrutinised or – in the event they are – may not be rejected as 
failing to withstand logical analysis.  While Bolitho offers an opportunity to address the 
shortcomings of Bolam in the genetic context and hold that nondisclosure is a breach of 
duty, there is no guarantee that the courts will subject medical decision making to 
sufficient scrutiny. 
 
Information Disclosure Cases 
The shortcomings of Bolam and the apparent reluctance of the courts to hold a body of 
medical opinion as not withstanding logical analysis indicates an alternate approach to 
breach may be necessary, otherwise a duty to disclose may end up being a hollow 
obligation.  Discretion is an essential element of medical practice but in the context of the 
proposed duty being able to justify nondisclosure when treatment is available defeats the 
purpose for which the duty is conceived. 
A useful steer emerges from doctor’s duty of care to their patients, which 
incorporates an obligation to make sufficient disclosure of risks inherent in any proposed 
treatment.  In this context the courts’ assessment of breach has departed from the 
traditional Bolam perspective and has started establishing a standard of care by reference to 
what the reasonable person would have wanted to know in the circumstances.  This 
approach, imperfect though it is, avoids the problems created by the deference shown to 
medical professionals in Bolam and Bolitho.  Given it is already applied in the context of 
disclosure – although within the doctor-patient relationship – it may be a suitable 
alternative to Bolam when assessing breach of duty.  The crucial question is how to assess 
what the reasonable person would want to know in respect of genetic risks. 
It is important to note at this juncture that the underlying argument in doctor-patient 
disclosure cases is consent, as the claimant is arguing that had they been informed of the 
risk, they would not have consented to the respective treatment.  Because the tort of 
negligence does not recognise ‘a patient’s inherent interest in material information … 
informed consent becomes a route for patients to seek financial compensation.’82  Because 
the underlying issue here is consent, claims arising from nondisclosure within the doctor-
patient relationship are distinguishable from claims involving the nondisclosure of genetic 
information, which are concerned with an eventuation of a risk of disease.  The two types 
of claim are, however, analogous in that both are concerned with the withholding of 
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information that, had a disclosure been made, may have informed and influenced the 
conduct of the claimant.  In cases of doctor-patient nondisclosure, the information would 
have affected the patient’s consent to the proposed therapy; in cases of genetic 
nondisclosure, knowledge of the risks enables blood relations to seek preventative 
therapies or preemptive treatment. 
Application of Bolam to questions of nondisclosure within the doctor-patient 
relationship has produced unsatisfactory results and underscores the shortcomings of the 
test in respect of claims concerning genetic information.  As previously explained, Bolam 
is inherently paternalistic.  In the context of disclosure, this can perpetuate a doctor-knows-
best approach to the question ‘what should be disclosed?’ and Bolam itself provides the 
perfect illustration.  Herein McNair J directed the jury that the appropriate question was 
whether the defendant’s actions had fallen ‘below a proper standard of competent 
professional opinion on … whether or not it was right to warn.’83  The emphasis was on 
what the responsible body of medical opinion would or would not have disclosed and in 
the context of genetic information this means nondisclosure, despite the existence of 
treatment, may be justifiable providing a responsible body of medical opinion concurs with 
such conduct.  McNair J also explained that the jury was entitled to conclude that when a 
doctor 
 
‘has a strong belief that his [the patient’s] only hope of cure is submission to 
electroconvulsive therapy, the doctor cannot be criticised if he does not stress the 
dangers, which he believed to be minimal, involved in that treatment.’84 
 
The content of doctor-patient disclosure was therefore originally considered to be the 
preserve of clinical discretion.  Absent a clear consensus on disclosure within the medical 
profession – and with the courts reluctant to express a preference for one body of medical 
opinion above another – the doctor occupied the role of arbiter of what information 
patient’s received, which in turn influenced the treatment to which they consented.  Two 
important cases challenged this status quo and these and subsequent cases are informative 
in respect of how breach should be assessed in claims concerning the nondisclosure of 
genetic risks.  The two key cases are Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital
85
 and Pearce v Bristol United Healthcare NHS Trust.
86
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Sidaway concerned a failure to disclose a slight risk of paralysis inherent in spinal 
surgery that the patient was undergoing.  The risk eventuated and the claimant sued 
alleging that had the risk been disclosed prior to her undergoing the operation she would 
not have consented to the procedure.  Pearce concerned the in utero death of the 
claimant’s child, which was two weeks overdue when the claimant saw the defendant 
clinician.  The claimant wished to have the birth induced or undergo caesarian section but 
the doctor advised her that it would be risky to induce birth and her recovery from a 
caesarian would be lengthy, preferring to allow nature to take its course.  The doctor 
neglected to mention a slight risk of in utero death as a result of the delay in delivery.  
Their Lordships’ judgment in Sidaway (while not entirely clear) laid the foundations for 
the approach to breach in information disclosure cases, which was subsequently refined by 
the Court of Appeal in Pearce.  Thus in order to understand how the assessment of breach 
is developing in this context – and how it may then be extrapolated to the nondisclosure of 
genetic information – it is necessary to consider both judgments. 
One of the key points of discussion in Sidaway was whether Bolam had a role to 
play in claims regarding medical nondisclosure.  In the Court of Appeal, skepticism 
regarding the role of Bolam was aired, with Donaldson MR asserting that the courts could 
not ‘stand idly by if the profession, by an excess of paternalism, denies their patients a real 
choice.’87  This observation is also relevant in respect of genetic information because the 
paternalism of Bolam means that nondisclosure may be justified, which has the effect of 
denying the proband’s blood relations access to screening and treatment and emptying a 
duty to disclose of content.  However, despite airing reservations, the court continued to 
apply Bolam, concluding that McNair J’s test was ‘the primary test of liability for failing to 
disclose sufficient information’.88 
In the House of Lords, Lord Scarman was also skeptical about the appropriateness 
of Bolam in nondisclosure claims, stating that he found it ‘disturbing’ that determination of 
the scope of the duty of care should be left to the profession.
89
  He argued ‘the courts 
should not allow medical opinion as to what is best for the patient to override the patient’s 
right to decide’. 90   Lord Diplock, in contrast, saw no justification for distinguishing 
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between disclosure of risks and diagnosis and treatment and applied the Bolam test.  Lord 
Bridge, with whom Lord Keith concurred, argued ‘a decision [about] what degree of 
disclosure of risks is best … must primarily be a matter of clinical judgement.’91  Lord 
Templemen was of a similar disposition, stating where a doctor conscientiously 
endeavoured to explain arguments for and against a major operation the court should ‘be 
slow to conclude that the doctor has been guilty of a breach of duty … merely because the 
doctor omits some specific information.’92 
In the main the Bolam test was applied, perpetuating a doctor-knows-best approach 
to information disclosure and representing a missed opportunity to robustly defend the 
patient’s right to choose.  However, Lord Bridge added an important caveat to the principle 
that was subsequently picked up and developed by the Court of Appeal in Pearce.  He 
accepted that it would not be justifiable to withhold risks from patients in all circumstances 
– even if a body of medical opinion supported such practice – and explained that while 
disclosure was primarily a matter of clinical judgement it was open to a court to ‘come to a 
conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary … that no 
reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.’93  Lord Templemen agreed that 
clinical discretion was limited in respect of disclosure, stating that he had ‘no doubt that a 
doctor ought to draw the attention of a patient to a danger which may be special in kind or 
magnitude or special to the patient.’94  But while their Lordships acknowledged that there 
were limits to clinical discretion in this context, they did not provide these limits the 
necessary clarity.  Lord Bridge referred to ‘a substantial risk of grave adverse 
consequences’95 and gave the example of a ten per cent risk of a stroke, but his example 
raises more questions than it answers.  As Jackson explains 
 
‘while we know that Lord Bridge believed a 1-2 per cent risk of spinal cord damage 
was not a substantial risk of grave adverse consequences, and a 10 per cent risk of a 
stroke was such a risk, his judgment begs the question how to draw the line 
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between these to points of certainty.  Is a 5 per cent risk of a stroke sufficient; or a 
2 per cent risk of death?’96 
 
In the context of genetic nondisclosure, Sidaway does not provide a sufficient point of 
reference for the assessment of breach.  The relatively opaque example provided leaves 
unanswered whether a risk of sharing a genetic disorder is a risk of grave adverse 
consequences consistent with the judgment of Lord Bridge.  Is a potentially shared 
mutation on the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene sufficient to trigger the caveat his Lordship 
appeared to be suggesting?  Certainly it must be noted that the foci of Lord Bridge’s 
judgment was ostensibly risks inherent in operations, but this does not mean all risks 
outside of the operating theatre are not grave enough consequences.  The case of Penney 
suggests that a risk of cancer is to be perceived as a substantial risk as the defendant was 
found liable therein for reporting abnormal results during screening as negative.  It can be 
suggested that a genetic risk of cancer may also represent a significant risk and is therefore 
likely to be consistent with Lord Bridge’s judgment.  Whether a rare condition, or one with 
a low penetrance,
97
 would be considered a substantial risk is less clear. 
The difficulty with Lord Bridge’s judgment is, as Kennedy highlights, is that it 
‘beg[s] the central question: “substantial” and “grave” to whom?’98  Thus whether or not 
the genetic risk of cancer – or any other genetic risk – is substantial depends on the 
perspective adopted by the courts.  If the assessment of what is substantial and grave is 
conducted from the perspective of the patient, it would be inconsistent with his Lordship’s 
rhetoric, introducing ‘a subjective patient-orientated standard … inconsistent with Lord 
Bridge’s rejection of the less radical objective prudent patient test.’99  Kennedy suggests 
that the assessment is made from the perspective of the court,
100
 which, in practice, is not 
dissimilar from the objective standards of the prudent patient test that Lord Bridge 
‘dismissed as unworkable’.101  The perspective adopted when assessing breach is important 
because it will significantly alter perceptions of risk: a clinician’s view may be sway by 
statistical significance, whereas the patient may focus upon the spectre of the potential 
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outcome.  Thus, depending on the courts’ chosen yardstick, the relevant standard of care 
could vary considerably.  In Rogers v Whitaker
102
 the Australian High Court parted 
company with a Bolam assessment of whether a risk was material and thus should be 
disclosed and adopted a patient-orientated standard.  The claimant lost sight in both eyes as 
a result of surgery and, even if the operation was performed with due care, a statistically 
slight risk of blindness existed.  The surgeon did not disclose the risk and it was argued 
this constituted negligence.  The court articulated a risk as material if ‘a reasonable person 
in the patient's position … would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical 
practitioner is or should be reasonably aware that the particular patient … would be likely 
to attach significance to it.’103  It is important to note that the test is not entirely subjective: 
it operates from a baseline of what the reasonable patient would find significant.  The 
second part of the test introduces an assessment of ‘whether or not there is anything 
specific to that patient that would render a risk significant’ and thus require disclosure.104  
The critical point in Rogers was that the patient had stressed the importance of not losing 
her sight, thus demonstrating the significance of the undisclosed risk to her.   
The Rogers standard may be criticised as a radical departure from the objective 
basis of negligence and a heavy burden upon doctors encouraging excessive risk 
disclosure.
105
  It is true that a subjective standard could lead to healthcare practitioners 
disclosing more than they previously would have in order to discharge their duty, but the 
standard would cut both ways.  Since patients ‘sometimes prefer to proceed in ignorance 
and research suggests this happens not infrequently’,106 courts would be unlikely to hold a 
doctor liable where a patient expresses a wish not to know but then recounts ex post facto.  
In principle, a subjective approach could link in with respect for the right not to know.  
Where a prospective recipient of genetic information expressed a wish not to be informed, 
nondisclosure could not amount to breach, meaning a more nuanced standard of care could 
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be developed recognising different outlooks on genetic risks.  The problem with a 
subjective standard in the genetic context is the impracticality of ascertaining the views of 
persons beyond the therapeutic relationship.  It is one thing to know a patient may hold a 
risk significant because, during consultation, they stress they do not want to lose their 
sight, it is quite another to know what a patient’s relatives may view as significant.  The 
burden of obtaining this knowledge is unlikely to be insubstantial.  An objective standard, 
akin to the reasonable patient element of the Rogers test, is potentially more practical in 
the context of genetic risks.   
There is some evidence of a reasonable patient standard creeping into domestic 
law, although the extent to which it influences the question of breach is open to conjecture.  
In Pearce the Court of Appeal favoured the approach of Lord Bridge – Lord Woolf MR 
stating that ‘the views of the majority [in Sidaway] most clearly appear from the speech of 
Lord Bridge’107 – whilst distancing itself from the judgment of Lord Templemen.108  The 
core issue in Pearce, like Sidaway before, was whether a doctor breached his duty by 
failing to disclose certain risks: specifically, the risk of in utero death of the patient’s child.  
Considering what should be disclosed to patients, the Court of Appeal held 
 
‘if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgement of a reasonable 
patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the 
patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient can 
determine for him or herself as to what course of action he or she should adopt’.109 
 
The language adopted by the Court of Appeal would appear to ‘indicate a more robust 
commitment to the patient’s right to information’,110 but the outcome of the case did not 
match the rhetoric.  In deciding whether or not the clinician was negligent, Lord Woolf 
MR highlighted that ‘the doctors called on behalf of the defendants did not regard that risk 
[in utero death] as significant’.111  This statement indicates that in Pearce the definition of 
a significant risk was drawn from the perspective of medical practitioners and not the 
patient.  Despite consistent assertions to the contrary under cross examination, it was 
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concluded that had the claimant ‘been able to understand what she had been told about the 
increased risk, her decision would still have been to follow, reluctantly, the advice of the 
doctor’.112  Thus while the court appeared to adopt a reasonable patient standard, adducing 
significance by reference to the opinion of the medical profession means the judgment and 
reasoning can be reconciled with the Bolam test.
113
 
The judgment of Lord Woolf, however, does appear to have laid foundations for a 
departure from Bolam in respect of negligent disclosure.  Subsequent cases appear to have 
adopted this trajectory and it has been suggested that healthcare practitioners must have 
regard for the perceptions of their patient in respect of risks.  In Wyatt v Curtis,
114
 Sedley 
LJ suggested Lord Woolf’s formulation refined Lord Bridge’s test by recognising that 
‘what is substantial and grave are questions on which the doctor’s and the patient’s 
perception may differ’ thus doctors must ‘have regard to what may be the patient’s 
perception.’115 
In Chester v Afshar,
116
 the House of Lords did not consider the issue of breach but 
did approve of Lord Woolf MR’s approach, stating: 
 
‘A surgeon owes a legal duty to a patient to warn him or her in general terms of 
possible serious risks involved in the procedure … In modern law medical 
paternalism no longer rules and a patient has a prima facie right to be informed by a 
surgeon of a small, but well established risk’.117 
 
The courts thus appear to be wriggling away from an assessment of breach based on Bolam 
though the extent to which a reasonable patient test has been adopted is open to debate.  In 
Pearce, Lord Woolf MR judged the seriousness of risks from the opinion of the clinicians 
but cases such as Wyatt and Chester have placed an emphasis on the reasonable patient’s 
perception of risk.
118
 Birch v University College London Hospital NHS Foundation 
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Trust
119
 – where it was held that failure to disclose an alternative, less risky means of 
diagnosis constituted a breach of duty – may also indicates that the doctor’s duty of 
disclosure is assessed by reference to the reasonable patient as opposed to Bolam.  
However, in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,
120
 both houses of the Court of 
Session applied Sidaway and Bolam to the issue of disclosure, rejecting the claimant’s 
argument that Pearce extended the duty to significant risks that would affect the judgment 
of a reasonable patient.  The case concerns an alleged mismanagement of a diabetic 
mother’s labour; delivery was complicated by shoulder dystocia and, as a result, the baby 
was deprived of oxygen.  Subsequently the infant was diagnosed with cerebral palsy.   The 
Outer House held ‘it is to the risk of adverse outcome to which the court should have 
regard when considering whether a warning should be given’,121 concluding the risks of 
shoulder dystocia were ‘far short of amounting to a substantial risk of grave 
consequences’.122 The Inner House affirmed this finding, explaining ‘what is of interest to 
the patient must be the outcome, adverse or otherwise, and not some possible 
complication’.123  The chances of shoulder dystocia occurring during the labour of diabetic 
women are nine to ten per cent, which is not insignificant, thus the insubstantial nature of 
the risk appears to have been deduced from the fact that in the vast majority of cases it is 
‘successfully addressed, without incident, by well recognised ordinary midwifery 
procedures; and in many cases the mother would not be aware of any problem having 
arisen.’124  The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court, with judgment expected in 
early 2015, thus any perceived move towards a reasonable patient standard must presently 
be regarded with caution. 
Furthermore, the lack of reference to Bolam – particularly by the House of Lords in 
Chester – does not necessarily preclude clinicians from avoiding liability because 
nondisclosure is consistent with a responsible body of medical opinion.  As Herring notes, 
the assumption appears to be ‘that no responsible body of medical opinion would think it 
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inappropriate to disclose a serious risk to patients.’ 125   Thus while there is evidence 
suggesting claims concerning negligent disclosure were departing from Bolam, the waters 
are presently muddied.   If the Supreme Court affirms a reasonable patient standard in 
Montgomery, an argument could be made for breach in the genetic context to be assessed 
from the perspective of the reasonable blood relation.  This is because considering breach 
from either the perspective of healthcare practitioners or the proband may lead to a clash of 
rhetoric comparable to Pearce.  The proband and clinicians do not occupy the position of 
family members – they do not necessarily share their perspective on significant risks.  
Although it could be argued that by submitting for genetic testing the proband clearly 
believes the potential risk is significant, thus (by extension) it should be disclosed to blood 
relations.  Certainly it could be posited that the reasonable relation would want to know 
what the proband finds significant, but the proband might not necessarily submit to testing 
for treatable conditions or do so for reproductive reasons.  Using the proband’s perception 
of significant as a barometer might cast the net too wide.  If the proband’s perspective is 
rejected, the question this leads to is what will the reasonable blood relation want to know 
in respect of genetic risks? 
Establishing what constitutes a risk that must be disclosed is one problem that may 
arise.  In Sidaway, Pearce and Chester the labels ‘serious’ or ‘significant’ are applied to 
the type of risks that it would be negligent not to disclose.  The question then is to what 
‘serious’ or ‘significant’ refer.  Is it the statistical chance of a risk eventuating or the 
spectre of the outcome should the risk manifest?  The case law concerning doctor-patient 
disclosure is inconsistent on this point: Pearce and Sidaway focus on the statistical 
possibility of a risk eventuating, whereas Chester and Birch appear to link seriousness with 
the potential outcome.  This is illustrated by the fact that the claimants recovered for 
statistically low but serious risks in the latter cases but the claims failed in the former.   
The difficulty with respect to genetic risks is if the courts are concerned with the 
statistics, the statistical likelihood of a disorder eventuating may become a determining 
factor in deciding whether it constitutes a serious enough risk to warrant disclosure.  Thus 
individuals with a genetic predisposition of low penetrance may not be informed of the risk 
of developing a serious but treatable disorder, whereas an individual whose genome 
indicates a highly penetrant risk of a treatable disease would be informed of that risk.  
Reliance on statistics would likely result in an inconsistent application of a duty to 
disclose, which is undesirable.  If both risks of disease are treatable then nondisclosure 
denies blood relations access to medical intervention in both instances, but if the 
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seriousness of a risk – and thus whether nondisclosure is a breach of duty – is determined 
by statistics, those whose deleterious genetic traits are less likely to manifest will be left 
without redress where the condition eventuates, much like the claimants in Sidaway and 
Pearce.  Alternately, if seriousness and the need to disclose were determined by reference 
to the spectre of the outcome – say breast or ovarian cancer – then inconsistency created by 
using statistics as a crutch is avoided and an arguably unsustainable line between 
conditions of comparable seriousness but varying penetrance is avoided.   
A useful starting point in determining what risks the reasonable relation would 
wish disclosed is provided by the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics 
(AMCG).  In its high profile 2013 recommendations on the reporting of incidental findings 
in gene sequencing,
126
 the AMCG identified a ‘minimum list’ of incidental findings that 
should routinely be disclosed.
127
  The minimum list prioritised ‘disorders for which 
preventive measures and/or treatments were available and disorders in which individuals 
with pathogenic mutations might be asymptomatic for long periods of time’,128 the focus 
on preventative measures or treatment linking neatly to the proposed scope of a duty to 
disclose genetic risks.  The AMCG’s recommendations are concerned with what incidental 
genetic risks should be disclosed to the proband but it provides a starting point for mapping 
out what information should be disclosed to blood relations and when failure to do so 
would constitute a breach of duty. 
Assessing the seriousness or significance of genetic risks by outcome and not 
statistics is an apt approach to defining what the reasonable relation would want to be 
apprised of.  It would create a presumption that claimants would want to know about 
serious, treatable risks and failure to disclose such would amount to a breach of the 
doctor’s duty.  The obvious objection is that the presumption would disregard blood 
relations’ interest in not knowing, a problem encountered in respect of the proband by the 
AMCG and which has seen the recommendations amended to allow for patients to opt out 
of receiving incidental genetic information during the early phases of the screening 
process.
129
  The problem is that blood relations are not able to opt out because they are not 
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party to the screening process to the extent the proband is.  A compromise position must 
therefore be sought which balances the doctor’s duty to disclose with relatives’ potential 
interest in not knowing.  Disclosure would therefore need to be conducted carefully.  An 
appropriate approach may be distilled from research conducted in Australia in 2006.  
Family members did not consider it a breach of privacy nor autonomy to receive a letter 
disclosing that they may be genetically at risk of cancer, even when respondents declined 
to receive any further information.
130
  The letter was worded in general terms and did not 
identify the proband or the familial cancer syndrome, mutation, or details of cancer risk.  
Thus highlighting the possibility of a shared risk in a family unit does not necessarily 
prevent exercise of the right not to know because individuals remain able to decide for 
themselves whether or not to pursue screening.  In this way, the right not to know would be 
preserved insofar as practicable because, while a risk is identified, choosing whether or not 
to find out more through genetic sequencing remains a decision for the individual. 
 
Conclusion 
If a duty to disclose is established then the assessment of breach must not empty the duty 
of content, otherwise it becomes a superfluous legal obligation.  The traditional approach 
to breach in cases of medical negligence, the Bolam test, poses difficulties because it 
incorporates a necessary respect for clinical discretion, with the determining of the 
appropriate standard of care drawing upon responsible bodies of medical opinion.  The 
problem that arises in respect of genetic risks is that both disclosure and nondisclosure are 
potentially justifiable under Bolam, as the courts are reluctant to choose between bodies of 
medical opinion.  Thus a failure to disclose a treatable risk may not necessarily constitute a 
breach of duty.  This problem may be overcome if the courts engage with the criteria in 
Bolitho and assess whether medical conduct withstands logical analysis.  However, it is 
difficult to prove that medical opinion is illogical and it is not certain that the courts 
meaningfully engage with this exercise, thus Bolitho may not sufficiently bridge the 
difficulties of the Bolam approach to breach. 
Another option in respect of assessing breach may be found in cases concerning the 
nondisclosure of risks to patients, wherein the courts appear to have departed from a Bolam 
approach and started to assess breach by reference to what the reasonable patient would 
have wanted to know in the circumstances.  The language used in these cases has referred 
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to serious or significant risk and whether this is determined by statistics or by reference to 
the seriousness of the outcome should the risk eventuate.  It has been suggested here that 
the courts are beginning to adopt the latter definition of a serious risk and thus serious, yet 
treatable genetic conditions may be categorised as significant enough to warrant disclosure 
to the proband’s blood relations.  Although there may be some conflict with a right not 
know, adopting the approach to breach used in cases of doctor-patient disclosure may 
prevent the duty to disclose being rendered hollow because nondisclosure is supported by a 
responsible body of medical opinion.  However, a note of caution is necessary in respect of 
arguments based on a reasonable patient standard because the forthcoming Supreme Court 
decision in Montgomery may restate Sidaway as the leading authority and reaffirm Bolam 
as the appropriate standard of disclosure.   
7. CAUSATION 
 
Issues with Causation 
The third requirement of any negligence action is proof of a causal link between the harm 
the claimant has suffered and the negligence committed by the defendant.  If a duty to 
disclose is held to exist between the proband’s doctor and their blood relations and 
nondisclosure is accepted as amounting to a breach of duty – either using a traditional 
Bolam approach or through an alternate test derived from litigation concerning doctor-
patient disclosure – then any claim will stand or fall on whether the claimant can 
demonstrate a sufficient causal link between nondisclosure and the harm suffered.  Without 
such a link, the claimant’s action will ultimately fail regardless of whether or not the 
defendant has actually behaved negligently.
1
  Therefore causation is a crucial element in 
crafting a duty to disclose because the duty may be emptied of content if a causal link, and 
thus liability, cannot be established. 
Where a claim in negligence involves an act of physical interference – an obvious 
example being injury caused by negligent driving – causation is not a complex conundrum.  
If the claimant is struck by the defendant’s car, the impact breaking their leg, the causal 
link between negligence and harm is straightforward to establish.  As Chico has written, 
negligence is at its happiest when dealing with knotty problems of a psychical nature and 
this is particularly true of causation.
2
  The problem for claimants in medical negligence 
cases is that ‘there will usually be at least two possible causes of the patient’s injury: the 
doctor’s actions and the patient’s pre-existing condition.’3  This observation is pertinent to 
genetic information and risks because the cause of injury can be portrayed as either the 
individual’s genetic predisposition to the eventuating condition or the clinician’s failure to 
disclose the risk. 
The key causation question in respect of genetic information is how the causal link 
is to be satisfied given that at least two possible causes for any injury will be present.  The 
traditional approach to causation in English tort law is the ‘but for’ test, which necessitates 
the claimant ‘prove that the tort has probably caused the injury or condition suffered.’4  In 
the example of negligent driving, this is a relatively straightforward proposition but 
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difficulties arise when more than one causal agent exists.  The balance of probabilities – 
the evidential burden upon which causation is measured – is subjected to scrutiny where 
two potential causal agents exist and the onus is ‘on the claimant to prove on a balance of 
probabilities which of them has caused the damage’;5 in plain terms, this means that it 
must be established that the defendant’s negligence more likely than not caused the injury.  
In statistical terms, the negligence must have a greater than 50 per cent chance of having 
caused the claimant’s injury.  When it is evidentially unclear to what extent the defendant’s 
negligence contributed to the outcome, the ‘but for’ test is modified and causation can be 
established through demonstrating a material contribution or increase to the risk of harm in 
a manner that is more than negligible.
6
 
This chapter will highlight the problems posed by the ‘but for’ test in the genetic 
context and will also caution against characterising genetic risks as losses of chance, since 
this approach will exclude from the scope of the duty situations when the doctor’s 
negligence has a less than 50 chance of having caused injury.  If the duty to disclose is not 
to be emptied of content, it is argued that the orthodox rules of causation should be relaxed 
and the causal link between nondisclosure and harm assessed as a material contribution to 
risk.  It is acknowledged that orthodox causation is only relaxed when judicial policy and 
justice necessitate and this chapter proposes policy issues that support modifying the rules 
of causation in the context of the nondisclosure of genetic risks. 
 
The ‘But For’ Approach  
The ‘but for’ test is the standard approach to assessing causation.  The question before the 
court is essentially whether, on a balance of probabilities, ‘but for the defendant’s 
negligence would the claimant have been injured?’  The test, rather artificially, constructs 
causality as being either black or white.  In plain terms, the defendant’s negligence must be 
more likely than not the cause of the claimant’s injury, a proposition that is generally 
unproblematic when concerned with physical harm.  Thus the negligent driving example 
cited above would provide minimal controversy.  Where an outcome would have 
eventuated despite the defendant’s negligence, causation is not established and the claim 
fails.  This is the reason a widow was unable to recover damages in Barnett v Chelsea and 
Kensington Hospital Management Committee.
7
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Here, three night watchmen attended a hospital’s accident and emergency 
complaining of vomiting after drinking tea.  The nurse on duty relayed the men’s 
symptoms via telephone to the duty medical casualty officer who instructed her to tell the 
men to go home and consult their own doctors.  Five hours after presenting themselves at 
the accident and emergency, one of the night watchmen succumbed to what was 
discovered to be arsenic poisoning, with the poison having been introduced into the tea.  
The deceased’s widow brought an action in negligence against the hospital, alleging that 
his death would not have eventuated had he been attended, diagnosed and treated by the 
duty medical officer.  The court accepted that the casualty officer had been negligent in not 
attending the night watchmen but concluded that, since the deceased would have died from 
arsenic poisoning even if the doctor had examined him, his death was not a result of the 
casualty officer’s negligence.  Therefore it could not be said that but for the defendant’s 
negligence the night watchman would not have died.  Causation could not be made out. 
Causation, however, ‘is not a strict technical matter which can be “solved” by the 
application of a quasi-mathematical formulae’.8  Thus while the ‘but for’ test is a fairly 
straightforward proposition in claims concerning physical harm it becomes problematic in 
the medical context because ‘there may be a variety of possible independent explanations 
for the occurrence of a condition.’9  Thus it may not be clear which agent caused the 
injury, or it may be arguable that the cause is a preexisting state prior to the defendant’s 
negligence.
10
  Genetic information and risks add an additional layer of complexity to the 
question of causation because harm can always be characterised as flowing from either the 
defendant’s negligence or the deleterious traits within the claimant’s own genome.  Thus it 
is not possible to confidently assert that, ‘but for’ nondisclosure, the condition would not 
have eventuated, since it is possible the condition occurred for reasons independent of the 
doctor’s negligence.  Where the condition would have eventuated in spite of any negligent 
intervention, the ‘but for’ test would see the claimant occupy a position analogous to 
Barnett, in that although there was negligence it was not causative of the injury.  
The critical difficulty is that a doctor cannot be said to be the source of a genetic 
condition, irrespective of negligence.  Genetic conditions are inherited disease, not 
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contagious ones, thus the base reason why a condition has eventuated will always be the 
deleterious traits within the claimant’s genome.  Applying the ‘but for’ test to 
nondisclosure would adduce a conclusion that the clamant would have been injured despite 
the defendant’s negligence.  On a balance of probabilities, there would be no negligence 
causing harm.  The nub of the issue is that a doctor’s negligence is a failure to improve the 
claimant’s prospects by enabling access to preemptive therapies.  The harm is the 
eventuation of the undisclosed risk but the source of that risk is not the negligence per se.  
Thus attempting to establish causation using the ‘but for’ test would empty a duty to 
disclose of content because a causal link between negligent act and harmful outcome could 
not be established.  Given that this approach would fail to recognise the impact of the 
defendant’s negligence upon the genetic condition and render a legal obligation to disclose 
fairly meaningless, the ‘but for’ test must be viewed as an unsuitable means of establishing 
the causal link. 
 
Loss of a Chance 
The ‘but for’ test is the standard approach to causation but, as demonstrated above, in the 
context of genetic nondisclosure it will be nigh impossible to satisfy, as the claimant’s 
genes would be identified as the sole cause of their injury.  Generally, causation is 
problematic in the medical context because ‘there may be a variety of possible independent 
explanations for the occurrence of a condition’,11 as medicine is often an inexact science, a 
realm of possibilities and probabilities rather than certainties.   In circumstances where two 
potential causal agents exist the question becomes, on a balance of probabilities, which 
was more likely the cause of the harm sustained.  Causation is generally established on a 
balance of probabilities, however, in clams concerning physical injury the link between the 
defendant’s negligent act and the claimant’s harm is typically straightforward.  Where the 
claimant’s injury has two (or more) potential causes, the balance of probabilities 
determines whether or not causation can be established.  This is particularly evident in 
claims relating to a loss of a chance.  These types of claims are particularly significant in 
respect of nondisclosure because one way of conceptualising causation in this context is as 
a weighting of the significance of the defendant’s negligence and the claimant’s own 
genome.   
Where two possible causes for an injury exist, for causation to be established the 
significance of the defendant’s negligence must exceed the point of balance.  In plain 
terms, it must be more likely than not that the defendant’s negligence (and not something 
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else) caused the claimant’s injury.  Statistically, therefore, the negligence must have a 
greater than 50 per cent chance of being the cause of the harm.  When the negligence is 
significant enough that it surpasses the point of balance, it is treated as having caused the 
claimant’s condition and full damages are recoverable.  If another non-negligent cause 
surpasses the point of balance, the claimant can recover nothing even if the defendant acted 
negligently. 
The balance of probabilities is thus an all or nothing threshold and its crude 
application in medical negligence claims is typified by litigation concerning the loss of a 
chance.  The leading case in this regard is Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority,
12
 
wherein the claimant – a 13-year-old boy – fell from a tree and damaged his hip.  The 
defendants failed to correctly diagnose the boy’s condition, which led to avascular necrosis 
in the hip joint and serious disability.  There was, statistically, a 75 per cent chance that the 
disability would have developed even if the claimant had been correctly diagnosed and 
treated and, correspondingly, only a 25 per cent chance that a complete recovery would 
have been made.  The trial judge and the Court of Appeal held that the claimant could 
recover damages equivalent to 25 per cent of his full loss but the House of Lords reversed 
the decision because the trial judge’s finding of fact was that, on a balance of probabilities, 
the disability would have occurred in any event, meaning that the fall was the sole cause of 
the claimant’s injury. 13   Thus although the defendant had acted negligently, their 
negligence had not caused the harm.  If, on the other hand, the claimant had demonstrated 
a 51 per cent possibility of recovery prior to the defendant’s negligence then he would 
have been entitled to recover the full amount of damages despite the fall from the tree 
constituting a 49 per cent contribution to the injury. 
The House of Lords was provided an opportunity to revisit loss of a chance in 
Gregg v Scott.
14
  The case concerned a negligent delay in the diagnosis of the claimant’s 
lymphoma, which reduced the chances of recovery from 42 to 25 per cent.  It was accepted 
that the original cursory examination of the patient was negligent, with the crux of the 
argument being whether a recognised harm had been caused.  The claimant argued that the 
harm was the loss of the chance to survive more than ten years
15
 (which was accepted, in 
medical terms, to mean a cure) or, as Lord Phillips and Baroness Hale perceived the issue, 
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the loss of a chance of a more favourable outcome to the claimant’s prognosis.16  The case 
was materially different from Hotson because ‘the immediate spread of the cancer would 
probably not have occurred had there been prompt diagnosis … [and] the developments 
which reduced his life expectancy were subsequent to the negligence’,17 whereas in Hotson 
falling from the tree damaged the claimant’s hip joint and the negligent diagnosis meant 
that the damage was not recognised and treated.  The claim might therefore have been 
articulated as a physical injury but, instead, it was couched as a loss of a chance of survival 
beyond ten years.  Since the claimant’s prospects had not exceeded the 50 per cent 
threshold prior to the clinician’s negligence, the claimant could not satisfy the balance of 
probabilities.  Lord Nicholls, in the minority, felt that the claimant’s position before the 
negligence should not be determinative, arguing that when a patient is injured and suffers 
‘a significant diminution of his prospects of recovery by reason of medical negligence … 
that diminution constitutes actionable damage’ whether or not the patient’s prospects 
before the negligence exceeded 50%.
18
 
The majority, however, applied Hotson and rejected the claim.  Baroness Hale 
‘relied heavily on policy concerns’,19 explaining that it would be problematic if claimants 
could submit lost chances as the basis of claims because ‘almost any claim for a loss of an 
outcome could be reformulated as a claim for a loss of a chance of that outcome.’20  This 
could lead to claims that would ordinarily be defeated being re-categorised as losses of 
chance, which would be extremely favourable to claimants because: 
 
‘he [the claimant] would recover 100 per cent if he proved on a balance of 
probabilities the loss of the outcome and would still recover something if he lost 
that argument but proved he had nonetheless lost some chance of a better outcome 
… it “would be a ‘heads you lose everything, tails I win something’ situation”.’21 
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Lord Phillips and Lord Hoffmann also expressed concern about the consequences of 
allowing claims for loss of a chance and were of the view that ‘a departure from Hotson 
would change the basis of causation from probability to possibility, that is, that some form 
of recovery would be due if it was shown that is was possible that negligence might affect 
a patient’s case.’22  Lord Phillips further cautioned that if special tests of causation were 
developed piecemeal to deal with perceived injustices the coherence of the common law 
would be ‘destroyed’.23  But this reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the decision of the 
House of Lords in Chester v Afshar, where their Lordships willingly modified the rules of 
causation to vindicate the claimant’s interest in autonomy. 24   As Maskrey and Edis 
observe, it is possible to  
 
‘look at the quartet of cases of Fairchild, Chester, Gregg and MacFarlane25 and 
ask whether their Lordships have actually achieved their aim of creating or 
maintaining coherence within the common law.’26 
 
The decisions in Gregg and Chester raise a further issue concerning the coherence, and 
importance, of patient ‘rights’ and it is difficult to see any coherent difference between ‘the 
right to decide whether to accept a particular treatment modality [Chester] and the right to 
be made in the first place aware of its existence and the possibility of its need [Gregg]’. 27  
The former right cannot be invoked unless the patient goes through the gateway of the 
latter, thus why should ‘the “right” to decide whether to accept treatment be accorded 
greater protection and value by the law than the logically and chronologically prior right to 
be told that such treatment is available and could be beneficial?’ 28   The incoherence 
between Chester and Gregg is difficult to justify without concluding concerns regarding 
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the potential consequences of allowing claims for loss of a chance – the re-categorising of 
claims that would otherwise be defeated – was a powerful influence on the majority. 
Lord Hope and Lord Nicholls dissented.  Lord Hope thought that the claimant’s 
case might actually be one of proved physical injury because the delay in diagnosis had led 
to the spread of the patient’s cancer 29  and concluded the significant reduction in the 
prospects of a successful outcome ‘is a loss for which the appellant is entitled to be 
compensated.’ 30  If it was necessary to prove that the loss was caused by a physical injury, 
he felt the enlargement of the tumour was such an injury and, further, ‘the principle on 
which that loss must be calculated is the same irrespective of whether the prospects were 
better or less then 50 [per cent].’ 31   
Lord Nicholls argued that the all-or-nothing threshold of the balance of 
probabilities applied in Hotson was ‘premised on a falsehood’32  and lead to arbitrary 
outcomes, because it meant a patient with a 60 per cent chance of recovery reduced to a 40 
per cent could obtain compensation but would ‘obtain nothing if his prospects were 
reduced from 40 per cent to nil.’33  Despite the claimant with an initial 40 per cent chance 
of recovery suffering a statistically greater loss than the claimant who originally had a 60 
per cent chance, only the latter is able to recover damages in respect of negligent treatment 
or diagnosis.  The problem for the claimant is that it must be more likely than not that the 
defendant’s negligence caused their injury and in the former scenario, where the chances 
of recovery are 40 per cent, it is concluded as more likely than not the claimant’s condition 
caused the harm.
34
 
In the context of genetic risks, the loss of a chance may be articulated in one of two 
ways.  First, it may be formulated as a loss of a chance of avoiding the condition outright; 
second, it may be argued that the claimant has suffered a loss of a medical intervention that 
would have helped them to avoid or minimise the condition.  An analysis of lost chances 
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and genetic risks within the former context presents a claimant with a barrier analogous to 
that which prohibited recovery in Hotson.  As Chico observes, 
 
‘where there is a greater than 50 per cent chance that the claimant could have 
avoided the particular genetic condition if she had known about the risks, she could 
argue that the manifestation of the genetic condition itself constitutes harm.’35 
 
Thus where the chance of avoiding the condition is less than 50 per cent, the balance of 
probabilities would weigh against the claimant as it did in Hotson – there would be no 
negligence causing harm.  The problem for claimants is that 'there are currently few 
genetic conditions which can be avoided’, 36  although therapies are available that can 
reduce the risks of certain conditions manifesting.  The problem with formulating 
causation in these terms is that where the chances of avoiding the condition are too low, it 
will be concluded as more likely than not that the claimant’s genes and not the 
nondisclosure is the cause of the injury.  The nondisclosure of genetic risks is not the 
source of the condition and formulating the loss of a chance as avoiding the condition 
means it is difficult to foresee the balance of probabilities favouring the claimant.  Both 
Hotson and Gregg illustrate the problems here, as the fall from the tree and the lymphoma 
had a higher probability of causing the deleterious outcome than the doctors’ negligence.  
Even though the immediate spread of Gregg’s lymphoma may not have occurred if the 
original examination had not been negligent, it was always more likely than not that the 
cancer, and not the negligence, was responsible for the reduction in life expectancy.  
Therefore arguments concerning a loss of a chance to avoid a genetic condition are 
unlikely to meet with success.  However, the debate in this respect does not seem to be 
completely settled as, in Gregg, Lord Phillips did accept that where ‘medical treatment has 
resulted in an adverse outcome and negligence has increased the chances of that outcome, 
there may be a case for permitting a recovery of damages that is proportionate to the 
increase’.37  Lord Phillips did not believe that such a case was made out in Gregg; the 
question therefore is whether the loss of a chance to avoid the manifestation of a genetic 
condition may be such a case.  Negligence in these circumstances could be characterised as 
increasing the chance of an adverse outcome (although, equally, it could be argued the 
claimant’s genes remain more likely than not the cause of harm) but whether the scenario 
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Lord Phillips envisaged is consistent with nondisclosure to persons beyond the therapeutic 
relationship is doubted. 
An alternative means of articulating the loss of a chance in claims arising from 
nondisclosure is as a loss of a chance of receiving medical intervention, which might have 
reduced the possibility of the genetic condition eventuating.  The emphasis here is not 
avoiding the condition but the loss of the opportunity to receive appropriate treatment for 
the condition that has eventuated.  In this context, the nondisclosure and not the claimant’s 
genome is what prevents them from seeking clinical advice and intervention.  The court 
would therefore be faced with a threshold question of whether or not treatment has been 
denied by the nondisclosure.  The presence of this gateway question would serve to limit 
the circumstances in which lost chances would be applicable and potentially restrict the 
opportunity to reformulate other negligence claims into lost chances, a concern that has 
typically dissuaded the courts from permitting arguments based on a loss of a chance.  The 
restriction arises because the focus is on whether the negligence has denied access to 
treatment, which is distinct from an analysis focusing on the denial of a more favourable 
outcome, as this formulation could more readily be applied beyond a diagnostic context. 
An argument might therefore be advanced that, providing any exception was 
narrow, the courts could dispense with the all or nothing position of the balance of 
probabilities that prevented recovery in Hotson and Gregg.  The analysis of causation 
could be formulated as negligence causing a loss of a chance of treatment, which is a 
potentially black and white assessment of whether a particular course of therapeutic action 
was denied by nondisclosure.  It is, however, unlikely that the courts would separate loss 
of a chance and analysis of statistical probabilities.  Thus reconstituting the issue as a 
denial of treatment invites consideration of the effectiveness of available therapies.
38
  This 
is not as disadvantageous as an argument based on avoidance of a condition because it is 
the success of the treatment that must surpass the point of balance and not the prospects of 
a disease not eventuating.  However, it would continue to prohibit recovery when 
treatments are represented as having a lower than 50 per cent chance of alleviating a 
condition because the negligence would not cause the injury on a balance of probabilities.  
It is likely that in some cases an argument could be advanced that causation is 
proved where a treatment successfully reduces the chances of a condition manifesting in 51 
per cent of cases – or, alternately, is beneficial to 51 out of 100 patients.  This would 
permit claimants to recover where nondisclosure had denied access to statistically 
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promising treatments.  However, the complexities of genetics and the possible advent of 
personalised medicine pose a problem since, if information is available (i.e. via 
pharmacogenomics) it could be argued before the court that while a treatment is generally 
successful in 51 per cent of cases, the particular claimant’s genetics mean it would only 
have a 20 per cent chance of success.  Evidence countervailing the broader statistics could 
lead to the balance of probabilities weighing against the claimant despite a notable success 
rate, indicating that relying on a loss of a chance of treatment may be problematic as 
increasing amounts of genetic information become available.  Arguments premised upon a 
loss of a chance should therefore be treated with caution as they might prove to be an 
unfavourable means of establishing causation.  If causation cannot be made out, then the 
duty to disclose becomes a worthless legal obligation, thus a more suitable means of 
assessing causation is necessary. 
 
Material Contribution to a Risk 
In Hotson and Gregg the House of Lords declined to depart from the ‘but for’ test ‘in 
response to the difficulty of proving causation in complex medical cases.’39  However, 
their Lordships have demonstrated a willingness to innovate in a series of cases involving 
evidential uncertainty and exposure to toxic substances in the workplace.  Firstly, their 
Lordships recognised liability when the defendant materially contributed to the claimant’s 
injury.  Here the question is not one of ‘alternative causation, in which it is assumed that it 
is either the defendant’s negligence or some other factor was the cause’ of the claimant’s 
injury,
40
 but of ‘cumulative’ causation when both ‘innocent’ and negligent causes are held 
to have contributed.
41
  Secondly, the House of Lords relaxed the orthodox rules of 
causation in the face of evidential uncertainty concerning the etiology of disease and 
accepted that liability is established when it is proved that a defendant materially 
contributed to the risk of injury.
42
  Thus a claimant may establish a causal link between 
negligence and harm providing ‘it can established that the negligence of the defender 
materially increased the risk of the claimant being damaged in the way in question.’43   
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Assessing causation as a material contribution to risk is favourable to claimants as 
it does not require proof that the defendant caused the injury, merely that the negligence 
increased the risk of such.  Applied in the context of nondisclosure of genetic risks, a 
material increase approach would address the problem created by the necessity of proof of 
cause in orthodox causation, since it cannot be said that a clinician is the source of a 
genetic condition.  The harm in this context is the eventuation of the undisclosed risk,
44
 not 
causing the disease per se.  Thus nondisclosure could be characterised as materially 
increasing the risk of a condition eventuating, since access to preemptive therapies is 
denied.  However, application of this approach to nondisclosure is problematic and certain 
barriers must be overcome if an argument in favour of a material increase approach is to 
stand. 
The first difficulty to contend with is that the material increase approach is 
generally relevant where there exists evidential uncertainty and a sufficient evidential gap 
may not exist in nondisclosure.  This is because genetic analysis is (ostensibly) a source of 
statistical probabilities associated with possessing specific genes.  Reconciling 
nondisclosure of genetic risks with a causative paradigm based on evidential uncertainty 
would therefore appear problematic.  Thus it might be suggested that conceptualising the 
issue as a loss of chance would appear the most appropriate way forward, although this 
returns to the problem of having to prove a greater than 50 per cent chance of avoiding a 
condition or receiving successful treatment prior to the defendant’s negligence.  A second 
hurdle to overcome is that the courts appear to have distinguished between material 
contribution to risk in an employment and medical context, thus causation was made out as 
a material increase in McGhee v National Coal Board,
45
 an employment case, but the same 
option was not available to the claimant in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority.
46
   
However, causation ‘is not a strict technical matter which can be “solved” by the 
application of a quasi-mathematical formulae’47 and engages ‘matters of legal policy and 
justice.’48  Thus judicial policy has motivated their Lordships to relax the orthodox rules of 
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causation ‘to prevent negligent employers from escaping liability on a technicality,’49 and 
to give content to rights of patients to self-determination.
50
  Thus, although at first blush it 
may appear problematic to apply a material increase test to nondisclosure, it can be argued 
that legal policy and justice necessitate relaxation of orthodox causation in the context of 
nondisclosure. 
 
Material Contribution to Risk, Genetic Nondisclosure and Judicial Policy 
The material contribution approach originally flows from the judgment in Bonnington 
Casting Ltd v Wardlaw.
51
  Here the claimant suffered from pneumoconiosis – a lung 
condition – caused by inhalation of silica dust while working in the defendant’s foundry.  
There were two sources of the dust: a pneumatic hammer and swing grinders.  The court 
accepted that the dust caused by the hammer did not amount to negligence because no 
measures were available to limit the exposure, but the dust extraction plant for the swing 
grinders was poorly maintained, often becoming choked and ineffective, which amounted 
to a breach of duty.  The question for the court was whether the poorly maintained 
ventilation on the swing grinders was causative of the claimant’s condition.  Lord Keith 
explained that it was for the claimant to ‘show that the dust released by their [the 
defendant’s] negligence from the swing grinders had contributed materially to the 
dangerous dust inhaled’.52  The defendant’s contended that as there was no data available 
regarding the proportions of dust caused by the swing grinders and the hammers, the claim 
had to fail.  Lord Keith, however, was of the opinion that the claimant had: 
 
‘proved enough to support the inference that the fault of the defenders has 
materially contributed to his illness … he has been exposed to a polluted 
atmosphere for which the defenders are in part to blame.  The disease is a disease 
of gradual incidence.  Small though the contribution of pollution may be for which 
the defenders are to blame, it was continuous over a long period.  In cumulo it must 
have been substantial’.53 
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The claimant therefore succeeded in his action because he was able to establish that the 
defendants had – on a balance of probabilities – materially contributed to his condition 
because the swing grinders’ extraction plant had been negligently maintained.  
Furthermore, the defendant’s contribution was more than negligible.  Significantly for 
present purposes, that the claimant was exposed to a non-negligent source of silica dust 
and may have developed pneumoconiosis in any event was not fatal to the claim.  In this 
respect an analogy can be drawn with genetic risks since there is also a negligent and non-
negligent source of injury.  A defendant may argue that because of the claimant’s genetic 
heritage they would have developed the condition in any event, however, it may also be 
argued that the failure to disclose the proband’s genetic information materially contributed 
to the onset of the condition where it has prevented access to treatment.  The nondisclosure 
can be characterised as contributing to the eventuation of a condition if treatment is 
available because the negligence perpetuates a situation where the condition is more likely 
to occur, since access to preventative or minimising therapies is denied. 
 The decision in Bonnington can also be characterised as policy-driven in that it 
prevented the employer from escaping censure from substandard practice because of a 
technicality.  Thus relaxing orthodox causation prevented an outcome that would have 
seriously undermined the validity employer’s duty of care to their employees.  Rejection of 
the claim would have meant that the defendants could have continued negligently 
maintaining their foundry because the silica dust from the swing grinders was not 
established as the cause of the claimant’s injury.  Therefore negligent practices that were 
likely to contribute to an outcome – but could not be characterised as causing that outcome 
– would have fallen through the cracks.  In order to ensure a robust duty of care, it was 
necessary for the courts to uphold liability for the underlying mischief.  Applying this logic 
to nondisclosure, it can be argued (in principle) that clinicians should not escape liability 
for failing to disclose risks to the proband’s blood relations merely because nondisclosure 
cannot be pinpointed as the cause of injury.  If a duty to disclose is to be sufficiently robust 
– and achieve its aim – a relaxation of orthodox causation is arguably a necessity because 
of the difficulties in overcoming the causation hurdle. 
 This argument, of course, does not address the missing evidential certainty that 
generally engages a material contribution analysis, nor the distinction between the 
employment and medical context apparent in the case law, but an appeal to legal policy 
may represent a means of resolving these difficulties. 
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The question of contribution was considered again in McGhee v National Coal 
Board,
54
 one of a number of policy-driven decisions representing ‘a direct response to the 
considerable difficulties that claimants can face when attempting to clear the causation 
hurdle.’55   Here the claimant worked in a brick kiln, was exposed to brick dust and 
developed dermatitis.  However, his actual exposure was not contested as being negligent, 
rather it was the defendant’s failure to provide onsite showering facilities which came 
under scrutiny, with the claimant alleging that this failure had materially increased his risk 
of developing dermatitis, since it meant he had to cycle home covered in dust.  Evidence 
put before the House of Lords was inconclusive as to whether or not the exposure had 
caused the dermatitis, but evidence did suggest that the lack of after work washing 
facilities had materially increased the risk of the claimant contracting dermatitis.  The 
evidential uncertainty in McGhee was therefore greater than in Bonnington, wherein the 
claimant’s disease was cumulative and the defendant’s negligence could be described as 
increasing the claimant’s prospects of developing a condition through increasing his 
exposure to the causal agent (although crucially the impact of the tortious silica could not 
be quantified). 
However, despite this evidential gap, their Lordships found for the claimant, Lord 
Salmon stating that there was no distinction to be drawn between Bonnington and McGhee.  
He explained that it would be  
 
‘unrealistic and contrary to ordinary common sense to hold that the negligence 
which materially increased the risk of injury did not materially contribute to 
causing the injury.’56 
 
Again, the decision owed as much to policy as to pragmatism for as Lord Wilberforce – 
upon considering who should suffer the burden of the evidential difficulty – explained: 
 
‘the answer as a matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the 
risks who, ex hypothesi, must be taken to have foreseen the possibility of damage, 
who should bear its consequences.’57 
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Thus because the defendant increased the risk of an adverse outcome (in this case, 
dermatitis) it was just that providing the claimant could demonstrate – on a balance of 
probabilities – that the negligence had materially increased the risk of injury then causation 
was made out.  A comparable argument might be made in respect of genetic risks, since 
the proband’s doctor possesses knowledge of the risks facing the claimant.  Although it 
cannot be said the doctor is the source of the condition, nondisclosure increases the risk to 
the claimant since access to therapies is denied.  If Lord Wilberforce is correct and those 
who create risk must bear evidential difficulties, then it might also be argued that those 
who possess knowledge of risks to others but fail to disclose these should also bear 
difficulties as a matter of policy.
58
  In the context of genetics, the evidential difficulties do 
not relate to aetiology of disease, because genetics are usually a source of statistical 
probabilities associated with possessing a particular gene.  Instead, the difficulties relate to 
proving nondisclosure is the cause of injury under orthodox principles of causation, which 
necessitates proof of a greater than 50 per cent chance of avoiding the disease or being 
successfully treated prior to the negligence.  Since ‘prospects of recovery are attended with 
a significant degree of medical uncertainty’ 59  the problem with relying on orthodox 
causation principles is that 
 
‘the courts are engaged in an inevitably hypothetical inquiry about what might have 
happened if the doctor had not acted as she did, and this sort of speculation is not 
well suited to precise quantification in percentage terms.’60 
 
These difficulties with establishing causation in cases of nondisclosure and the 
unsuitability of quantification in precise percentage terms reiterates the earlier point that 
causation ‘is not a strict technical matter which can be “solved” by the application of a 
quasi-mathematical formulae.’61  In fact, attempts to do so may create injustice and the 
judiciary has shown a willingness to avoid such outcomes.  In Fairchild v Glenhaven 
Funeral Services,
 62
 the House of Lords invoked policy considerations in finding for the 
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claimant because, per Lord Bridge, ‘[a]ny other outcome would be deeply offensive to 
instinctive notions of what justice requires and fairness demands.’63  
In Fairchild, the claimant had – throughout his working life – suffered multiple 
exposures to asbestos and as a consequence had developed mesothelioma.   These 
exposures were negligent but a problem existed in that it was not possible to establish on 
orthodox principles of causation which among the claimant’s employers had caused his 
injury.  At the time, the prevalent theory regarding the aetiology of mesothelioma was that 
it could be caused by single ‘rogue’ fibre, rather than by accumulative exposures. 64  
Consequentially, orthodox causation could not be satisfied because it demanded a causal 
link be established between one of many exposures and the claimant’s mesothelioma.  This 
link could not be made out because of the state of medical knowledge regarding the 
disease.  The House of Lords was dissatisfied with an outcome that did not favour the 
claimant, because such ‘would be deeply offensive to instinctive notions of what justice 
requires and fairness demands.’65  Thus their Lordships turned to the principle established 
in McGhee and approved the judgement as a foundation of the proposition that proof of a 
material increase to risk can be sufficient to establish causation.
66
  It was concluded that 
such an outcome was 
 
‘just and in accordance with common sense to treat the conduct of A and B [the 
defendants] in exposing C to a risk to which he should not have been exposed as 
making a material contribution to the contracting by C of a condition against which 
it was the duty of A and B to protect him’.67 
 
Furthermore, their Lordships emphasised that ‘[p]olicy considerations weigh in favour of 
such a conclusion’, 68 otherwise the claimants would have been ‘thwarted through no fault 
of their own by the lack of scientific knowledge’ and negligent employers would have 
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avoided liability on a technicality.
69
  Thus it was established in McGhee and approved in 
Fairchild that ‘in particular circumstances, a breach of duty which materially increased the 
risk should be treated as if it had materially contributed to the disease’.70  A further reason 
justifying a relaxation of orthodox causation in these cases is that a finding of no liability 
would have emptied the defendant’s duty of care of content.  A result favouring the 
defendants would have meant they escaped censure for substandard practices, which would 
undermine the effectiveness of the employer-employee duty of care. 
 This relaxation of orthodox causation principles was most recently revisited by the 
Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz v Grief,
71
 where the court adopted ‘a somewhat Janus-faced 
approach to it.’72  The exception in McGhee and Fairchild was affirmed as applying ‘to 
give the claimant an action merely for the defendant’s creation of a risk that the deceased 
might contract mesothelioma’ but their Lordships ‘were at pains to point out it was 
exceptional.’73  Although Sienkiewicz does not rule out the exception applying in contexts 
other than asbestos, it is noted that ‘the general tenor of the judgments suggests that any 
such attempt to extend the circumstances in which the rule applies will not be 
countenanced.’74  Most notably, Lord Brown cautioned that courts should be ‘wary indeed’ 
of creating any additional special rules in personal injury.
75
  This somewhat echoes the 
view of Lord Phillips in Gregg where he stated ‘if special tests of causation are developed 
piecemeal to deal with perceived injustices in particular factual situations … the coherence 
of our common law will be destroyed.’76  Yet despite Lord Brown’s skepticism towards 
special rules and Lord Phillips’ desire for coherence, it is possible to query whether 
coherence within the common law has been achieved
77
 or causation is actually ‘in a state 
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of flux’.78  Legal policy and justice are influential factors in determining liability and, 
while fixed rules are to some extent preferred, policy considerations will occasionally 
necessitate departure from orthodox principles.  This point is most graphically made by the 
outcome in Chester v Afshar, to which this chapter returns below. 
The courts willingness to innovate in the context of diseases flowing from exposure 
during employment has not always been reflected in medical negligence claims.  One 
reason for this may be the paternalism demonstrated towards the medical profession: 
causation based on ‘alternatives’ provides a measure of protection to healthcare 
practitioners, since it is for the claimant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
negligence – and not the underlying condition – caused the injury.  A ‘cumulative’ 
approach would instead see causation made out providing the negligence made a more than 
negligible contribution to the harm.  Stauch argues that a distinction between industrial 
diseases and medical negligence is necessary because, in claims involving the NHS, 
‘allowing recovery in doubtful causation cases will affect the resources available for other 
patients.’79  Furthermore, he argues that in scenarios involving industrial diseases ‘the 
claimant is exposed to risk factors that … all ultimately derive from the workplace 
environment’ but in the medical context ‘the doctor intervenes on behalf of the patient to 
ward off natural risks … and the treatment itself usually adds to the risks in play’.80  The 
counterpoint to this is that a clinician should not avoid censure because a non-negligent 
source of injury also exists.  If this were true, then the duty owed by a doctor to their 
patient would arguably be less onerous than the duty owed by an employer to their 
employees.  Given the potentially significant impact of substandard practice in healthcare, 
the duty must be robust, but difficulties arise when there exists ‘a variety of independent 
explanations for the occurrence of a condition.’81 
The problem is typified by Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority,
82
 where a 
premature baby was administered excess oxygen and later developed retrolental fibroplasia 
(RLF), rendering him permanently blind.  Evidence suggested that the excess oxygen 
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might have caused the claimant’s RLF but there also existed four other potential causes of 
the condition.  Citing with approval from the judgment of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson 
VC in the Court of Appeal,
83
 Lord Bridge explained: 
 
‘the occurrence of RLF following a failure to take a necessary precaution to prevent 
excess oxygen causing RLF provides no evidence and raises no presumption that it 
was the excess oxygen rather than one or more of the four other possible agents 
which caused or contributed to the RLF in this case.’84 
 
Thus because the claimant could not demonstrate that the excess oxygen caused or 
contributed to the RLF, and four other possible explanations existed, the claim failed.  The 
court was at pains to note that in circumstances where a condition had multiple 
explanations, there was no presumption in favour of the defendant’s negligence.  The 
decision, however, is ill at ease with the rule in McGhee and Fairchild, since it is fair to 
describe the administration of excess oxygen as materially increasing the risk of RLF in a 
way that was more than negligible.  Furthermore, the existence of a non-negligent source 
was not fatal to the claims in either Bonnington or Sienkiewicz.  The distinguishing feature 
in Wilsher therefore appears to be the uncertainty regarding which of the five possible 
agents caused the RLF.  In contrast, McGhee and Fairchild only concerned single agents.
85
  
Litigation involving genetic information may thus be distinguishable from Wilsher because 
they involve a single agent – the genetic risk.  In this respect, the position of the proband’s 
blood relations is analogous to Bonnington, wherein the claimant was exposed to a non-
negligent source of silica dust and may have developed pneumoconiosis in any event.  The 
presence of this non-negligent source, however, was not fatal to his claim because the 
negligent source contributed in a manner more than negligible.  Thus, in the context of 
genetic risks, it can be posited that because of their genetic heritage a claimant would have 
developed the condition in any event, but that a failure to disclose the proband’s genetic 
information materially contributed to the onset of the condition because it prevented access 
to treatment.  The nondisclosure contributes to the condition occurring if treatment is 
available because the negligence perpetuates a situation where the condition is more likely 
to eventuate, since access to preventative or minimising therapies is denied. 
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A departure from Wilsher may be further justified by the Court of Appeal decision 
in Bailey v Ministry of Defence.
86
  Here the claimant had undergone an unsuccessful 
operation to remove a gallstone and, following the procedure, there was a lack of care and, 
in particular, a failure to resuscitate.  The claimant was subsequently diagnosed as 
suffering from pancreatitis and transferred to an intensive care unit, then the renal ward, of 
another hospital, where she aspirated on her vomit, leading to cardiac arrest and hypoxic 
brain damage.  The argument centred upon whether or not the defendants’ lack of care had 
materially contributed to the claimant’s weakened state, which left her unable to react to 
her own vomit.  The trial judge held that defendants had materially contributed to the 
claimant’s condition and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, Waller LJ explaining 
that 
 
‘In a case where medical science cannot establish the probability that “but for” an 
act of negligence the injury would not have happened but can establish that the 
contribution of the negligent cause was more than negligible, the “but for” test is 
modified’.87 
 
It therefore appears that the courts are beginning (albeit tentatively) to apply the Fairchild 
exception to claims beyond asbestos litigation.  It may therefore be open to claimants in 
clinical negligence to establish causation where the defendant’s negligence has materially 
contributed to the risk of harm eventuating.   The proviso is that an evidential gap must 
exist.  In Bailey the gap arguable took the form of the indivisible nature of the claimant’s 
condition, in that it could not be deduced whether the pancreatitis or the negligence was 
the cause of injury, only that both contributed.  In the context of genetics, there does not 
exist an evidential gap per se, since genetics tends to provide statistical chances associated 
with developing particular conditions.  However, the difficulties posed by orthodox 
causation are advanced as justification for pursuing a relaxation of the ‘but for’ principle. 
Assistance can be drawn from the decision in Chester v Afshar,
88
 which concerned 
the nondisclosure of an inherent risk in spinal surgery.
89
  The problem facing the claimant 
was that for causation to be made out she had to prove that but for the negligence – the 
failure to disclose the risk – she would not have undergone the operation and, thus, not 
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have been harmed.  But she could not prove this, instead she could only prove she would 
not have had the operation on that day.  All five of their Lordships agreed that the claim 
failed on a strict application of the law, but the majority were unable to accept this and 
argued the patient’s right to self-determination required a remedy, relying on legal policy 
and justice to find for the claimant.   
Chester illustrates of ‘the House of Lords’ willingness – albeit, in this case, by a 
majority only – to bend the rules of causation in the name of justice.’90 The decision is 
distinct from McGhee and Fairchild because the risk to which the claimant was exposed 
was inherent in the operation and not a consequence of the negligence.  The nondisclosure 
therefore had no impact upon the probability of the risk eventuating and could not be 
characterised as materially increasing a risk of harm.  Thus Chester goes beyond the 
relaxation of orthodox causation in Fairchild and demonstrates that – where policy and 
justice dictate – the courts are willing to adopt a more holistic approach to causation, 
relaxing the orthodox principles where a merit worthy claimant faces considerable 
difficulties in overcoming the causation hurdle.  The facts of Chester are not strictly 
analogous to circumstance involving genetic nondisclosure but there are some similarities.  
Most significant is that in neither scenario are the eventuating risks a product of negligence 
– the negligence is, instead, the failure to disclose the presence of such risks to the 
claimant.  The negligence in Chester, however, did not impact upon the probability of the 
risk eventuating, whereas in cases of genetic nondisclosure the failure to disclose an 
identified, deleterious trait materially increases the risk of the condition manifesting 
because access to treatment is denied. 
The important aspect of Chester, however, is its illustration of the courts 
willingness to relax orthodox causation to protect claimants’ legally recognised interests 
and give content to a corresponding duty.  In Chester the claimant had been injured 
because of an infringement of her interests in self-determination.  Her doctor owed a duty 
of disclosure, the purpose of which was ‘to enable adult patients of sound mind to make for 
themselves decisions intimately affecting their own lives and bodies’.91   In failing to 
discharge this duty and respect the claimant’s interests, the doctor harmed the claimant, but 
application of orthodox causation would have disclosed no remedy.  By modifying 
causation, the House of Lords enabled negligence to vindicate the claimant’s interests and 
provide content to the duty.  Therefore despite rhetoric advocating coherence in the 
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common law
92
 and wariness in respect of special rules in personal injury
93
 the courts are 
not averse to making policy-driven decisions in ‘direct response to the considerable 
difficulties that claimants can face when attempting to clear the causation hurdle.’94 
Thus the difficulties facing claimants in cases of genetic nondisclosure may be 
viewed as sufficient justification for relaxing orthodox causation and adopting a material 
increase approach. 
 
Reconciling Genetic Nondisclosure with Material Increase 
The difficulties establishing causation in cases of genetic nondisclosure reemphasises that 
causation ‘is not a strict technical matter which can be “solved” by the application of a 
quasi-mathematical formulae.’95  In fact, attempts to do so may create injustice and the 
judiciary has displayed a willingness in cases such as Fairchild, Bailey and Chester to 
avoid such outcomes.  The crux of the argument here is that by failing to disclosure genetic 
risks to the proband’s blood relations a doctor materially increases the risk of a genetic 
condition eventuating.  This is because nondisclosure denies access to preventative or 
preemptive therapies.  Although genetic conditions are also a consequence of a deleterious 
trait in the claimant’s genome, the existence of a non-tortious agent does not preclude 
proof of causation.  In Bonnington there existed two sources of the noxious agent, only one 
of which was negligent, but the contribution of the negligent source was deemed sufficient 
enough to have materially contributed to the harmful outcome.  Of course an attempt can 
be made to distinguish Bonnington from claims arising from genetic nondisclosure on the 
basis it concerned a cumulative condition.  The increase in exposure thus contributed to the 
probability of the adverse outcome eventuating, whereas failure to disclose a deleterious 
genetic trait is a failure to reduce the risk of a disease manifesting. 
However, in McGhee the claimant’s exposure to brick dust (which was the likely 
source of his dermatitis) was not contested as negligent and the material increase was 
articulated as a failure to provide after work washing facilities.  This can be interpreted as 
increasing the risk because it increased the claimant’s exposure to the brick dust (as he 
then had to cycle home covered in the dust), which is arguably consistent with the decision 
in Bonnington.  However, the defendant’s wrongdoing may also be interpreted as, 
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essentially, a failure to reduce the risk to the claimant.  In other words, the defendants, by 
not taking steps that would have increased the claimant’s prospects of avoiding dermatitis, 
materially increased the risk of the condition eventuating.  Likewise, in Bailey, the 
negligent care can be described as failing to improve the claimant’s post-operative 
condition.  The care they received materially contributed to the claimant’s weakened state, 
placing them at risk of further harm, which ultimately occurred because the claimant’s 
weakness meant they were unable to react to their own vomit.  The defendant in Bailey can 
also be described as failing to act to decrease the risk to the patient, although, notably, the 
case concerned a contribution to their general condition and not a specific disorder. 
The causal link flowing from a material contribution does not, therefore, require a 
direct means of increasing risk, typified by the increased exposures in Bonnington and 
Fairchild.  Causation can also be made out where the contribution is indirect, such as the 
failure to provide after work washing facilities in McGhee, which essentially amounted to 
a failure to decrease the risk posed by the claimant’s non-negligent exposure to brick dust.  
In the context of nondisclosure, the deleterious gene is a non-tortious source of harm – 
akin to the brick dust – but the clinician’s failure to disclose genetic information relevant to 
the condition increases the risk of the disorder eventuating because it denies the claimant 
access to medical treatment.  For example, if the proband is identified as genetically 
predisposed to breast cancer and their relatives are not informed of the potentially shared 
risk, then family members are not able to seek either chemoprevention or surgical 
intervention.  Should the claimant develop the disease then the nondisclosure has arguably 
made a material contribution to the outcome, in that the claimant was denied an 
opportunity to decrease the risk to their health.  There is no fundamental difference 
between this scenario and one where the clinician fails to correctly diagnose a patient’s 
cancer.  In both circumstances the defendant does not cause the cancer but materially 
contributes to the development of the condition through their negligence.
96
  Though one 
may suggest that the existence of the doctor-patient relationship alters the dynamic of the 
latter scenario, if a duty to disclose has been recognised by the courts then there should be 
no material distinction between the two sets of circumstances.  The defendant’s negligence 
has materially increased the risk in both. 
Thus a material contribution approach to causation in claims of nondisclosure 
would appear consistent with existing case law on a factual basis.  Although the majority 
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of cases where a material increase analysis is applied are employment claims, Bailey 
demonstrates that clinical negligence is not immune to relaxation of orthodox causation.  
The decision in Wilsher, which eschewed a material increase approach, can be 
distinguished on the basis it concerns multiple casual agents, whilst genetic nondisclosure 
cases only concern the one: the deleterious genetic trait.  A further hurdle exists, however, 
in that orthodox causation is only modified when a compelling policy reason exists.  In 
cases concerning exposures at work, such as Fairchild, the relevant issue is the evidential 
gap resulting from scientific uncertainty on the aetiology of mesothelioma.  It is not always 
necessary for there to be an evidential gap for the courts to relax orthodox causation, a fact 
demonstrated by Chester where it was not evidential difficulties that prevented the 
claimant satisfying the but for test but the fact she may still have proceeded with the 
operation at a later date.  Thus she could not prove that but for the negligence she would 
not have been harmed because she would still have run the risk of spinal injury at some 
unspecified future point. 
In both Fairchild and Chester the courts resolved the difficulties facing the 
claimants by relaxing orthodox causation on policy grounds.  These grounds were 
discussed earlier in this chapter; the question for present purposes is what policy issue may 
justify relaxing orthodox causation in the context of nondisclosure of genetic risks.  Two 
potential appeals to policy can be made in this respect.  The first is that disclosure of 
genetic risks is in the public interest and, therefore, by providing a remedy for claimant’s 
injured by nondisclosure the courts would be furthering those interests.  If one interest is 
the right to life then relaxing the orthodox rules of causation could be argued as the court 
acting consistently with s6 Human Rights Act 1998, which places a duty on the court to act 
compatibly with ECHR rights.  Provision of a remedy for an infringement of a claimant’s 
Art 2 right could thus be presented as justifying departure from the but for test in the 
genetic context, although whether this is a likely route is certainly debatable. 
A second appeal to policy could be made on the basis that if harm is recognised, the 
law must provide a remedy, for otherwise a duty could be emptied of content.  In Chester, 
the eventuation of the undisclosed risk was the gist of the action and the majority 
recognised that adhering to orthodox causation denied a remedy to the claimant, which in 
turn stripped the doctor’s duty to warn of content.  Thus a relaxation of the orthodox rules 
was justified.
97
  In Fairchild, recognition of mesothelioma as harm and the employer’s 
duty of care would have been rendered inert by the difficulties posed by orthodox 
causation.  An outcome that allowed the defendants to avoid censure for substandard 
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practices on a technicality was inconsistent with justice and fairness,
 98
 thus causation was 
modified to enable proof of a causal link by material increase. 
Both of these examples illustrate circumstances when a refusal to modify causation 
would have led to a situation where negligence recognised harm but did not provide a 
remedy.  This was a position the House of Lords found to be unacceptable in both cases 
(albeit the majority only in Chester) because justice required the claimants’ interest to be 
vindicated and the corresponding duty enforced.  The eventuation of an undisclosed 
genetic risk has been argued as a harm grounded in an interference with the interest in 
bodily integrity.  If this interpretation is recognised by the courts, then to vindicate the 
claimant’s interest and give the correlative duty content, justice must require an available 
remedy.  Recognising that a genetic condition eventuating is harm, and nondisclosure of 
the risk constitutes negligence, is moot if a claimant cannot prove a casual link.  The 
problem facing claimants is that orthodox causation requires the clinician’s negligence to 
be the cause of harm, not one of the causes of harm.  If a claimant must prove on a balance 
of probabilities that negligence caused the genetic condition, the availability of a remedy 
will depend on a statistical lottery.  Since medicine is an inexact science, imposing 
certainty is arguably disingenuous, as there often is none.
99
  Moreover, if a particular 
behaviour and outcome is recognised as harmful, it follows that the law must provide a 
remedy if a duty is to have content.  If harm is recognised but causation cannot be made 
out – because ‘but for’ the claimant’s deleterious gene they would not have been injured – 
a duty to disclose would possess no content.  Defendants would owe a duty to the 
proband’s blood relations but in the vast majority of cases it would be unenforceable 
because the claimant could not evidence a causal link.  In this event, the duty is rendered 
hollow; harm may be inflicted, a breach of duty may occur, but since the claimant cannot 
satisfy the balance of probabilities the defendant would avoid censure for substandard 
practice.  This is arguably one of the reasons the courts modified causation in Fairchild, 
Bonnington and McGhee; in these cases, a finding of no liability would have rendered the 
employer’s duty to their employees hollow because the obligation attracted no legal 
consequences.  A duty would have been owed to provide a safe place of work but no 
liability would have accrued following a failure to uphold the appropriate standard of care.  
Thus the duty and the requisite standard of care would have been unenforceable because 
the defendant faced no consequences – put differently, the duty would fail in this context 
because the claimant was not provided a remedy. 
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  For a duty to disclose to possess sufficient content to be enforceable, a breach of 
duty must attract tangible consequences.  When harm and nondisclosure occur it must not 
be impossible in the vast majority of cases for the claimant to prove causation, otherwise 
the duty will be rendered hollow.  A sufficient prospect of liability must attach to the 
obligation or recognition of harm and negligent act become an empty gesture.  Claimants 
will find it very difficult to satisfy orthodox causation because deleterious genetic traits, 
and not nondisclosure, can be portrayed as causing the harm.  If harm could have been 
avoided or minimised by a timely disclosure, justice must require a remedy to vindicate the 
claimant’s interests and provide content to the duty to disclose.  Thus, it is argued as 
justifiable to relax orthodox principles of causation and allow claimants to prove 
nondisclosure materially increases the risk of harm. 
 
Conclusions on Causation 
This chapter has explored the potential difficulties in proving causation should a duty to 
disclose be accepted by the courts.  It has been established that the ‘but for’ test would 
disadvantage claimants because it focuses on the primary cause of injury.  Therefore, in the 
context of genetic risks, it could be fairly argued that harm would not have occurred but for 
the claimant’s deleterious genetic trait.  The problem is typified by the decision in Barnett 
v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital, which concluded that since the claimant would have 
died from arsenic poisoning in any event, the doctor’s negligence was not a causal agent of 
the harm.  If such an approach were applied to claims concerning a duty to disclose then 
there is a real risk that it would empty the duty of content because it would be virtually 
impossible to establish a causal link between the harm and the negligent act. 
Causation may alternatively be approached as a loss of a chance and it is for the 
claimant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant more likely than not 
caused the harm.  This has led to a dichotomy between individuals whose initial chances of 
avoiding injury are above and below the point of balance.  Thus, those whose original 
chances of avoiding harm were greater than 50 per cent are able to recover in full, but 
those whose chances were below 50 per cent are unable to establish a causal link between 
the defendant’s negligence and their injury.  The courts are particularly reluctant to allow 
claims for a loss of a chance because this may lead to claims that would otherwise fail 
being re-categorised and succeeding, which may unduly favour claimants and overly 
burden defendants.  Thus in the context of genetics, the balance of probabilities would 
require proof of a greater than 50 per cent chance of avoiding a genetic condition of being 
successfully treated, restricting application of a duty to disclose to those scenarios where 
potential outcomes can be adduced with sufficient certainty.  But medicine is an inexact 
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science and applying orthodox causation would allow substandard practice to avoid 
censure because of a technicality. 
If the loss of a chance is characterised as avoiding a genetic condition a problem 
arises in that few genetic conditions can, at present, actually be avoided.  Thus it has been 
suggested, in the alternative, that causation could be assessed as a lost chance of successful 
treatment, which could potentially create a platform for reconsidering loss of a chance 
arguments as the availability of treatment acts as a threshold question.  It is unlikely, 
however, that the courts would be receptive and thus the courts would likely consider the 
potential benefits of treatment and whether, in percentage terms, available therapies would 
have altered the claimant’s prognosis.  Again, this would restrict application of the duty to 
circumstances where there is certainty of a cure.  In reality – for example, in the case of 
individuals at risk of cancer – treatment rarely offers a guarantee of cure but early 
diagnosis and preemptive treatment improves an individual’s prognosis and may present 
opportunities to minimise the condition that late diagnosis would not. 
Finally, this chapter explored causation as a material contribution or increase to a 
risk of injury.  It has been argued that relaxing orthodox causation may be appropriate and 
that the evidential difficulties facing claimants in cases of genetic nondisclosure may be 
viewed as sufficient justification for relaxing orthodox causation and expanding the rule in 
McGhee and Fairchild.  Orthodox principles of causation require proof of a greater than 50 
per cent chance of avoiding the disease or being successfully treated prior to the 
negligence.  However, the doctor does not cause the claimant’s disease per se but increases 
the risk of it eventuating, since the failure to disclose denies access to preemptive 
treatment. 
It has been argued that cases such as McGhee, Fairchild, Bailey and Chester 
illustrate that the courts are willing to make policy-driven decisions in response to ‘the 
considerable difficulties that claimants can face when attempting to clear the causation 
hurdle.’100  Chester, in particular, illustrates that the courts are willing to adopt a more 
holistic view of liability and modify the rules of causation in the interests of justice, 
particularly where orthodox principles would empty a duty of content. 
In the genetic context, a material increase can be characterised as either direct 
following Bonnington (wherein negligently maintained ventilation increased the claimant’s 
exposure to the noxious agent) or indirect as per McGhee (where a failure to provide 
showers was held to materially increase the risk of the claimant developing dermatitis).  
Furthermore, the rule in McGhee and Fairchild has been applied to medical negligence in 
Bailey v Ministry of Defence, thus it appears open to claimants to establish causation on the 
                                                        
100
 Mason, Laurie, above, n 8, p. 171. 
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basis the defendant’s negligence has materially increased the risk of harm.  In Bailey this 
material increase amounted to the weakening of the claimant’s physical condition through 
poor care, meaning they were later unable to react to their vomit and asphyxiated.  It may 
thus be possible to establish causation in claims of nondisclosure by demonstrating 
negligence materially increases the risk of a condition eventuating because nondisclosure 
denies access to preventative treatment.   
Adopting this approach is argued as significant if a duty to disclose is to have 
meaning, since an application of the orthodox ‘but for’ approach would invite a finding 
that ‘but for the claimant’s genes they would not have become ill’ unless a difficult 
statistical threshold could be met.  This would strip a duty to blood relations of meaningful 
content.  Applying the rule in McGhee and Fairchild may therefore be is justified if a duty 
to disclose is to be more than an empty gesture. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Genetic information is simultaneously personal and familial.  The results of a patient’s 
genetic screening are indicative of the genetic heritage of both that individual and their 
blood relations.  For this reason, healthcare practitioners will find themselves in possession 
of information that is relevant to the health of individuals beyond the traditional doctor-
patient relationship.  Where the identified conditions or susceptibilities are treatable, there 
is a benefit in disclosing the proband’s genetic information to their relatives.  An important 
question is how the law will react to the familial properties of genetic risks.  The judiciary 
could restrict disclosure and uphold doctor-patient confidentiality and data protection or 
recognise disclosure as a method of preventing harm in appropriate circumstances. 
The core argument of this thesis has been that disclosure should be obligated where 
treatments are available for genetic conditions.  One example is where a risk of breast 
cancer is identified in the proband’s genome.  As early intervention is beneficial to 
individuals at risk of this condition, disclosure of a genetic risk would facilitate timely 
access to screening and therapies or surgical interventions, such as chemoprevention or a 
double mastectomy.  Facilitating access to preventative therapies or early diagnosis and 
treatment is (self-evidently) beneficial to the long-term health of family members; where 
no treatment exists, the risk of psychiatric harm arguably prohibits disclosure.  Disclosure 
of genetic information may also benefit the economic position of healthcare providers, who 
may be able to offer cheaper, preventive therapies and facilitate a reduction in the number 
of patients undergoing costly, invasive treatments.  An illustration of the possibilities is 
provided by tamoxifen, a drug that can reduce the risk of breast cancer, which costs 
approximately £130 for a five-year course for a single patient; treatment for a patient 
suffering breast cancer will cost around £60,000 for the equivalent period. 
This thesis argues an appropriate means of achieving disclosure is through creating 
a tortious duty.  It is argued the requirements of liability in negligence – duty, breach and 
causation – can be made out where a doctor fails to disclose genetic risks to the proband’s 
blood relations.  In respect of duty, the three elements of the Caparo test – foreseeable 
harm, proximity and fair, just and reasonable – can be satisfied.  Foreseeable harm has 
been presented as the eventuation of the undisclosed genetic risk; drawing upon UK and 
US case law it is argued that defendants do not have to be the source of the claimant’s 
injury for actionable harm to exist.  This is evident in claims concerning nondisclosure of 
risk such as Chester v Afshar, Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California and Safer 
v Estate of Pack, wherein adverse outcomes the defendants were not the source of formed 
the gist of the actions.  In these cases, none of the defendants created the risks facing the 
claimants – they, instead, arose from a non-negligent operation, an ex-boyfriend and a 
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genetic trait respectively – but because a disclose was not made, the defendants were liable 
for the adverse outcomes, as these might otherwise have been avoided or minimised had a 
timely disclosure been made.  Though clinicians are not the source of a genetic condition – 
this is claimant’s biological heritage – harm occurs when an undisclosed, treatable risk 
eventuates.  It is argued the failure to disclose infringes the claimant’s interest in bodily 
integrity, thus the harm is the physical burden nondisclosure could have prevented or 
minimised.  As an illustration, if the proband is identified as genetically predisposed to 
breast cancer, the options available include chemoprevention or a double mastectomy.  If 
this diagnosis is disclosed to their blood relations the same options become available to 
those individuals; if that risk is withheld, and the claimant develops cancer, harm is 
inflicted because disclosure would have facilitated access to these therapies, which could 
have prevented or reduced the risk of the condition occurring. 
The question of proximity is also surmountable.  Traditional approaches to 
proximity are based on physical closeness or the existence of an antecedent relationship, 
but these are inapplicable in this context because blood relations are third parties.  
However, a relationship of sufficient neighbourhood can be established if it is 
demonstrable that the claimant is an identifiable victim of the defendant’s negligence.  
This approach to proximity was most famously applied in the American case of Tarasoff v 
The Regents of the University of California and has also been applied genetically 
transmissible diseases in Safer v Estate of Pack.  Domestically, support for an identifiable 
victim approach can be drawn from Palmer v Tees Health Authority, W & Others v Essex 
County Council and Selwood v Durham County Council.  Who is an identifiable victim in 
the genetic context is deduced by reference to straightforward degrees of consanguinity, 
which dictate who is at the highest risk of ‘sharing’ a deleterious genetic trait identified in 
the proband’s genome.  It is thus possible to deduce the identity of the potential ‘victims’ 
of deleterious genetic traits and take the most suitable precaution – namely to disclose the 
presence of the genetic risk – which, in turn, provide access to diagnostic screening and 
treatment. 
Potential policy issues that may militate for or against a duty to disclose have also 
been explored,
1
 including doctor-patient confidentiality and the risk of psychiatric injury, 
but it is argued here that none prohibit a duty existing.  Instead, these policy issues can be 
overcome if a duty to disclose is developed with fair and sensible boundaries.  Thus the 
duty to blood relations must not be developed in a manner which undermines doctor-
patient confidentiality, but in a way that restricts the proband’s interest only to the extent 
                                                        
1
 For a full discussion of the various policy issues, see chapter three. 
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necessary to facilitate disclosure of treatable genetic risks.  If disclosure is consistent with 
a public interest and thus represents a justifiable infringement upon confidentiality and 
data protection, the duty to disclose would be consistent with the legal paradigm governing 
the processing of medico-personal data.
2
  The objection that disclosure may actually inflict 
psychiatric harm can be rebutted on the basis that disclosure would only be obligated when 
treatments are available for the identified genetic condition.  In these circumstances the 
risk of psychiatric harm occurring would be countervailed by the possibilities of treatment.  
It is acknowledged that in circumstances where no therapies are available, such as in cases 
of Huntington’s disease, the risk of disclosure causing harm is prohibitive, and it is argued 
that the availability of treatment is critical limitation on the scope of a duty to disclose.  
Thus a duty would not arise in circumstances where no treatment exists for the genetic 
condition; in this context, the possibility of disclosure inflicting harm would not be 
outweighed by therapeutic interventions, therefore the benefits of making disclosure to 
facilitate preparedness are not considered to be compelling. 
This thesis also considers the questions of breach and causation and how these may 
apply in claims arising from the nondisclosure of a patient’s identified genetic risks.  In 
respect of breach, it is argued that applying Bolam may pose difficulties because of the 
courts’ reluctance to choose between divergent bodies of medical opinion.  It is therefore 
possible for nondisclosure to be non-negligent conduct if it is conduct consistent with the 
views of a responsible body of medical opinion.  These difficulties may be overcome if the 
judiciary is willing to engage the qualification from Bolitho and examine whether an 
opinion supporting nondisclosure withstands ‘logical analysis’.  It is argued here that it is 
appropriate to scrutinise the risks and benefits inherent in a decision to, or to not, disclose 
and whether these are properly weighed in the circumstances.  It is also suggested that 
while the judiciary appear reluctant to apply Bolitho in circumstances involving complex 
and technical medical issues, there may be an increased willingness to find a body of 
medical opinion does not withstand logical analysis if the matter is accessible to a lay 
person.  Thus the courts may be more willing to reject a body of opinion as illogical in 
claims concerning nondisclosure because the decision whether or not to warn is, arguably, 
not technically complex.  In the alternative, it is proposed that breach could be assessed by 
means not dissimilar to those applied in cases concerning doctor-patient disclosure.  The 
question of breach in these cases is couched in terms of whether a risk was sufficiently 
serious that the reasonable person would want to have known about it in the circumstances.  
What constitutes a sufficiently serious risk is unclear and seriousness may be assessed 
                                                        
2
 See chapter two for a full discussion of public interest justifications, confidentiality and data 
protection. 
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either through the statistical likelihood of an outcome eventuating, the severity of the 
potential outcome, or a combination of the two.  Some genetic risks are thus likely to fall 
within the scope of such a test but whether such an approach would be consistent is 
uncertain.  Assistance might be drawn from the recommendations of the American College 
of Medical Genetics and Genomics on the reporting of incidental findings during genetic 
screening, as these the recommendations focus on disclosing treatable risks.  There is, 
however, a residual question regarding whether doctor-patient disclosure cases have 
actually moved away from applying Bolam, thus arguments drawn from this vein of case 
law must be considered cautiously in light of the forthcoming Supreme Court decision in 
Montgomery v Larankshire Health Board.  If the Supreme Court affirms the trajectory the 
case law appeared to be taking, then failing to disclose a treatable genetic risk may lead to 
a breach of duty.  If the Supreme Court restates Sidaway as the leading authority on 
disclosure, genetic nondisclosure may instead fall within Bolam-Bolitho. 
In respect of causation, it is argued that the ‘but for’ test is incompatible with 
claims concerning nondisclosure of genetic risks.  This is because, should a duty be 
upheld, a ‘but for’ analysis may legitimately find that harm would not have occurred to the 
claimant ‘but for’ their deleterious genetic heritage.  This would mean liability would be 
impossible to make out and it would leave any duty to disclose empty of content.  Since 
nondisclosure involves two potential causal agents – the nondisclosure and the genetic risk 
– it is likely the courts will adopt a loss of a chance analysis of causation drawing upon 
Hotson and Gregg v Scott.  Loss of a chance is problematic because the original chance 
must have been, on a balance of probabilities, more likely than not to occur prior to the 
defendant’s negligence.  In statistical terms, a claimant must have had a greater than 50 per 
cent chance of avoiding an adverse outcome; if the original chance is below the point of 
balance, it is considered certain that the adverse outcome would have eventuated in any 
event, despite the defendant’s negligence.  Therefore a loss of a chance analysis will 
require the initial probability of a claimant avoiding a genetic condition to be greater than 
50 per cent, but, as has been noted, few genetic conditions can de facto be avoided.  An 
alternative analysis would be to restrict the statistical enquiry to whether or not the 
nondisclosure has resulted in the claimant losing a chance of treatment.  A preference is 
expressed for a black or white analysis, but it is likely the courts will not separate loss of a 
chance and statistical probabilities, thus focusing on treatment would lead to an analysis of 
the chances of therapeutic success.  This is more favourable than focusing on avoiding the 
condition but is still restrictive in that it requires a greater than 50 per cent chance of 
successful treatment.  Since medicine is an inexact science, adducing success with 
certainty is difficult and thus any loss of a chance approach should be viewed with caution, 
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for it may overly restrict application of a duty to disclose.  The approach to causation 
preferred in this thesis is an assessment based upon a material contribution to risk, drawing 
upon the decisions in Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw, McGhee v National Coal Board, 
Fairchild v Glenhaven and Bailey v Ministry of Defence.  The question here is whether or 
not nondisclosure contributes to, or increases, the risk of a genetic condition eventuating, 
in a way that is more than negligible.  It is acknowledged there are problems with adopting 
this approach but it is argued that these can be overcome by an appeal to policy.  If a 
material increase approach is adopted, causation will be established if nondisclosure denies 
the claimant access to preventative therapies or early diagnosis and treatment, thereby 
increasing the probability of the genetic condition manifesting.  Thus returning to the 
example of the familial risk of breast cancer, a failure to disclose materially increases the 
risk of the condition eventuating, because the cancer could have been avoided or 
minimised by chemoprevention or surgery. 
Genetic screening offers an opportunity to tackle diseases through preventative 
therapies or early diagnosis and treatment.  For this reason it is important to recognise 
genetic information is familial in nature and, thus, relevant to persons other than the 
proband.  In order to recognise that relatives’ are harmed by nondisclosure of genetic risks, 
it is necessary for the law balance the familial benefits of disclosure with the proband’s 
interest in doctor-patient confidentiality.  The current paradigm of confidentiality and data 
protection is ill equipped to recognise the familial aspects of genetic screening and a 
change in the law is necessary if the interests and long-term health of the family are not to 
be overlooked.  This thesis argues that an appropriate means of achieving protection for the 
proband’s blood relations is through recognition of a duty to disclose genetic risks.  The 
tort of negligence has previously been a route through which novel claims concerning 
nonphysical injury have achieved recognition
3
 and it is argued here that negligence may 
again be the appropriate means by which to litigate claims arising from the nondisclosure 
of a patient’s deleterious genetic traits. 
  
                                                        
3
 For example, psychiatric injury. 
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